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**THE NECESSITY FOR THE COMPILATION  
OF A NAVAL STAFF HISTORY.**

By CAPTAIN ALFRED DEWAR, O.B.E., R.N. (Retired), B. Litt. (Oxon).

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On Wednesday, 16th March, 1921, at 5.30 p.m.

ADMIRAL SIR F. C. DOVETON STURDEE, Bart., G.C.B., K.C.M.G.,  
C.V.O., LL.D., in the Chair.

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THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, Captain Alfred Dewar has kindly consented to come and give a lecture here on "The Necessity for the Compilation of a Naval Staff History." He requires no introduction from me because he is a Gold Medallist of the Institution and he is well known for his historical work. With your permission, I will now ask him to commence the lecture.

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**LECTURE.**

ADMIRAL VESEY HAMILTON has a very illuminative remark in the preface to his work on Naval Administration. He said: "For myself I have learnt more of the interior workings of the Admiralty in the compilation of this volume than I did in five years at the Admiralty where the work in one's own department is more than sufficient for the day." This gives a very clear conception of the value of history and of its direct relationship to business. Unfortunately our

introduction to the subject usually consists of the dry bones of something that happened a hundred years ago, whereas what we want and what is of real and superlative use to us is a history of events in the last ten or twenty years.

It is a great mistake to think that history is concerned with the far-off past; it is just as directly concerned with the immediate past and with the affairs of last month. These may appear to be the concern of current business, but business must be measured in terms of relativity and not merely of time. Some crucial point of to-day's business may depend on the wording of a contract or of a will drawn up many years ago and never looked at since. The real difference between current business and history is that the man dealing with current business is dealing with emergencies as they arise. The daily tide of paper covers his desk in the morning and ebbs away at night, leaving him no time for thought or necessary research. As Kempenfeldt, writing to Middleton in 1779, said: "We are every day plagued and puzzled with minutiae whilst essentials are totally neglected."

Where then does the function of history come in? Its function is to stand aside from current business and give a clear exposition of events. This may seem quite a simple matter, but it is not so simple as it looks. It may appear to be merely a question of sending for former papers and examining them for ourselves. But, first of all, if there is no history one doesn't know what the papers are. You may know those of last week and last month and the Secretary's Records may produce them for a year or two back, but that is a different thing from knowing them and having a clear and comprehensive grasp of all the ins and outs of a subject for thirty or a hundred years back. Take the subject of Naval Education, for instance. You know there was a considerable controversy about it some fifteen years ago. Now its cardinal problem is to adjust naval training to the demands of a growing number of technical sciences. That problem began in 1860, and the fact that no one has ever been encouraged to write a history of Naval Education gives a curious insight into the naval mind. Numerous committees have sat on it—the Shadwell in 1870, the Rice in 1885, the Tracey in 1901, the Douglas in 1905, the Custance in 1912, the Goodenough Fleet Committee and Lord Jellicoe in 1918, and they all deal to a large extent with the same problems, but they have never been digested and reduced to the form of a history.

There is another reason why history is of special importance to the Navy. The Navy is a business which is only occasionally actually engaged in the performance of its business, and its business is of such a nature that the people doing it often do not know what they are doing in its relationship to the whole. This they can only learn from history.

But it is not only after the war but equally during the war that historical method is a great asset. One of the greatest difficulties one has to face in the work of a great staff is the difficulty of obtaining in a brief and handy form what has been said, done, or decided on some important point, such as the possibilities of invasion, or an expedition to the coast of Syria, or the mining of Heligoland Bight.



The papers are here, there or somewhere, but without something in the form of an historical summary it is difficult for anyone new to a big office to get hold of the right ones.

During the War there was no effort made to compile a clear brief history of German submarine warfare, with the result that all sorts of fallacious ideas passed into current thought. For instance, at Dover it was thought that the Belgian coast barrage had a great effect on German submarines, but no one really conversant with the history of the subject ever thought so. At the very time, in the summer of 1916, when the Vice-Admiral at Dover was congratulating himself on the absence of mines in that area, Flanders submarines were still active on the East Coast.<sup>1</sup>

Now it may be argued that this is not history but really the dissemination of intelligence, but history is merely a form of publicity and communication, and so far as the collection of material is concerned is not unlike intelligence work.

During the War one often felt very acutely the want of a provisional history of what had been done during the early years of the War. A very striking instance of this is to be found in the recently published Jutland papers.<sup>2</sup> Admiral Jellicoe, in an important letter dated 30th October, 1914, asked for the Harwich destroyers to be sent to him when an action was imminent and his letter received the general approval of Their Lordships. But when the action was imminent we know that the Harwich destroyers were not sent, and it is probable that the letter and its history had been forgotten.

As an instance of the advantages of a provisional history may be cited the case of a short report on German Submarine Tracks which was prepared in 1917, and which indicated that for nearly a month they had been going up the same track in the North Sea about twenty-five miles wide. Plans Division immediately prepared an operation on this track involving the use of two flotillas of the Grand Fleet, half a flotilla of submarines and a minefield, which led to the destruction of three submarines between 2nd and 8th October (U 106, U 66, and U 50). But the Grand Fleet was never told the history of this. The information was regarded as too secret for general dissemination. Their destroyers had experienced very heavy weather; they had seen nothing and the Grand Fleet was opposed to further operations of the same sort, though they might have been repeated on at least one occasion.

In any case this is an instance of the value of publicity and inter-communication which is the real working principle of history. All sorts of work was being done in all quarters of the globe, great divisions had sprung up almost in a night, the capacities and limitations of the mine and submarine had to be gauged, and the general

<sup>1</sup> The cessation of German submarine activity in the summer of 1916 was due to an order issued by Admiral Scheer, C.-in-C. of the High Sea Fleet, on 24th April to cease operations against commerce. Flanders followed suit, and with the exception of an occasional mine-laying trip on the East coast and one or two trips to the Channel, submarine activity ceased till September, 1916.

<sup>2</sup> "Battle of Jutland," Cd. 1068, 1920, page 601.

ignorance that prevailed about one another's work was a serious hindrance to the prosecution of the War. Up to the end of the War many naval officers remained ignorant of the real machinery of the blockade. All sorts of points cropped up where history was required, such as the history of what had been done to stop the Lulea iron ore trade and to mine the Bight, and it often took a long time to get a sufficiency of information about a subject because no history of the matter had been kept. Again, when the question of convoy was being considered, distinguished officers who opposed it had failed to grasp the fact that it had already been performed successfully in the Indian Ocean in bringing home the Dominion troops, and the history of the early convoys supplied sufficient answer to many of the objections urged against it.

The best systems of registry and indexing cannot take the place of a history, for history does not merely index, but digests papers and reduces them to a manageable form. This is the business of history, and it is also the secret of successful business. Those sections and divisions which had the history of their work and its figures at their fingers' ends were able to make rapid decisions for any sudden emergency. There is no time in such circumstances to digest a mountain of papers. Therefore, behind the worker in current affairs there should stand the historian, for history and historical research is really an effort to throw light on the real state of affairs. It is an endeavour to find the truth, and how difficult it is to find the truth, especially for men in great place, is too well known to require mention. But though history is important and the Navy is important, it is a fact that the two in combination are considered by many officers of the Navy as of very little importance.

Before dealing with the compilation of a Staff History, it is desirable to say a few words on the principles of historical method<sup>1</sup> and the organization of historical work.

For the principal aspects of historical work Bernheim's headings may be accepted. They are briefly—

- (a) Heuristics or the finding of the sources.
- (b) Criticism or the criticism of sources and corroboration of their statements.
- (c) Interpretation or establishment of their casual connections,
- (d) Arrangement and expression.

These headings may appear to a general audience somewhat academic but they are very sound.

History is the record of men's doings and at first is only to be found in documents. We are so accustomed to taking books down from shelves that we forget that at first there are no books. There are only vast piles of papers and one does not even know what they are. It is like searching for the hidden word of Masonry. I have been told that the Freemason is supposed to go to Jerusalem for the purpose.

<sup>1</sup> For historical method see "Historische Methode," by Ernst Bernheim, and the shorter work of Langlois and Seignobos. For principles of archival work see "Manuel pour le classement des Archives," Dr. S. Muller, Feith and Fruin, 1910.

But if he merely wishes to learn its difficulty he need not leave Whitehall. The preliminary work of history is to get the documents. To know if there are any, what they are, and where they are, this is called by Bernheim "Heuristics." If you have ever tried it, you will feel sure that it deserves to be called something.

What Bernheim calls Heuristics, or the discovery of sources, is closely associated with archival work—that is the custody and cataloguing of sources. Till the sources are discovered and properly arranged it is extremely difficult to make any real progress. But to arrange them postulates a general knowledge of the War, and therefore a sort of preliminary survey of the War is required in order to gain a correct perspective. One of the principles of archival work is that any particular collection such as the papers of a particular department or section should remain as a complete whole, and this has not always been carried out. Now the Admiralty has a department—the Secretary's Record Office—to deal with papers, and its general system is sound. The headings with which it worked are to be found in a digest table which goes back to about 1782 (the copy I have seen has Barrow's name on it), and this is really a List of Subject Headings. This was kept annually, and a Compendium of Digests, covering a longer period of about thirty years, kept a record of the more important subjects. Unfortunately the Digest Table and its system gradually came to reflect the general trend of naval thought. It was used chiefly for looking up questions of personnel and not for general historical study, so that the War found it lacking in a number of headings required in modern war. Generally speaking, it had come to deal rather with what would be termed in modern staff parlance "administrative" work. At the same time the general arrangement in commands is sound and is very old and the whole system only required space and general adaptation to modern needs. One very grave defect was that Confidential and Operational papers were not given to it, but were kept in safes. I shall forbear to say anything about safes. I believe they are useful as a safeguard against burglars, but for archival and historical purposes their utility is less evident.

I shall say no more of Heuristics. It is an important branch of historical work and gives rise to all the mixed feelings of a quest. You may be talking about some subject with someone and he may say "I believe I have a paper about that," and will then produce, perhaps from a safe, the very paper or bundle of papers which constitute the key to the subject. You will gaze at him, and you will understand how Balaam felt when he was uncertain whether to bless or curse.

Now when the War had started no one thought of history.<sup>1</sup> No one thought the history of what happened in 1914 would be of any value in 1916. There was no thought of a provisional history of the War year by year or of a Staff History. History was a mere Cinderella whom

<sup>1</sup> Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee corrected this statement and pointed out that Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Edmund Slade were asked to undertake this work as soon as the War commenced, but the fact remains that in 1917 there was no provisional history of what had happened in 1916. Such a history could only have been compiled by the sections concerned.

Sir Julian Corbett fortunately offered to adopt, and she went over to the C.I.D. She is still there, and she was so badly treated in her real home that she may not be very willing to come back. There she took the form of what used to be termed the Interim History, which was intended to be a history for popular consumption to be ready by the end of the War. It was quickly found, however, that before you use records stowage must be found for them and they have to be bound and put in boxes, and this led to the institution of what is really an Archival Section which, though attached to the C.I.D., is really an extension and annexe of the Secretary's Department.

History must always be closely in touch with and may even be regarded as a function of the Secretariat, for it arises directly out of records which are the special charge of the Secretariat. This work is being slowly but surely done and is the first stage of a Naval Staff History. One is sometimes inclined to think that too much importance was given to the idea of a popular history, and that principles of staff work were subordinated to the unique competency and literary reputation of Sir Julian Corbett. The primary idea seems to have been the compilation of a popular history; the archival work was regarded merely as a subsidiary issue, whereas it is the converse that is true; it is the archival work that is of real importance; once that is done, you can write as many histories, in as many forms, as you like. This principle comes out very clearly in the German Admiralty Staff History, which is issued by the Superintendent of the Marine Archives, who is a vice-admiral. However, the main end was secured. The papers began to be arranged and continue to be arranged under competent supervision.

At the same time Sir Julian Corbett's History is not a Staff History, nor is it official in the sense of being an Admiralty official history. In fact the Admiralty have been careful to attach a disclaimer to its volumes emphasizing the fact that they are not responsible either for the substance or its presentation. They have merely given Sir Julian Corbett access to their records. As a measure of expediency arguments can be found in favour of such a system. No one else would or could do the work, and a large measure of gratitude is due to Sir Julian Corbett for undertaking it. But to divorce historical work from the Naval Staff and, so to speak, to "farm" it out (however competent may be the historian) is unsound, for history is not an end in itself but only as an aid to work in the present and cannot really be understood and utilized except by those who are practical exponents of the work.

The fact remains that there was no historical section of the Naval Staff of the Admiralty and the C.I.D. undertook the work and the system has proved workable, and so long as the necessity of a Naval Staff History is borne in mind, the archival work done by the C.I.D. for the Admiralty and the historical work done there will be of great use to the Naval Staff. How then does it differ from a Staff History?

A Staff History is an intensive study of the general and detailed aspects of the War. Its name implies that it must be prepared by a Naval Staff. If the Naval Staff cannot undertake it, it cannot be done



at all. It differs from the history being prepared by the C.I.D. in certain essential features:

(a) Its scope is wider and more exclusively technical. Its aim first of all is wider. It embraces all sorts of subjects outside the scope of a popular history that can only be satisfactorily dealt with from a naval point of view. For instance, in operations such as the Falklands operations, the methods of coaling and supply, and the considerations that led to the choice of different anchorages. In covering this ground it will often be very uninteresting to anyone but a naval officer, just as a detailed history of cotton spinning will be uninteresting to anyone outside the cotton industry.

(b) It must be documented. For instance, the naval officer will not be content with opinions but will wish to read for himself the text of important signals and orders. In studying the disposition of squadrons and flotillas he will require the actual text of the operation orders on points where any doubt occurs.

(c) It must be written from a definitely naval outlook. Here, in order to free myself from the possible reproach of bias, I shall quote the historian. Sir Julian Corbett says in his "Introduction to the Campaign of Trafalgar": "The campaign has been left in the same comparative darkness that enshrines the bulk of our naval history. It is not an exaggeration to say that the whole of naval history requires re-writing on staff lines. The need for a Historical Section at the Admiralty is crying. If you sever the work from the Admiralty you sever it from the well-spring of that intangible spirit which is our peculiar asset. Nowhere out of intimate touch with the Fleet can its inspiration be assured. No chair of history can fill the place of an Historical Section. What is of the sea must breathe the breath of the sea. Without it we pine in academical speculation."

Briefly, if you want to write on shoemaking for shoemakers, you have to be a shoemaker. Another historian—one of the most distinguished in Europe—Ernst Bernheim, deals with the subject more generally in his "Lehrbuch der Historischen Methode."<sup>1</sup> He says that one can rightly formulate the question whether the handling of single branches of history belongs to the sphere of the historian and is not rather the business of the respective craftsmen. Assuming that you can find a "Fachmann" with some historical education, he holds him to be much the most competent for the historical handling of a subject. The professional man will consider its development from the standpoint of the professional. What is of interest to him will not arouse the interest of historians and is by them passed over or insufficiently explained.

(d) Fourthly, it must be in close touch with practical experience and current naval thought. This association cannot be obtained outside the Admiralty. Otherwise it becomes separate from the revivifying stream of actual current thought. We have given reasons why naval history should be written by a Naval Staff. There is another reciprocal advantage to be gained. There is a reason why Naval Staff officers should

<sup>1</sup> "Lehrbuch der Historischen Methode," Ernst Bernheim, 1908.



write or try to write history. It is an education in itself. The natural tendency is to accept the printed word or the typed lecture. But here there is nothing—nothing but a virgin soil of documents. In going through them the worker will discover all the actual channels of business, will see the actual working of the machinery, will hear its creaking, will tread in the actual track of the men who performed the work and get in touch with their immediate difficulties. That is why Moltke attached such importance to staff officers working for a year in the historical section of the Gross Generalstab. It is not the printed book that alone is valuable. The process of its compilation is still more valuable. And there is a great deal that has to be left out of the book that is valuable. Some of the most important parts of a book never get into print. Work of this kind is a valuable training for intelligence work, for in both cases one is confronted with reports, some conflicting, some absurd, many incorrect, a few directly contradictory—all to be collated into a picture of the course of events. Therefore not only should a Naval Staff History be written by the Naval Staff, but Naval Staff officers who have any talent in this direction should all for a season be set to compile history. If this work is done outside the Navy, its fruits do not return into the current of naval thought.

There are four principal auxiliary sciences which are required for the historian—language, script, knowledge of documents (*diplomatik*), and geography. The two first, language and script, can be dispensed with, for the language is English and the script is usually typescript. Knowledge of documents, such as logs and signal logs, the naval officer has, for he has kept them since he was a boy. Naval geography requires a good knowledge of navigation, and this, too, is part of the ordinary equipment of a naval officer. Literary talent is more difficult to acquire, but there are a number of officers who possess it.<sup>1</sup> I shall now say a few words on principles of arrangement.

In the history of the Russo-Japanese War an attempt was made to deal with events in chronological succession and to embrace events in all theatres of operations, whether naval or military, in one progressive narrative. The aim was to give a clear impression of the interrelation of the various incidents, and of the resultant decisions. It is the system of seeing everywhere at the same moment, and though something of the same sort has been attempted in the C.I.D. history, it is only possible to a limited extent.

The fact is it is not real. No one at the Admiralty or at sea saw everything that was happening in every theatre of the War. The big events certainly reacted on one another, and where they did so they were linked up, and can be linked up in history, but they must be dealt with separately.

Again, there is a great advantage in working along the lines on which business was actually conducted. A preliminary study of the

<sup>1</sup> One of the great bars to historical research, probably to all kinds of research, in a large disciplinary community like the Navy, is the fallacy of general competency, that is, that everybody is equally competent to do anything. There are a number of young officers with a literary and historical talent, but it is very difficult to obtain their services.

War usually indicates the main lines of treatment. It is not possible to state them categorically. Sometimes they are by commands such as the Grand Fleet, sometimes by incidents and areas such as the Dardanelles; sometimes by topics such as anti-submarine operations, or convoy.

It is necessary, of course, to show when and how the operations in different areas were mutually affected, but not only is it better to keep them distinct, but if they are treated in detail it becomes a matter of necessity. The best method of approach is probably by means of monographs. The Historical Section of the Training and Staff Duties Division is busy with this work and has already completed nearly a score of them, all of which will be useful in the compilation of a Staff History, and do in fact constitute the beginnings of a Staff History.

The following is a very rough outline of a Staff History :—

#### GENERAL HISTORY.

1. Forces, Mobilization, Plans and Policy.
2. Home Waters in 1914.
3. Flanders Coast.
4. Operations, Foreign 1914, Tsingtau, Cameroons.
5. Protection of Trade, culminating with the Battle of the Falkland Islands and Destruction of *Dresden* and *Königsberg*. Pacific, East Indies, Atlantic.
6. Home Waters, 1915.
7. The Dardanelles.
8. Development of Patrol Flotillas, Growth of Mine-sweeping, Routes and Escorts.
9. Naval Work of Blockade.
10. Home Waters, 1916—Battle of Jutland.
11. Submarine Warfare, 1917 and 1918.
12. River Expeditions—Mesopotamia and Archangel.
13. Home Waters, 1917 and 1918.
14. The Admiralty and Naval Staff.

Then there are a series of special histories required on operational and technical subjects, such as Fleet Tactics, Convoy, Bombardments, Landing Operations, River Work, Minesweeping, Minelaying, Gunnery and Ordnance, Torpedoes, Hydrography, Aircraft in Naval Work, Submarine Work, Coastal Motor Boat Work, Naval Construction, Naval Hygiene and Medicine, Administration, Dockyards and Repairs, Administration of Stores, of Coal and Fuel, Organization of Temporary Bases, Welfare, Canteen and Recreation.

A few words may be said as to other Staff Histories. It is hardly necessary to emphasize the importance placed by Moltke and Foch on history. The whole doctrine of war in Germany and France has been built up on historical analysis. Foch was an ardent advocate of historical research. The French Naval Staff has instituted a Historical Section with four bureaux by a decree of 19th July, 1919, installed at the Avenue Octave Gerard. Its object is to furnish the French Navy with a precise documentation (*documentation précise*) of the War

drawn up in rigorous style. It is under Captain Castex and has members of the famous *Ecole des Chartes* attached to it. A historical section was previously established as early as 1910 in the French Navy, but it was merely a section of an Operations Division and was quickly absorbed in researches on current work.

In Germany the Admiralstab are at work preparing a history under the Superintendent of the Marine Archives. It is in five sections—The War in the North Sea; The War in the Baltic; Black Sea; Cruiser Warfare; Submarine Warfare. One volume has appeared, the first volume of the first section.<sup>1</sup>

It is hardly necessary to mention the older histories. The German Staff History of the 1870 War appeared between 1874 and 1881. It was in five volumes, with five cases of maps, uncritical and laudatory. Then there is the immense work of the American Civil War, seventy volumes, 1880-1901, merely a compilation of documents—not an example to be followed. Then there is the French General Staff History of 1870 which began in 1901, and is still incomplete.

We should avoid bulk. Detail and documents are required but they should be carefully selected. The best form for the Staff History would probably consist of a series of revised monographs after the style of those issued by the German Great General Staff, with one good introduction of about 100,000 words giving the main aspects of the War.

At the same time one may well conclude with a note of warning. There is always a tendency to seize on catchwords. We do not want history to become a catchword.

"Practical" was the great catchword of that most unpractical Navy, the navy of the eighties and nineties. When I was a midshipman there was great loud talk of being practical, and masts and yards were supposed to be very practical, and in order to be practical we had to sit in gunrooms and learn off by heart how to tack and wear ship.

We do not want to turn history into a subject for examination. History is a necessity to the Navy but not to each individual naval officer. One hears sometimes of the two schools of historical thought and material thought. But the fact that history is of importance does not make gunnery unimportant, for gunnery cannot easily be dissociated from naval history. We do not want to add another subject for examination and to set naval officers to learn up naval history. To turn history into a subject is to kill it. Dr. Schiller tells us that experience shows that institutions once set up to realize a purpose tend to operate so as to defeat the purpose to which they owe their being. Every institution generates toxic by-products and waste products and in the end is choked by them. As William James said: "The natural enemy of a subject is the professor thereof."<sup>2</sup> We want to be very careful then that our conception of history is real and practical and that our methods of study are correct.

<sup>1</sup> The first volume of the Baltic series has also been issued.

<sup>2</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1920.

# DISCUSSION.

CAPTAIN T. DANNREUTHER, R.N. : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, the subject with which the lecturer has dealt now comes within the province of the Historical Section of the Naval Staff under the direction of the Director of Training and Staff Duties, Admiralty. Formerly historical work was undertaken by the Naval Intelligence Division, with which I am connected, and I should like to give the direction in which that latter department worked.

It was the practice for the N.I.D. to collect all reliable reports from naval officers or eye-witnesses and issue them in narrative form to the Fleet as soon as possible, without criticism. These volumes, when completed, were put away for ten years, and may be said to correspond to the confidential Naval Staff monographs now being written in narrative form from official documents. The final result of this process is to produce a short history of naval operations, written from the original reports, preferably by a naval officer and a historian in collaboration, as, for example, Admiral Sir Edmund Slade and Sir Julian Corbett. Such a history is necessarily technical and confidential, because it deals with the class of matters to which the lecturer has referred, but it is also written in a critical style with all the facts from both belligerents available. I would submit that it is desirable to wait ten years before the Staff monographs can be considered fit for the production of a Naval Staff History for the Navy. The reason for this is that monographs are a pure record from British sources of the actual events as they occurred. They are merely documents in narrative form, and it is considered improper to produce a history criticizing the action of officers whilst such officers still hold important commands in the Fleet. An interval of ten years is sufficient to clear the board of those officers, as far as it affects discipline, and it allows of ten years, too, for digesting the enemy side of the question. If a staff history were written now of the late War it would possess the fault that the whole of the German case cannot be appreciated. At the present moment the Germans are waiting for the production of Sir Julian Corbett's work, and, no doubt, Sir Julian Corbett is anxious to see the German official history. Both works show a want of appreciation of what was done by the other side. In ten years' time, when Sir Julian Corbett's history is out and the German history is available, it will be time enough, in my opinion, for the Naval Staff itself to produce a critical history of the operations, when a full knowledge of the views of both sides of the question is available.

A point connected with the production of such a history which has not been dealt with by the lecturer is a consideration of the use that naval officers can make of it for study when it is written. I am sorry to say that the confidential work of Admiral Slade and Sir Julian Corbett is not sufficiently appreciated in the Service, if one can judge by the numbers that have read it. I submit to the lecturer for his opinion a scheme for the production of a staff history. In my view you want a historian to produce a vignette of the times in which the campaign takes place. You want to put into the reader's minds the Admiral's own temperament, and that of his adversaries, and what his Government thought about him, and what actions were expected of him. You want to state actually what the Admiral knew and all the surrounding circumstances, so that you can then close the book down and allow the student or class of officers to suggest a line of action to be taken in the said circumstances. In effect, you say to the officers, "Here are the circumstances: if you were in that man's shoes what would you do?" If the class think the problem out and express their opinions on paper, they would learn a historical lesson by referring again to the next chapter of the history in the same way as a schoolboy gets the answer to an arithmetical

problem from the key, and learn what the admiral actually did, to compare with their own opinion of what he should have done, and it can then be decided whether the officers' opinion or the admiral's action was the better. They would then find out whether the admiral made mistakes at the time and the influence they had on the campaign later, or whether their own ideas were mistaken and how they would have worked out in the light of subsequent events.

I hope the Naval Staff History will develop from the monographs so as to give the actual circumstances of the time in set problems so that officers can be told "Here is the case, work it out for yourselves and say what the admiral should do."

CAPTAIN THURSFIELD : I would like to protest against the view just expressed by Captain Dannreuther that a ten-year interval should be allowed to elapse before a Naval Staff History is written. The grounds, I gathered, for that view were that the full materials are not available. That is perfectly true, but full materials never are available. There are always materials at hand and they are always increasing as more and more information comes to light; and if we wait for the full materials to be available the history will never be written at all. Anyone who has had the job of writing history, even in a small way, and discovering exactly what happened in any circumstances, knows how very difficult it is to get a clear idea as to what happened if there has been any appreciable delay before the task is undertaken. One of the most reliable sources of information is the people who were present at the events one is trying to narrate, and the sooner after those events one can obtain their narratives the more accurate and the fuller will they be. If we put off the compilation of the history we lose in accuracy. Again, there are important lessons to be learned from what happened in the late War, and I do not think we should be condemned to wait for ten years before being allowed to endeavour to learn those lessons.

I would like to support the lecturer's view of the necessity for a Staff History. Sir Julian Corbett's history, excellent though it is, does not altogether fulfil the needs of those who are trying to learn lessons from the War, principally because no authorities are quoted. The preamble to that history states that the Lords of the Admiralty have given Sir Julian Corbett access to official documents, but it does not state that they have given him access to all official documents. In any case Sir Julian Corbett does not quote any official documents, nor does he even give in all cases a hint as to how much he has taken directly from official documents and how much is the result of his own deductions from such documents as he has had. I suppose that is one of the chief reasons why the Admiralty specifically state that they take no responsibility for his presentation of the facts. It is almost impossible that they should. Sir Julian Corbett undertook the business of producing the history early in the War. The Board of the Admiralty which entrusted that work to him might have been prepared to accept his presentation as expressing their views, but obviously they could not bind every subsequent Board of the Admiralty to do so. The result is that Sir Julian Corbett's history is much more a popular history than an authoritative one, and that is the reason why a Naval Staff History, which probably would not be so good in many ways as Sir Julian Corbett's, but would have the advantage of being authoritative and quoting sources, is so much required.

INSTRUCTOR-COMMANDER TUCK : As I have been connected with the production of Sir Julian Corbett's history, and as I am at present in charge of the production of the Naval Staff monographs, perhaps it may be of interest if I make a few remarks. It has always been felt that there would be a difficulty of distinguishing



what are Sir Julian Corbett's deductions from the facts and the conclusions to which the Admiralty have come, but I understand that Sir Julian was precluded from giving references to documents which are still confidential, so that he was unable to document his history in the way which a naval officer would have done. The reader will, therefore, always be left in the dark as to what is the Admiralty's opinion and what is Sir Julian Corbett's opinion. The Naval Staff monographs we are now producing give full references for every statement that we make. We give in appendices important telegrams and important documents, so that a monograph produced by the Training and Staff Duties Division is practically a chapter of the Naval Staff History, except of course that it contains no comment. One of the speakers said he did not see why we should have to wait for ten years to know what had happened during the War. The object of the Naval Staff monographs is that a naval officer *shall* know what happened during the War. Another point he made was that the best authorities on events are the people who took part in them. That is very true, but it is not absolutely true. I have this very afternoon consulted an officer who was concerned in a certain operation; in fact I showed him a monograph which was being prepared on the subject, and he said: "On page 29, line 6 and so on, what is stated is quite wrong." I said: "I am very sorry, but they are your own words," and I actually produced his own report in which he had made the statement that I had put down. He was the officer who conducted the operation; he was the officer who had sent in the report; but seven years afterwards he had forgotten all about it and actually contradicted what was said in the Naval Staff monograph. I believe that is quite a common occurrence with historians. The actors in the drama which you are portraying have forgotten their parts, and they are very apt to put down to somebody else the part which they themselves played, or conversely—not, of course, intentionally. I believe it is the custom in the Navy—it was when I was at sea some years ago—for officers to go into the wardroom and discuss all sorts of things, and finally they arrive at what is called a composite opinion. Someone begins by expressing a very definite opinion; he is rudely contradicted by the gunnery officer; then the torpedo officer ejects a certain amount of poisonous gas; and finally an opinion is arrived at which is distinctly a composite one. But we historians have to go back to the actual reports of the people who carried out the operations and wrote down at the time what happened. It is my own experience that the very best source of information (I say it with all due deference) is not always the admiral's despatch. We go back farther than that; we go back to the signal books and to the logs of the ships. If we want to know whether a ship was steering north-east or south-west we do not take the admiral's word for it, but the log. If we want to know whether a signal was made at 9 o'clock or 10 o'clock, we do not take the admiral's word for it; we look and see what the signal boy says. The signalman wrote it down at the time and he is sure to know the truth. That means that an enormous amount of investigation is required and a colossal library of books. If you want to write the history of an action you have no idea of the amount of information that has to be studied. Take a battle like that of the Dogger Bank; the logs themselves would make a pile as high as this room. Both the logs and the signal books have to be scrutinized and compared the one with the other. Each one, of course, will differ from all the others, especially the signal logs, as you may imagine, and we have to piece them together, compare them in parallel columns and finally come to some definite conclusion as to the signal that was made, what time it was made, what time it was received and when it was acted upon. All those things come out in the study of the logs. So that the production of a history is going to take a very long time, and if we are going to wait ten years before we begin we shall be very much in arrears when the next

war comes on. It seems to me, therefore, the best thing to do is to start at once doing the best you can. We can now arrive at a definite narrative of what we ourselves did and the reason why we did it. The decision whether we were right in what we did or whether our ideas as to what the enemy were doing were right or not we shall have to defer until they themselves tell us what they were doing and why they were doing it. The first part of the Naval Staff History, that is the narrative of events, can be begun at once, and if there was sufficient staff to do it it would be done. I was talking recently to a member of the Historical Section of the Japanese Navy. That Section has been in existence for several years, and its job is to write history and write it quickly—to produce it for immediate use. Their Staff History of the Russo-Japanese War was written and complete in 130 volumes in I forget how many years after the war—perhaps three or four years. There is one other point which has not been touched upon in connection with the writing of Staff Histories to which I should like to refer. Captain Dewar mentioned the connection between history and business. I would like to give an illustration of that from the Japanese side. The Japanese Historical Section was a definite part of the Naval Staff, and I was informed by a member of that Section that his work of producing the history was very much impeded because the Naval Staff would keep on asking his opinion about future operations. They repeatedly asked whether such and such operations had been suitable in the past and how they had been conducted. He thought that was a great obstruction to the work of compiling a history, but it seems to me rather a feather in the cap of the Historical Section that the staff which were conducting operations and which were drawing up orders actually consulted the Historical Section as to what effect those orders would have. That was never done so far as I know in our Navy, but in the Japanese Navy it is the practice. Whether it is a practice we should adopt or not I must leave to higher authorities to decide.

CAPTAIN ALFRED DEWAR, in reply: I do not think there are any very important points to which I have to reply. All the speakers seem to agree that history is very important. I do, however, disagree with the suggested ten years' burial, because in that time papers disappear and logs go away. I think ten years is much too long. Of course it is necessary to keep many things confidential, and the Naval Staff History would be confidential. Still you can very much overdo secrecy, and it was very much overdone during the War. I feel sure that Admiral Sturdee has something very interesting and instructive to say to us, so I will not occupy your time any longer.

THE CHAIRMAN (ADMIRAL SIR F. C. STURDEE, Bart., G.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., LL.D.): Ladies and Gentlemen, I rise to propose a hearty vote of thanks to Captain Dewar for his interesting lecture and for the interesting discussion it has evoked. Probably you expect a few remarks from me. I should like to say that, as soon as the War commenced the Naval Historical Section in this country was started, on 4th August, 1914, by Sir William Slade and Sir Julian Corbett. All papers and records were sent to them. What happened after four or five months I do not know, as I had left, but I do know that a start was made as soon as the War commenced. I am absolutely of opinion that we ought to have the records of what happened at once. We want the Staff History to-day. As Instructor-Commander Tuck mentioned, it will not be final, but it will show what the admirals and the captains did at the time, and on what information they acted. When we get the other side of the case it can be corrected and brought up to date. I am sure it is a mistake to wait for years until a history is produced. I do not personally agree that criticism of an action is contrary to discipline. The facts are there, and it is for the staff (I am not talking of the public) to consider

those facts and see whether they could have done better with the information which the admiral who was in charge of the operations possessed at the time. I, therefore, think it is very important that this history should be published for staff work as soon as possible, otherwise the experience will be lost. Of course it should be confidential. With regard to the next point, I do not think we have been careful enough in keeping our records in the ships. We may not have been careful enough in keeping the clocks correct by Greenwich time. No doubt when guns are fired the chart house clock alters, and that is one of the reasons why the times recorded are not always the same. I am in absolute agreement that you cannot always trust to the admiral's memory. He is thinking of many more important things than history, but he has someone who writes down the facts, viz., the signalman and the recording officer. I can, therefore, quite understand that admirals do not remember the exact details of what occurred. I once found myself in an action doing a figure of eight, which I had not realized at the time, but the purpose in view was effected, which was the principal thing. I think the lecturer was perhaps a little hard when he said that the people concerned did not know the facts during the War. Summaries were made, I presume, at the Admiralty, and were considered, besides very good charts with regard to the German submarines and aircraft, and were issued to the admirals. I do not think you can expect every officer in the ship to be given these details, neither do I think it necessary. It is the officers who are controlling events who want to know them. It is, of course, very interesting to know facts, but I do not think it would have been the least bit of use for us to know in the North Sea what was happening in Mesopotamia. I think, however, the Admiralty ought to have a summary made of what was happening in Mesopotamia in order that they might know what would happen if, for instance, they sent an expedition to the White Sea or anywhere else. It is valuable experience and enables officers to get the facts ready for the next event. In my opinion we want, for the purpose of training officers, to know as much as possible to-day why certain things were done. I do not think you can train a naval war staff if you do not give them this information. We do not want to train them on information a hundred years old. Opinions have now to be formed on very vital questions as to the future policy of the Navy, the building policy of the Navy, and it can best come through the staff. That is how Moltke trained the generals for the war of 1870, and I hope the permanent training in the Navy will be carried out in that way. It is very important that all the facts should be known as soon as possible in order that they may be digested, but it is impossible to come to a final conclusion until we obtain the other side of the case. When that happens—in ten, or it may be thirty, years' time—then the two can be brought together. What happened at Trafalgar was not known for about 100 years. What we want now are the facts, what the decisions were, the action that was taken, what the officers did, and so on.

I propose a hearty vote of thanks to the lecturer for the interesting way in which he dealt with the subject. I hope it will make us take a greater interest in it in future, so that events may be recorded in order that we may know exactly what we have to do if the war which I heard mentioned happens within the next ten years.

The resolution of thanks was then put and carried by acclamation.

COLONEL B. C. GREEN: Ladies and Gentlemen, I am sure you would not like the meeting to conclude without according a very hearty vote of thanks to Admiral Sturdee for taking the Chair this evening. At some meetings the Chairmen are merely figure-heads, but we always have at the meetings in our lecture hall Chairmen who not only take the greatest interest in the lecture itself but

act as judges and sum up the case for and against. I have attended many lectures here, and I find that we always gain a great deal of valuable information from the Chairmen. Some of the audience hold the opinion of the lecturer; some of them, as has occurred to-night, differ on some point or other from the lecturer; but in our Chairman we always have an impartial man who sums up for and against and enlightens us in general on the subject. Our Chairman to-night has put before us what he thinks should be done, and I for one absolutely endorse his views. We have all very much enjoyed the lecture, and I am sure we have equally enjoyed the comments which have been made not only by the speakers but by the Chairman. Ladies and Gentlemen, I ask you to accord a very hearty vote of thanks to Admiral Sturdee for presiding this evening.

The resolution of thanks was carried by acclamation, and the meeting terminated.



## THE RELATIONS OF THE PRESS WITH THE ARMY IN THE FIELD

By the RIGHT HON. LORD RIDDELL.

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On Thursday, 24th March, 1921, at 5.30 p.m.

SIR R. H. BRADE, G.C.B., in the Chair.

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THE CHAIRMAN said: Gentlemen, those members of the Institution who are interested in this subject will, I think, remember that in 1913 Mr. Gwynne, the editor of the *Morning Post*, read a paper in this room on this very subject, and, I believe, with very much the same title. During the course of the discussion that followed we were told that certain negotiations which had been started between the departmental authorities (the Admiralty and War Office) and the Press authorities had resulted in agreement between the two, and that there was in being an organization which was designed to secure agreement to withhold from publication information on Service matters which it was considered to be against the public interest to make generally known. That organization was in being, and very effectively in being, I think, at the beginning of the War. It was intended that it should form the nucleus of a war organization, but it rather receded into the background, at any rate for a time. It was, however, always there, and it intervened at suitable moments to arrange various difficulties which arose from time to time. It is now still in being, I think, as the only organization for effecting the purpose for which it was originally designed. All this I say merely by way of introduction of the lecturer, for the representative of Press interests in that organization was Lord Riddell, and no one contributed more than he to such success as it achieved. Still by way of introduction, I might mention further that in addition to his activities of the kind I have described, he was also, later on, a sort of accredited representative—I think I may call him—of the Press at the Peace Conference and at the subsequent congresses and meetings that have been held in connection with it. I think that nobody—certainly nobody I know—has a better knowledge of this subject from all points of view than Lord Riddell. With these few words I will introduce him to you, and ask him to give his lecture.

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### LECTURE.

DURING the War it was my task to represent the Press in its negotiations and dealings with the War Office and other public departments. For that reason I have been asked to address you on the subject of "The Relations of the Press with the Army in the Field."



During the first nine months of the War the British effort was seriously prejudiced by the attitude of the War Office to the Press. This was due partly to tradition, partly to the antipathy of the soldier to an institution which makes a business of collecting and selling news, and partly to the apprehension of indiscretions and criticisms. The result was unfortunate. The public were deprived of reliable information concerning the War, and misled by statements of an optimistic character issued by those in authority.

In short, when the War commenced the War Office was full of explosive and inaccurate ideas regarding the Press. Lord Wolseley had said that the special correspondent was the curse of the modern army, and while Major-General Callwell, who was in charge of the Intelligence Department during the early days of the War, has made a gallant attempt to balance the scales fairly between the War Office and the Press, it is obvious from his remarks that he thought, and still thinks, that newspapers have swollen heads and require to be kept in their place. He says in "The Experiences of a Dug-out" that as long as he can remember the War Office has provided a sort of Aunt Sally for the young men of Fleet Street to take cockshies at when they could think of nothing else to edify their readers with, and that most of them have made uncommonly bad shots.

To do the General justice, however, he makes it clear that in his opinion the Press was badly treated by the War Office and G.H.Q. at the outset, and that he was placed in the uncomfortable position of having to administer a policy which he believed to be entirely mistaken and which, moreover, practically amounted to a breach of faith. It is astonishing that these mistakes should have been made. As far back as 1912, at the instance of the War Office acting through my friend Sir Reginald Brade, a Committee was set up with the object of providing a liaison between the Navy and Army on the one hand and the Press on the other. The Committee was named the Admiralty, War Office, and Press Committee, the chairman was my friend Sir Grahame Greene, then Secretary to the Admiralty, the vice-chairman was Sir Reginald Brade, and in addition to other representatives of the Services, the Committee comprised representatives of the Press, both London and provincial. I was on the Committee as representing the London newspapers. Before the War it did much useful work, and its functions were well understood by both the Government and the Press. On 27th July, 1914, a meeting of the Committee was hurriedly convened. All the Press representatives except myself were away from home, but Mr. Robbins, of the Press Association, attended on behalf of his father. In a few brief words Sir Grahame announced that the country might shortly be at war, that it would be necessary to move ships and troops, and that the Admiralty and War Office were anxious to know what could be done to suppress the publication of information regarding these movements. He remarked, which was true, that no statutory power existed to prevent publication of these details. I said I was confident that the newspapers would publish nothing detrimental if they were asked to be silent. Mr. Robbins

and I then drew up the following letter, which was despatched by Mr. Robbins to every newspaper in the Kingdom :—

27th July, 1914.

*The Crisis in the Near East.*

DEAR SIR,—

At a meeting of the Admiralty, War Office, and Press Committee, held this afternoon, it was resolved that as, in view of the present situation, the authorities may have to take exceptional measures, the Press should be asked to refrain from publishing any information relative to movements of British warships, troops, and aircraft, or to war material, fortifications, and naval and military defences, without first communicating with the Admiralty or War Office respectively in accordance with the arrangement which was notified to you by me in January of last year.

Having regard to the nature of the case, it was found impossible further to indicate the character of the information the publication of which is undesirable in the national interests. The request does not affect the dissemination of news concerning ordinary routine movements or training on the part of the Navy or the Army; its object is to prevent the appearance of anything concerning steps of an exceptional kind which may be rendered necessary by the existing state of affairs.

I may add that the authorities from time to time will continue to issue such information as may be made public.

Yours faithfully,

E. ROBBINS.

Another meeting was called on 29th July, when this further circular was issued to the Press :—

29th July, 1914.

*The Crisis in the Near East.*

DEAR SIR,—

Following the notice which I sent you on Monday on behalf of the Admiralty, War Office, and Press Committee, I have to notify you that the authorities have now ordered certain exceptional measures, and they earnestly hope, in view of the general importance of reticence, that the Press will refrain from referring to these measures or making public any details which may come to their notice.

Yours faithfully,

E. ROBBINS.

And on the 30th July this was followed up with :—

30th July, 1914.

*The Crisis in the Near East.*

DEAR SIR,—

Supplementing the communications sent you on behalf of the Admiralty, War Office, and Press Committee this week, I am desirous to inform you that the Committee to-day resolved, in view of the grave

position of affairs, that the Press be earnestly requested to abstain for the present from publishing any information regarding :—

- (a) Movements of ships, troops, aircraft, or war material;
- (b) Fortifications, defence works, arsenals, dockyards, oil depots, ammunition stores, and electric light installations,

without first obtaining the sanction of the Admiralty or War Office respectively.

With a view to avoiding inconvenience to the Press and public, the authorities have arranged that the supply of official news shall be increased in so far as may be possible.

The Committee regret the necessity for making this somewhat drastic request, and only do so by reason of the very exceptional situation.

Yours faithfully,

E. ROBBINS.

I give these letters in detail because they are of some historic importance. The newspapers of this country are entitled to point their critics to the fact that in not a single instance were these requests disregarded. The preparations were made with such secrecy that the Germans now admit that on 20th August they knew neither when nor where our troops were landed, nor their strength. Military critics are rather apt to sneer at the Press as a commercial institution. I may point out that it is also a patriotic institution, and that when it became necessary for the Press to subordinate its own interests to those of the nation, it did so without complaint or self-advertisement.

The ignorance which exists on this subject was indicated in a speech made by Sir John Simon in December, 1914, when he alleged that it was by the bold use of the censorship that the Expeditionary Force crossed the Channel without risk of attack. He went on to say that when the history of these things came to be written the absolute necessity for such a censorship would become apparent to everybody.

The Press Bureau was established on 7th August, 1914. On the night of the 6th I met Lord Kitchener and Mr. Churchill at dinner. The former said, "I am going to appoint a Press Censor, and there he is," pointing to Mr. F. E. Smith, now Lord Birkenhead. "Come and see me at the War Office to-morrow morning, and I will tell you all about it."

In the morning Lord Birkenhead, Sir Reginald Brade, and I went to Lord Kitchener's room, where we found him with the door open, surrounded by Generals and maps, everyone coming and going in a state of great excitement. I asked him what the duties of the Press Censor were to be. His reply was, "He will see that nothing dangerous goes into the newspapers. Go away with Brade and settle the matter." We went to Sir Reginald's room, when he and Lord Birkenhead conferred on the question of premises. A representative from the Office of Works was sent for. He said that there was a disused building in Whitehall next to the Admiralty which might serve the purpose. Here Lord Birkenhead was installed with a scratch staff.

I am glad to have this opportunity of stating that he, his brother, Sir Harold Smith, and their assistants performed a very difficult and trying task with great skill and ability. For a period of more than 200 years there had been no Press Censor in England, and as we know, Lord Birkenhead's appointment was not received with favour by the Press. His position was made all the more difficult by the fact that he was not a real censor, but only a shield and recording angel for the naval and military censors acting under the direct instructions of the Admiralty and War Office. He became a member of the Admiralty, War Office, and Press Committee, to whom he explained that he acted in a three-fold capacity. He was a distributor of news, the adviser of the Press, and if proceedings were to be taken against a newspaper they would be initiated by him. The Defence of the Realm Act was passed on the 8th August, 1914, and regulations under the Act were issued on the 28th November, 1914. The effect of this legislation was to render the publication of certain information illegal and to prescribe penalties. Newspapers were under no obligation to submit their copy to the Press Bureau, which was not founded under any Parliamentary authority. At their own peril they could publish what they thought fit, but their sources of information were severely curtailed and scrutinized by the action of the cable and telegraph censors, by whom all foreign messages were examined, and also certain inland telegrams.

I do not propose to trace the history of the Press Bureau. It is sufficient to say that Lord Birkenhead resigned his position in September, 1914, that he was succeeded by Lord Buckmaster, who resigned in 1915, and that he was followed by Sir Frank Swettenham and Sir Edward Cook, who continued in office until the termination of the War. It is only fair to say that all these gentlemen did their utmost to persuade the naval and military authorities to increase the supply of information for the benefit of the public. It is an open secret that Lord Buckmaster, in particular, had a vigorous but ineffective contest with the military authorities.

The original intention was that war correspondents should proceed to the Front. The late Major A. G. Stuart was told off to act as Press Officer, having been in control of the Press representatives at army manœuvres in 1912 and 1913. The correspondents selected were called together and acquainted with the arrangements. No correspondent was to take a motor car, and each correspondent was to be provided with a horse. After a lapse of some six weeks it became apparent that the selected correspondents were not to be allowed to go to the Front, and the War Office notified their willingness to acquire the horses which had been purchased, it being stated that the experience gained in the past few weeks had convinced the Army Council that, owing to the long distances that had to be covered, horses would be useless for War Correspondents when permitted to take the field. Meanwhile unauthorized correspondents had made their way to France and had been arrested by the French or sent back to England. The authorities adopted the alternative of appointing Major-General Swinton as Official Eye Witness. He went to France on 14th September, and

continued his functions until the middle of July, 1915, having been joined in November, 1914, by Captain Earl Percy as his assistant.

Meanwhile matters had been developing on the Home Front. Grave dissatisfaction existed not only amongst newspaper proprietors and editors, but also amongst the public and in some sections of the Army regarding the inadequate information published concerning the progress of the War, and the doings of the British troops in particular. I was continually urging the War Office to allow the correspondents to go to the Front. Eventually, during March and April, three parties of correspondents were permitted to make short tours in France.

In the early part of March, 1915, the following notice was issued by the Press Bureau, warning the Press that they were too optimistic:—

"The magnitude of the British task in this great War runs serious risks of being overlooked by reason of exaggerated accounts of successes printed daily in the Press, and especially by exhibiting posters framed to catch the eye and magnify comparatively unimportant actions into great victories. Reported reverses to the enemy are proclaimed as crushing defeats, Germany is represented as within measurable distance of starvation, bankruptcy, and revolution, and, only yesterday, a poster was issued in London declaring that half the Hungarian army had been annihilated.

"All sense of just proportion is thus lost, and, with these daily, and often hourly, statements of great Allied gains and immense enemy losses, the public can have no true appreciation of the facts or of the gigantic task and heavy sacrifices before them.

"The Director appeals to all those who are responsible for the Press to use their influence to bring about a better knowledge of the real situation, and rather to emphasise the efforts that will be necessary before the country can afford to regard the end for which we are striving as anything like assured. The posters, more especially those of the evening papers, are very often preposterous as well as misleading, and, at such a time, those responsible may fairly be asked to exercise a reasonable restraint and help the nation to a just appreciation of the task it has undertaken and the necessity for unremitting effort to secure the only end that can be accepted."

I gather from General Callwell's book that this notice was issued at his instance. While admitting that the policy of secrecy was a serious blunder, and very nearly lost us the War, he has no hesitation in asserting that one of the principal obstacles in the way of transforming the United Kingdom into a great military nation when the enemy was in the gate was the excessive optimism of the Press. Nor does the General discriminate between newspapers and periodical publications containing the views of so-called experts.

The newspapers did not take this notice lying down. On 26th March the Newspaper Proprietors' Association sent the following letter to the Press Bureau and copies to the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, Lord Kitchener, and other members of the Cabinet:—



*"To the Director of the Press Bureau.*

"DEAR SIR,—

"My Council have had under consideration your memorandum of 12th March, 1915, Serial No. D. 183, for which, in their opinion, there is no adequate justification. The Press has dealt faithfully with the news furnished by the naval and military authorities, but it may well be that the public misunderstand the situation and that this misconception is producing serious results. If, however, the people are being unduly soothed and elated, the responsibility lies with the Government and not with the Press. In this connection my Council desire to direct your attention to the optimistic statements of the Prime Minister, Sir John French, 'Eye-Witness,' and other persons possessing official information. The Press acts upon the news supplied. If this is inaccurate or incomplete, the Government cannot blame the newspapers. My Council desire to represent that the methods now being adopted are fraught with grave public danger. Ministers are continually referring to the importance of energy and self-sacrifice on the part of the industrial population, who cannot be expected to display these qualities unless, generally speaking, they are acquainted with the facts. In dealing with the news, the Naval and Military authorities should consider not only our enemies and the army in the field, but the commercial and industrial classes at home, upon whom so much depends. It is futile to endeavour to disregard the long-established habits and customs of the people.

"As you know, I am writing on behalf of the London Press only, but my Council are confident that their views are shared by the provincial newspapers.

"I am directed to send a copy of this letter to the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, Lord Kitchener, and other members of the Cabinet."

The result of this letter was that Mr. Asquith invited the Association to lay their views before him at a deputation. A free exchange of views took place with the result that Mr. Asquith invited the Press to appoint a representative who would interview Lord Kitchener and Mr. Churchill each week with the object of putting questions to them and receiving private information for circulation to editors. I was detailed for the duty, and for some months had frequent interviews with Lord Kitchener. I strongly urged him to allow a limited number of correspondents to go to the Front. The following is a note of a conversation I had with him on 16th April:—

*"War Correspondents.*

"I stated the Council's views to Lord Kitchener in some detail. He dealt with the matter at length. He explained that the rules for the conduct of the War have been made by the General in Command of the French Forces. One of these rules is that no correspondents shall be allowed to accompany the troops. So long as this rule obtains it must be observed by the British military authorities. I asked Lord

Kitchener whether correspondents would be permitted to accompany the British Army if the English newspapers were able to prevail upon the French Commander to alter his decision. His answer was that if the rule were altered the change would apply to the British as well as to the French Army. I further asked him whether he would place any obstacle in the way of the alterations. He answered in the negative, and added, 'The French Commander is responsible for the campaign which is being carried on in his country, and the major part of which depends upon the French troops.' I asked whether there would be any objection to the Press endeavouring to prevail upon General Joffre to alter his regulations. He replied:—

'Not the slightest, but the application must not be made as if I were a party to it. General Joffre has made the rule, and I act loyally in conjunction with him in this as in all other matters. He considers the rule necessary for the safety of France, and even if we disagreed with any of his regulations we should be acting wrongly if we did not loyally abide by his decision.'

At intervals he makes inquiries to ascertain whether any change is being made in the French Press Regulations. If and when any such change takes place the English Press will at once get the benefit of it. He referred to the tours which have taken place, and remarked that if desired he would be happy to endeavour again to arrange for similar tours in order to enable representatives of the English Press to visit the scenes of recent actions."

On the 23rd April I had another interview with him at the urgent solicitation of Lord Burnham and Lord Northcliffe, of which the following is a note:—

"I had a further discussion upon this subject with Lord Kitchener, in the course of which I communicated to him the views expressed at the last meeting of the Council, and read to him extracts from Lord Northcliffe's letter. Lord Kitchener said that an official intimation from French Headquarters would be necessary before he could depart from the arrangement entered into with the French military authorities, but suggested that immediate arrangements should be made for a visit to France of a limited number of British newspaper correspondents. He thought that four or six would be a suitable number, and said it would be necessary that all the leading newspapers in the country should have the right to use the despatches of at least one of the correspondents. I proposed that the papers should be grouped in order to avoid clashing as far as possible. He said that this would be quite satisfactory, and he gave instructions for the necessary communications to be made to the English Headquarters. Sir Reginald Brade, with whom I subsequently discussed the details, suggested that the correspondents should make some suitable place their headquarters, and from there pay visits to the various points of the battlefields. I asked Sir Reginald to endeavour to arrange that the correspondents should have the right to visit the French as well as the English

lines, and he promised to put this request forward to the French headquarters. The correspondents will only be allowed to remain in France for a limited period, but Lord Kitchener intimated that subsequent trips of the same sort could be arranged at frequent intervals. I understand that our chairman, Lord Northcliffe, and other members of the Association, are in favour of a scheme of this sort, which I believe will commend itself to the Association generally, as well as to the provincial Press. Obviously it is desirable that correspondents of outstanding merit be selected, in order that the Press may be furnished with a series of brilliant despatches."

Following on this six accredited Press correspondents took up their residence at G.H.Q. in France during the first week in May. Notwithstanding the limitation referred to in my conversation with Lord Kitchener, they remained until the termination of hostilities. Lord Kitchener never recalled them, and although he never officially recognized their position, it was assumed for practical purposes that they were fixtures. Subsequently, in November, 1915, I made arrangements with Lord Kitchener that correspondents should accompany the army in the Balkans.

The arrangements in France were, however, somewhat nebulous, as may be judged from the fact that early in November the following regulations were issued in regard to correspondents:—

(1) Current events must not be mentioned in detail until the events have been made public in the Commander-in-Chief's despatches.

(2) Only general mention of the fighting can be made. Nothing outside the official communiqués is to be touched upon.

(3) Matters of controversial or political interest must be excluded.

(4) Praise or censure is to be left to the Commander-in-Chief.

(5) Mention of any formation by name is prohibited, including such items as the New Army, Territorials, etc., also names of units or individuals.

(6) The articles of war correspondents must be confined to topographical descriptions and generalities.

(7) Detailed information obtained by war correspondents can be used only when permission is given, and the time of publication will vary according to circumstances.

The War Office denied all knowledge of the new regulations, which were withdrawn.

The correspondents' despatches did much to stimulate the nation and enable it to realize the nature of the struggle in which we were engaged. The authorities, however, were resolute in declining to allow the correspondents to describe the doings of the different regiments by name.

There could be no doubt of the advisability of giving this information from the public point of view, but the military authorities alleged that it would be imprudent to disclose the position of the various units. The Australian and Canadian publicity departments, however,

adopted the plan of describing the doings of their troops, with the result that the doings of the Home Army were inadequately appreciated in comparison. It is not for me to say whether the authorities were right in the view they took. The Press urged that the enemy already knew in most instances what units were fighting on the various fronts, but this was denied by the Intelligence Department.

In May, 1915, I arranged with Lord Kitchener that a summary of the casualties should be issued at frequent intervals for the private information of editors. This was done throughout the War, and the secrecy imposed upon the Press was in no case violated.

As the war developed the publicity settled down to a certain extent, although the Press had frequent cause of complaint, and were not backward in expressing their views. Many foolish mistakes were made by the censors, but perhaps these were inevitable. Looking back, it is rather surprising that the system worked as well as it did, considering that the work was done by people without any previous experience and without any principles to guide them. A series of disjointed prohibitions was evolved but, as far as I am aware, no general principles were laid down. On the one hand the Press were always fighting for more freedom, while on the other mysterious and unknown personages, acting through the medium of the Press Bureau and the censors at G.H.Q., were always insisting on the necessity for secrecy. No concordat was ever reached between the authorities and the Press.

The War has shown that modern wars are conflicts between nations, not armies, and the vital necessity of a complete and friendly understanding between the Army and the Press. It is only by mutual confidence and good will that the best results can be secured. Tact and forbearance on both sides are necessary, particularly in times of strain and excitement. Whenever possible it is wise for the Army to be frank with journalists, and to trust to their honour to refrain from publishing what they are asked to keep secret. Absolute silence should be preserved, however, regarding forthcoming military operations. Concerning these it may be pointed out that indiscreet statements by soldiers in private conversation have been a frequent cause of the leakage of information. Great care must be exercised in selecting censors. Well-devised regulations are useless unless they are administered with judgment. Experienced soldiers on active service are the best censors for field work. Generally speaking, "dug-outs" are unsuited to act as censors, and should not be appointed except when other officers are unavailable, and then only when they possess the necessary experience and other qualities. Immediately military operations become imminent information should be furnished to the organizations representing the Press, so that editors may be enabled to appoint their correspondents and to make other necessary preparations. The censorship and other arrangements affecting the Press should be established with the least possible delay. Whenever feasible a reasonable number of newspaper photographers should be licensed and all proper facilities afforded to enable them to take suitable pictures.



It should be remembered that newspaper photography is a special art, and that newspaper photographers are the best judges of what will interest the public and what can be photographed and reproduced effectively. Every effort should be made to work on amicable terms with Press photographers, so as to use them to the best advantage. Explanations should be furnished to prevent them from taking photographs which might assist the enemy or be undesirable for any other reason. Double censorship is undesirable and leads to contrary decisions. Censorship at the Front should suffice. Censors at the Front know the facts, and are the best judges. Censors should be trained during time of peace. Lectures on the subject should be given to officers, who should be made acquainted not only with the technical details involved, but should also be instructed regarding the general principles underlying the relations of the Press with the Army in the field.

Perhaps you will think that I have been critical. My object has been to show the weak points of the system with a view to avoiding a recurrence of similar difficulties. Of one thing I am quite sure—that everyone concerned did his best, and did what he thought was right. Take Sir Frank Swettenham and Sir Edward Cook. They worked like galley slaves, and no two men were subject to more vituperation. There is no doubt that the War killed Sir Edward Cook—a gentle, kindly, sensitive creature, although I believe it is only fair to say that he suffered more from his encounters with the military authorities than he did from the criticism he received at the hand of the Press. Sir Frank Swettenham was made of tougher fibre—a genial, witty cynic, with the gift of mordant sayings, who still survives to tell the tale. Even if the system were wrong, Sir Frank Swettenham and Sir Edward Cook did their utmost to make it a success. It was unfortunate that a spirit of hostility developed between the Press and the Press Bureau. Under the circumstances, perhaps, it was inevitable. Constant criticism tends to harden the hearts of the criticized, and to compel them to be always on the defensive. I have told you of my relations with Lord Kitchener, who always treated me with the greatest courtesy and consideration. General Macdonogh and General Cockerill were always kindness personified, and always reasonable.

"Praise to the face is open disgrace," but I cannot allow the occasion to pass without stating publicly what the country and the Press owe to Sir Reginald Brade. He it was who adopted a statesman-like policy before the War; he it was who tried to give effect to it; and he it was who smoothed over, or tried to smooth over, the difficulties that occurred from day to day. He was one of the pivots of the War, and the nation can never be sufficiently grateful for what he did so quietly and unostentatiously. To the Press he was always a good friend, but a candid one. He saw what was possible, and he gave his opinion without fear or favour. I have said nothing to-night in regard to the naval censorship, but there are things which I could say, and which I intend to say, when I have an opportunity. Mr. Churchill, Mr. Balfour, Sir Edward Carson, Sir Eric Geddes, were



always sympathetic and anxious to help, but they were under the control of the machine which recognized its own difficulties but often failed to appreciate other points of view. The Chief Naval Censor, Sir Douglas Brownrigg, is a delightful companion, but more suited to the quarter-deck than the Censor's Department.

Much irritation was due to the form of the Defence of the Realm Act, and the regulations issued under it, which were amended in some respects after a protest by the newspapers. I suggest that the regulations regarding the Press should be revised in the light of experience, and that the revised draft should be retained in the archives of the War Office for use in case of need.

Copy of letter from Lord Northcliffe to Lord Riddell, dated 20th April, 1915. Published in *The Times*, 1st April, 1921.

MY DEAR SIR GEORGE,—

Propos our conversation to-day. The vexed question of war correspondents is not a difficult one. The chief difficulty is that of getting writers and artists of distinction to do the work. So far as the English armies in France and Flanders are concerned, they want correspondents, and, by the way, they want more newspapers and other reading matter.

General French has come to the same opinion as the Germans, that war correspondents are necessary to armies, first, as the German war book tells us, in order that the troops may read about the war in which they are engaged, and, secondly, so that the public may know about their relations and friends and the war itself. I had the pleasure of a couple of days at General French's Headquarters, and discussed the subject with him and many Staff Officers. If really good men can be obtained, there should be no difficulty in allowing responsible, fully accredited writers, artists, photographers, and cinematograph operators, under the guidance of some officer and proper censorship, to be with our various armies. What the Germans can do we ought to be able to do. I do not suggest that they should be the same correspondents all the time, because journalists do not write freshly if they are engaged too long in the same task. The selection might easily be left to you and the Newspaper Proprietors' Association.

There should certainly also be at Headquarters a permanent correspondent of Reuter's Agency, able to send out contradictions of the German lies at least as quickly as Doctor Hamann issues his matter from Berlin. The Foreign Office is obviously anxious to counteract the effect of these mendacious reports in neutral countries. As to the French Army, I am informed that at Headquarters they have no objection to such a permanent correspondent being with the English Army. They have already recently adopted means to circulate news of the French Army rapidly throughout the whole world. The attitude taken at the French Headquarters was that, as far as the English Army is concerned, it is not their affair. General Joffre said: "The English have done so much more than we could have expected that I have no right either to criticize or to suggest anything."

A member of his staff, who deals with these matters, said to me during the course of a conversation which, I may say, lasted five hours, "We are quite willing to receive writers of distinction, each preferably representing a syndicate of newspapers, and not one newspaper." I pointed out that such Cook's tours as the last one through the English and French lines are of no use to anyone. He realized that, and said that if writers of distinction went they should have a much more leisurely experience. The telegram I showed to you to-day was asking me to get a certain famous correspondent.

It is essential that the War Office should understand that just as there are generals and generals, so there are writers and writers.

The process of getting correspondents to the Front of the French Army appears to be as follows: The French Ambassador communicates with the Foreign Office in Paris, naming a correspondent, the Foreign Office passes on the name to the Headquarter Staff, and the necessary arrangements are then made. I thoroughly understand General Joffre's objection to a miscellaneous crowd of newspaper people, or any other people, hanging about his headquarters. I realize, as I said to you to-day, that a newspaper man with an army is just as much of a nuisance as a soldier would be in a newspaper office. On the other hand, if the Government wish to avoid strikes and to enlist in this War the services of the whole of the people, they should strain every nerve to get really distinguished writers to make the War what it is—a matter of life or death to the nation.

I have written at some length because I have devoted considerable time and thought to the subject.

Yours sincerely,

NORTHCLIFFE.

Sir George A. Riddell,  
20th April, 1915.

#### DISCUSSION.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. H. ANDERSON (Staff College, Camberley) said: As a firm believer in the necessity of training in peace together so that we may have mutual confidence between the Press and the Army in war, I should like to mention, from the point of view of a soldier who was in France the whole time, one concrete case as showing where we as soldiers were at fault in our lack of complete organization. The case I want to bring before you illustrates the fact that, after the Press had once been accepted at the Front, a great many of us who were not at general headquarters were unaware of its exact standing, of the number of correspondents, and even of the fact that correspondents were in our areas, for they were not under our direction, but were directed from general headquarters. My own experience at the headquarters of divisions, corps, and armies was that any person of intelligence who was ever for any particular time at such headquarters could always deduce what was going to happen from various obvious small signs; in that way people at headquarters who used their eyes and brains were undoubtedly able to get some information. If the Press had been in the confidence of the commanders there is no question but that matters which were known to be secret would never have been published. But there is a danger when you have correspondents who are not officially informed of things, and are able to find them out for themselves, that information will be injudiciously published. It is a rule of human nature that when

you find a thing out for yourself you are inclined to make use of it. I think the ordinary soldier—I speak for myself—before the War had a hazy sort of recollection that MacMahon's march east to relieve Metz was given away to the Germans by the British Press. That was about the extent of the knowledge of the Press which the ordinary soldier possessed, and from that episode there dates a certain suspicion with regard to Press correspondents. Well, Sir, here is the case, which I think is interesting as showing the necessity that not only general headquarters, but also those below in command, should be aware of the position of Press correspondents. In June, 1917, after the Second Army had made their attack at Messines, Sir Douglas Haig was anxious that the Germans should not know that troops were moving north up to Flanders to take part in what were subsequently known as the Passchendael operations. He was anxious that the Germans should not think that offensive operations on the front south of Flanders were ceasing, and accordingly he gave orders to Lord Horne, who was commanding the First Army, that he should induce the Germans to think that operations on this front were being continued in force. The First Army area included the front opposite Lens and Douai and in front of the Vimy Ridge, where operations had been taking place during April and May. Consequently, for 28th June, 1917, Lord Horne arranged that several minor operations which he wished to carry out should be combined into one operation and joined up by a heavy bombardment on the whole front covering three small attacks; also that by means of smoke demonstrations and dummies over the trenches and a concentration in the air and every other manoeuvre, an endeavour should be made to deceive the Germans into imagining that an attack was intended on a front of fifteen miles between Loos on the north (where one of the three operations took place), past Lens in the centre (where the Canadians were in charge of an operation), down to Oppy Wood on the south where there was another operation), the three minor operations to be covered by bombardment on the whole front in such a manner as to simulate a great attack. The attack was to be carried out just before dusk in order that the situation might not be cleared up to the enemy before darkness fell, and that alarms and rumours as to what was happening might reach the Germans throughout the night. A thousand guns' bombardment on this front of fifteen miles was undertaken. The operation was very successful, and Lord Horne was satisfied at having carried it through so as to get the desired effect. But on 30th June, in the papers from home, we read to our chagrin an account of these operations. We were not aware—Lord Horne and myself—that there were correspondents in this region, but the accounts were most vivid, and did credit to the intelligence of the correspondents, although at the same time they gave away the strategy, as we thought, to the Germans. May I read a short extract from the account in one journal?—

"Between these two extremes"—that is, Loos on the north and Oppy on the south—"our men edged forward on both sides of the Souchez River, and all these four operations were covered by one tremendous bombardment of the enemy's front from north of Lens to below Oppy, over the whole of which area his trenches and gun positions were subjected to shelling as heavy and sustained as that which ordinarily accompanies an infantry attack on a first-class scale. Probably the Germans will claim that such an attack was expected, and certainly they were justified in expecting it."

That was just what we wanted the Germans to claim. But the account goes on:—

"The chief object, however, was probably not a large geographical advance, but the hammering of the enemy and disorganizing his retirement. His

casualties we know from prisoners were very heavy"—actually we got some three hundred prisoners—"and the invisible effects of our shelling behind the whole front must have been terrific."

The end of the article runs:—

"The whole concerted operations, therefore, were extremely satisfactory. I am not sure that it does not almost verge on a practical joke to cover four such minor enterprises with one universal bombardment on such a scale as we gave the enemy last evening. But it served the excellent purpose of thoroughly deceiving and bewildering the enemy. They can seldom have been more badly worried, and their losses from shelling alone must have been very heavy."

Well, it seems obvious to me that had the Press correspondents known of the exact nature of the instructions these extracts would not have been written. For these extracts, sent by wireless to Amsterdam or Rotterdam, would indicate to the Germans that we were really bluffing.

LORD RIDDELL: Why did the Censor pass them?

MAJOR-GENERAL ANDERSON: I was about to mention that. I am not in any way criticizing the Press. This was passed by the Censor. My point is that had we been in better touch with the Press correspondents we could have explained to them the whole of what was intended, and such a course, as Lord Riddell has said, would have been sufficient to prevent anything being given away by them. As it was, we believed that through that article a great part of a successful operation was given away because the Germans would undoubtedly see that it was bluffing which was intended. My purpose in rising was simply to say that we must train in peace in the Army so as to understand the Press position. The position of the Press in war—and I agree that the Press has to come into war—should be known, not only to general headquarters, but to subordinate commands, and the rest may be left to the honour of the profession and to their patriotic motives.

LORD RIDDELL, who was then called upon by the Chairman to reply, said: There is nothing for me to reply to. I am in complete sympathy with what Major-General Anderson has said. I think that he has put his finger on a weak spot which will receive attention in due course.

The CHAIRMAN: It now devolves upon me to wind up the proceedings. I think that from what Lord Riddell has said—the accuracy of which I can vouch for very closely—the conclusion which I derive is that where we were lacking—I am speaking from the point of view of the officials and authorities—was in the fact that we did not quite carry out in war the spirit, at any rate, of the arrangements we had made in peace. In peace our arrangements were based on a willing and very close co-operation between the naval and military authorities and the Press, and when restrictions had to be imposed it was the Press who imposed them on themselves. When war came the mistake which was made—and which I hope will not be made at another time—was in forsaking that principle. The counsel of perfection would be for the naval and military authorities to say that this or that matter must not be mentioned, and to leave it to the Press, who would then see that it was not mentioned, and those under their orders would obey them readily and willingly. The reason, speaking generally, why this counsel of perfection was not followed was because we were not quite ready, and we were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the catastrophe. It was not only that these Press arrangements

—in some of which we had great hopes—did not quite bear the strain, but in every department of the work of the nation there was a breakage at certain points, and the only wonder is that the national organization stood the strain at all.

I have to thank Lord Riddell on behalf of you all for the time that he has given to this subject, and the extremely interesting paper which he has read to us. I wish to assure him that the interest of his paper is not confined to the comparatively few who are here to-day. It will be printed in our JOURNAL, and I cannot say how many thousands of readers all over the world will read it, and I am sure will derive enjoyment and instruction from it.

MAJOR-GENERAL ANDERSON: I am sure I am only voicing the debt which those present owe to you, Sir, when I propose a vote of thanks to you for taking the chair. If it had not been the evening before Good Friday we should have had a much larger attendance. Having served some time ago at the War Office in a subordinate position, I have met Sir Reginald Brade—at any rate in the passages!—and I know what real sacrifice of time it means for him to come here and take the chair at this lecture.

The vote of thanks was accorded by acclamation, and the proceedings terminated.





## A NAVAL COMPARISON, 1807-1917.

By **LIEUT.-COMMANDER VICTOR H. DANCKWERTS, R.N.**

On Tuesday, 5th April, 1921, at 5.30 p.m.

**REAR-ADMIRAL H. W. RICHMOND, C.B.,** in the Chair.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** My only duty at the present moment is to introduce the lecturer, Lieut.-Commander Victor H. Danckwerts, who comes up from the Staff College to give us an outline of a comparison between the naval circumstances in this country in 1807 and in 1917. From what I have heard of the plan of his lecture I think the parallel which he will draw will be a very interesting one and deserving of our attention, and I hope there will be some discussion on what he says afterwards.

### LECTURE

**May 16th, 1806.**

Great Britain declares the European coast from Brest to the Elbe to be blockaded.

**November 21st, 1806.**

Napoleon issues the Berlin Decree, declaring the whole British Isles to be blockaded.

**November 11th, 1807.**

Great Britain declares the whole coast of Europe to be in a state of blockade.

**December 17th, 1807.**

Napoleon increases the stringency of his orders by the Milan Decree.

**November 5th, 1914.**

Great Britain declares the North Sea to be a military area, dangerous to neutrals.

**February 18th, 1915.**

Germany declares a war area round the British Isles dangerous to neutrals.

**March 1st, 1915.**

Great Britain declares intercourse with Germany by sea to be cut off.

**February 1st, 1917.**

Germany declares unrestricted submarine warfare.

**February 16th, 1917.**

Great Britain increases the stringency of her orders.

### INTRODUCTION.

1. The parallel revealed by the table given above is almost complete. To all appearances, after an interval of 110 years, the steps taken in the life and death struggle between sea power and land power are almost exact repetitions of those taken in the struggle between the same great sea power and the man who once controlled the whole of Europe.

Insert the word "blockade" in place of the evasive and less controversial expressions used in 1915, and it appears that Germany did but follow the example of Napoleon in struggling against the silent, inexorable pressure of the sea. On each occasion the struggle was prolonged and bitter, on each occasion the power of the sea came near to exhaustion, but on each occasion the British Empire emerged triumphant.

2. In this paper an attempt will be made to examine into this apparent parallel and to discover to what extent it is more than superficial, and whether we may deduce lessons of importance, or confirm those tardily deduced from the Napoleonic Wars by modern writers. To do this it is necessary to sketch briefly the chief events in the struggle between sea and land power on each occasion.

## PART I.—THE NAPOLEONIC WARS.

### ORIGIN OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM.

3. The Continental system has always been associated with the name of Napoleon, for he it was who enforced it and perfected it. But it was no new conception of his own. As far back as 1793 it was foreshadowed, and in January, 1797, the Directory published a Decree almost as severe as Napoleon's later restrictions, which only failed to be as famous because the Directory was too weak to enforce it throughout Europe, and Napoleon, in the early years of his power, too occupied to turn his mind to the commercial struggle. It was not till 1806 that he began his great effort "to conquer the sea by the land."

### PRUSSIA FORCED INTO THE WAR.

4. On 1st April, 1806, King Frederick William III of Prussia was compelled by the threat of war with Napoleon to issue an ordinance which excluded British ships from the ports of Prussia and Hanover. (They were, of course, already excluded from the ports of France.) The British Government replied by placing an embargo on some 400 Prussian ships then in British harbours, and on 8th April, declared a blockade of the coast from the Ems to the Elbe. This was followed by a declaration of war against Prussia.

### ORDER-IN-COUNCIL OF 16th MAY, 1806.

5. On 16th May, 1806, Great Britain issued an Order-in-Council placing the coast of the Continent from Brest to the Elbe in a state of blockade. The blockade, however, was only to be enforced strictly between the mouth of the Seine and Ostend. Outside these limits the coast was not closed to neutral ships provided that they had not come from, or were not bound to, one of the enemy's ports, and carried none of his goods. This order appears on the face of it to be peculiarly futile, but it was designed to avoid, as far as possible, the difficulties with America then beginning to be seriously felt, more especially those in connection with the rule of 1756. It was also necessary in the

interests of British merchants not to cut off trade with Germany in neutral bottoms, and, moreover, Prussia was only forced into opposition and was not at heart hostile. On 25th September, in fact, the restrictions on the trade of the Elbe and the Weser were removed, and on the 26th Prussia sent an ultimatum to Napoleon which resulted in war. By the end of October Prussia had been crushed, and on the 21st November, 1806, Napoleon issued the famous Berlin Decree.

#### THE BERLIN DECREE.

6. The preamble of this Decree stated that, whereas Great Britain did not recognise International Law as observed by civilised nations, but extended her hostilities to ships engaged in commerce, to peaceful individuals, and to their property on board merchant ships, and declared coasts to be blockaded on which she had not a single warship—measures which aimed at ruining the world's commerce to the advantage of her own—therefore Napoleon had resolved to apply against her the measures of her own maritime code. Accordingly he declared the British Isles to be in a state of blockade, and prohibited all commerce and correspondence with them. All British subjects found in any country occupied by French or allied troops were liable to imprisonment, their merchandise and property being also considered lawful prize. The Decree further declared that no ship coming from Great Britain or her colonies would be received in French or allied ports, and ordered the confiscation of ship and cargo whenever false statements were made on this head.<sup>1</sup>

7. The preamble ended with a clause defining the duration of the Edict, which said "The present Decree shall be considered as a fundamental principle of the Empire, until England has acknowledged that the law of war is one and the same on the land and on the sea, that it cannot be extended to private property of whatever kind, nor to the persons of individuals not in the profession of arms, and that the right of blockade must be restricted to fortified places, actually invested by sufficient forces."<sup>2</sup>

8. The Decree was communicated at once to the governments of Spain, Naples, Holland, and Etruria, and its adoption was expected as a sign of friendship to Napoleon; while every government that made peace with him thenceforth was expected to comply with this and the later enactments of the Continental system.

#### GROUPING OF POWERS.

9. In order to have a proper understanding of the effect of this Decree it is necessary to take into consideration the position on the Continent at the time. Spain, Holland, Italy, and the smaller German states were vassals of Napoleon, all completely under his control. Austria had been completely overthrown in the short Austerlitz

<sup>1</sup> Cambridge Modern History. Vol. ix., p. 365.

<sup>2</sup> Mahan. "Influence of Sea Power on French Revolution and Empire." Vol. ii., p. 273.

campaign of 1805; Prussia had just been crushed in the shorter Jena campaign of 1806. With the exception of Portugal, Russia, Scandinavia, and a portion of the Levant, Napoleon was master of the coastline of Europe, and well able to close that coastline against British goods. By the treaty of Tilsit in July, 1807, Russia was brought within the system, and a secret clause bound Russia and France to make common cause, and to summon jointly Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, and Austria to shut their ports against England.

#### ORDER-IN-COUNCIL OF 7th JANUARY, 1807.

10. The British Government replied to the Berlin Decree by an Order-in-Council dated 7th January, 1807, which forbade all trade by neutral vessels between two ports whence British ships were excluded. The direct object of this order was to stop the coastwise traffic of Europe. It may be noted that it bore very heavily on American ships, which were in the habit of coasting from port to port of the Continent.

11. Napoleon returned to Paris in July, 1807, and proceeded to devote his attention to the strict enforcement of his Decrees. Portugal and Denmark were notified that they had to choose between war with France or war with Great Britain, with the result that the Danish Fleet was seized by Great Britain, Portugal was invaded by the French, although the Portuguese Fleet escaped to Brazil, and the ports of both Portugal and Denmark were closed against British ships. Turkey was at war with Great Britain, Leghorn and the Papal States were seized by Napoleon, and at last he was able to say that the whole coast of Europe was closed against British ships. The pressure on the country soon began to be felt, and brought about the issue of the famous retaliatory Orders-in-Council of 11th November, 1807.

#### ORDERS-IN-COUNCIL OF 11th NOVEMBER, 1807.

12. There were actually three Orders-in-Council of that date followed by three more on 25th November, all of which dealt with the same subject. Setting forth the Berlin Decree as the justifying ground for their action, the Orders-in-Council proclaimed a paper blockade of all the ports from which the British flag was excluded, that is, a blockade of the whole coast of Europe. To quote from the text of the Orders:—"All ports and places of France and her allies or of any country at war with His Majesty, and all other ports or places in Europe from which, although not at war with His Majesty, the British flag is excluded, and all ports in the Colonies of His Majesty's enemies, shall from henceforth be subject to the same restrictions, in point of trade and navigation, as if the same were actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner."<sup>1</sup> In addition all trade in articles produced by countries excluding British ships and goods, or by their colonies, was to be considered unlawful and all ships indulging in such trade were thenceforth to be lawful prize. Another clause threatened

<sup>1</sup> Mahan. "Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire." Vol ii., p. 283.

the penalty of confiscation against any ship on which were found French "certificates of origin," that is, papers which declared the cargo to be non-British.

13. An examination of the text of these orders suffices to show that the British Government, while pressing heavily on all States which freely placed their resources at the disposal of Napoleon, yet sought to lessen the hardships of those on which the Continental system was imposed by force. This action was not prompted by motives of philanthropy, but was taken in order to maintain the commerce of Great Britain by forcing the enemy's trade to pass through British ports, and thus raising Britain's revenues to the point necessary to support her in the great struggle. The British Ministry's catch phrase was "No trade except through England."

#### THE MILAN DECREE.

14. Napoleon replied with the Milan Decree of 17th December, 1807. The Berlin Decree had only declared merchandise which had passed through a British port to be good prize; the new Decree declared the ships which carried the merchandise to be condemned as well. Alleging that the Orders-in-Council subjected all neutrals to an enforced stay in a British port and a compulsory impost on the cargo, he then declared that any ship undergoing search by British cruisers or compulsory voyage to a British port was thereby "denationalised," and would be considered lawful prize. Any ship, of whatever nation, sailing from any British port would also count as good prize.

#### GENERAL LINES OF THE RIVAL POLICIES.

15. Thus, in 1807 the two combatants had laid down the general lines of the policies which they intended to pursue. Napoleon's conception was that, by closing the whole coast of Europe to the products of Great Britain and her colonies, and thus sweeping away the export trade of Great Britain, he would destroy utterly the wealth of that country and compel her to sue for peace upon his own terms. He was making no serious attempt to stop the British import trade by direct means, for he had no force available for such a purpose other than scattered privateers, and in any case it does not seem to have been one of his objects. Physical starvation of England at that time was probably impossible, and so far was Napoleon from attempting it that we even find that he occasionally encouraged the export of grain from France to England when the former country had a surplus harvest. In order to make his system effective, Napoleon brushed aside the rights of neutrals, excusing this illegal conduct as retaliation for the illegal conduct of Great Britain. In his view neutrality meant trade with England, and trade with England meant advantage to the latter and disadvantage to himself. "There are no neutrals," he wrote to Russia in 1810, referring to the situation of Denmark and Sweden.

16. Could Napoleon have enforced his decrees absolutely the danger to England would have been very great, for she had become



the warehouse and manufacturing centre of Europe. The only other developed markets at that time were the U.S. of America and the West India Colonies. With Europe completely cut off it was possible that with these alone England might have eked out a precarious existence, but as it was, the American market became more and more uncertain. It was eventually cut off altogether by the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809. South America for a brief period attracted the manufactures of England, but the supply so far exceeded the demand that many firms reached bankruptcy through speculative shipping to Monte Video.

17. Faced with the apparent destruction of her own export trade, Great Britain determined to prevent the free importation of colonial products into France in neutral ships. Napoleon had decreed that English goods were forbidden in the countries under his sway, and that no neutral ship might call at a port in the British Isles. Great Britain replied by importing her products into the Continent by every possible means, and by decreeing that no neutral ship might proceed to Europe *without* calling at a port in the British Isles.

18. Napoleon based his decree upon a control of all the coasts of Europe which should enable him to confiscate all ships evading his orders. Great Britain based hers upon a command of the sea sufficient to make it dangerous for neutrals to disobey her. The logical result of the two systems should have been that England would have had no exports and Europe no imports, and it would have become a question whether England could do without her exports longer than Europe could do without her imports. But as a matter of fact this simple issue was never reached, as each combatant proceeded to complicate the situation by the development of a system of licenses designed to enable ships to evade her decrees. The necessity for trade between England and Europe was too great to be denied.

#### THE LICENSE SYSTEM.

19. Already, in 1806, the British Government had begun to issue licenses to neutrals to trade in a manner forbidden by the Orders-in-Council then in force. In the year 1807, 2,606 licenses were granted; in 1809 more than 15,000; and in 1810 as many as 18,000. The majority of these licenses were issued to neutrals or only nominal enemies, such as Prussia and Russia.

20. Napoleon adopted a similar system in 1809-10, granting licenses for the export of French, Italian, and German merchandise in the ships of those countries, and the import into French harbours of colonial goods, provided that French manufactures were exported instead. Thus we find the two mortal enemies collaborating to defeat the measures devised by each for the destruction of the other. To quote from Mahan "Under the rival license systems new and curious methods of evasion grew up. Compelled to take French articles which were not wanted in Great Britain, as well as those that were, the former were put on board of so inferior a quality that they could be thrown into the sea without loss. At either end smuggling boats met the licensed vessel before entering port, and took from her forbidden

articles. Ships of either nation with foreign flag and simulated papers were to be seen in each other's ports."<sup>1</sup>

21. Other causes also were at work to modify the effect of Napoleon's decrees. In 1808 the Spanish rising opened one door to the Continent; the German coast ever provided another. In 1809 Great Britain even found it profitable to restrict the blockade to the coasts of France, Holland, and Italy. All the Northern States of Europe chafed under the Napoleonic yoke, and all connived at evasion of his edicts. At the end of 1810 Russia began openly to admit the prohibited goods, and in July, 1812, the formal conclusion of peace between Great Britain, Russia, and Sweden virtually put an end to the Continental system. Its downfall was assured by the campaigns of 1812 and 1813.

## PART II.—THE EUROPEAN WAR, 1914-1919.

### CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.

22. Before narrating those events in the late War of which it is desired to take notice, it is necessary to recall two of the changes which had occurred in the last century. The first of these was the Declaration of Paris, signed and ratified in 1856.

23. The second change was the Declaration of London. This had not been ratified by the British Government, but it is of importance in view of the fact that the Government announced on 20th August, 1914, that they intended to be guided by the Declaration of London with certain modifications.

24. The effect of Article 4 of the Declaration of Paris, and the articles on Blockade in the Declaration of London, were such that Great Britain never declared a blockade of Germany, for by so doing she would have rendered herself liable to all the limitations and legal disabilities laid down in the two declarations. In the words of Mr. Asquith—"we should have been enmeshed in a net of juridical niceties."

### GROUPING OF THE POWERS.

25. We must also take note of the grouping of the Powers in 1914. The enemy coastline was limited to Germany in the Baltic and North Sea, Austria in the Adriatic, and Turkey and Bulgaria in the Near East. The coasts of Russia, Belgium, France, and later Italy were under allied control. All the rest of the coast of Europe was neutral. The neutrality of Holland and Scandinavia was particularly important since the allies were not in a position to prevent exports to Germany from those countries. The development of America and the great self-governing Dominions has freed Great Britain to a large extent from her dependence on the markets of Europe. On the other hand she is now absolutely dependent on overseas commerce for her continued existence. More than half the food and raw materials absolutely

<sup>1</sup> Mahan. "Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire." Vol. ii., p. 327.

necessary to keep the country from starvation are imported from overseas, and they are paid for by exports of coal and manufactures. Great Britain is more dependent on oversea communications for her existence than any other country has ever been.

#### THE OPENING MOVES.

26. On 4th August, 1914, the British Government issued their lists of contraband articles. On 20th August an Order-in-Council was issued, declaring that, since France and Russia had informed the British Government that they intended to act in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration of London, and since it was desirable that the naval operations of the Allies should be conducted on similar principles, therefore during the present hostilities the Declaration of London, subject to certain modifications, would be adopted and put into force as if the same had been ratified by His Majesty's Government. The chief of the modifications referred to was the affirmation of the doctrine of continuous voyage as applied to conditional contraband. This was absolutely essential if allied action at sea was to have any effect on Germany, since all German oversea trade was diverted through neutral channels, Holland and Scandinavia.

27. The British Government continued the attempt to carry out the provisions of the Declaration of London whilst continually varying the details. Copper, iron ore, rubber, wool, and cotton were successively declared absolute contraband, although they had all been upon the free list of the Declaration of London. Various other modifications were made, but it was not until July, 1916, that the Government finally cancelled all orders relating to the Declaration of London and announced that "it is, and always has been, His Majesty's intention, as it is and has been that of his allies, to exercise their belligerent rights at sea in strict accordance with the Law of Nations."

#### CLOSING OF THE NORTH SEA.

28. To return to the narrative. On 3rd November, 1914, the British Admiralty published an announcement which was described as the Closing of the North Sea. Stating that minelaying under a neutral flag and reconnaissance conducted by trawlers, hospital ships, and neutral vessels, were the ordinary features of German naval warfare, they therefore gave notice that "the whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and all other vessels will be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines which it has been necessary to lay, and from warships searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft. . . . From the 5th November onwards the Admiralty announce that all ships passing a line drawn from the northern point of the Hebrides through the Faroe Islands to Iceland do so at their own peril. Ships of all countries wishing to trade to and from Norway, the Baltic, Denmark and Holland are advised to come, if inward bound, by the English Channel and the Straits of Dover.

There they will be given sailing directions which will pass them safely, so far at least as Great Britain is concerned, up the East Coast of England to Farne Island, whence a safe route will, if possible, be given to Lindenaes Lighthouse."

29. It will be noticed that this was not an Order-in-Council or a State document of any kind. It was merely an announcement by the Admiralty, issued through the Press. It was not legally valid in any way, and it did not order, it advised. It was merely intended, by dwelling on unknown and unexplained dangers, to frighten neutrals into taking the advice offered and passing through the Downs. By this means all ships could be more easily examined and a greater control could be obtained over them than if they passed into the North Sea round the North of Scotland.

#### GERMAN DECLARATION OF WAR AREA.

30. Meanwhile Germany had been experimenting with the submarine as a weapon against commerce. It had become evident that the submarine on the surface was so vulnerable a craft that she could not afford to employ the accepted method of commerce warfare, that of search. Moreover the geographical and strategical position of Germany was such that the submarine could not capture and send in her prizes, even if she wished to do so. The alternative was to sink all prizes without search by means of gun or torpedo. This involved danger to neutrals which increased as the British adopted the old methods of concealment by neutral flags and neutral markings.

31. By 1st February, 1915, the German Government had come to the conclusion that the serious use of submarines against commerce was worth trying. Accordingly they announced that—

"All waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland and all English seas are hereby declared to be a war area."

"From the 18th of February all ships of the enemy mercantile marine in these waters will be destroyed, and it will not always be possible to avoid danger to the crews and passengers thereon."

32. In a long justification issued by the German Ambassador to the United States in reply to a protest from that country, it was specifically stated that the methods of England referred to in the declaration were the arming of merchant ships, the instructions to merchant ships to resist examination and capture, and the use of neutral flags by British ships. The Ambassador's statement ended by saying "Germany is compelled to resort to this kind of warfare by the murderous ways of British naval warfare, which aim at the destruction of legitimate neutral trade, and at the starvation of the German people. Germany will be obliged to adhere to these announced principles till England submits to the recognised rules of warfare established by the Declarations of Paris and London."

33. Compare this passage with the words of Napoleon in the Berlin Decree—England's "measure which aimed at ruining the world's commerce to the advantage of her own"—and again "the present decree shall remain a fundamental principle of the Empire until



England has acknowledged that the law of war is one and the same on the land and on the sea, that it cannot be extended to private property of whatever kind, nor to the persons of individuals not in the profession of arms, and that the right of blockade must be restricted to fortified places, actually invested by sufficient forces." Increased immunity from capture of so-called private property at sea, and the definition and limitation of blockade were two of the fundamental ideas at the base of the Declarations of Paris and London, to which declarations Germany appealed. Surely the parallel between the decrees of Napoleon and of Germany, decrees so far apart in time but so similar in expression, and directed towards the same processes of the strangling grip of sea power, should mark for us the importance of those very processes, and warn us against future efforts to restrict by international agreement and codification the "exercise of our belligerent rights at sea in accordance with the law of nations."

#### ORDER-IN-COUNCIL OF 11TH MARCH, 1915.

34. Great Britain's reply to the German declaration was not long delayed. On 11th March was issued an Order-in-Council "framing reprisals for restricting further the commerce of Germany," which bids fair to become in future years as famous as the Orders-in-Council of November, 1807. Quoting as its justification the German declaration of a war area and the methods to be adopted therein, and claiming that such methods gave Great Britain an unquestionable right of retaliation, the order contained five main clauses, which were to the following effect:—

- (i) No merchant ship might sail to any German port.
- (ii) No merchant ship which sailed from any German port might proceed on her voyage with any goods on board laden at such port.
- (iii) No merchant ship might carry to a port other than a German port any goods having an enemy destination.
- (iv) No merchant ship sailing from a port other than a German port might carry goods of enemy origin or ownership.
- (v) Any vessel which cleared for a neutral port, or was allowed to pass with such a destination, and which subsequently proceeded to an enemy port, would be liable to condemnation if captured on any subsequent voyage.

35. An examination of this order shows that, whilst avoiding all the legal difficulties of declaring a blockade of Germany, it yet aimed at securing all the essential results of such a blockade, and extended its operations to the prevention of enemy commerce through adjacent neutral countries, a thing specifically forbidden in blockade except as regards contraband of war. Further, any ship which evaded the orders and so to speak ran the blockade, might be condemned if captured even when innocently employed on a subsequent voyage, a danger of ultimate condemnation, amounting almost to a certainty, to which the blockade runner had never previously been exposed.



## METHODS OF ENFORCING THE ORDERS.

36. The order was enforced by intercepting at sea all ships passing North of Scotland, and intercepting in the Straits of Dover all ships passing by the English Channel. All intercepted ships were sent into harbour for examination, and this examination naturally entailed considerable delay and caused great annoyance to neutrals. It soon became apparent that delay on the one hand, and trouble on the other, would be avoided if guarantees could be obtained which would render it safe to permit the passage of certain commodities to countries adjacent to Germany. Every means was used to induce neutral governments to afford guarantees against re-exportation of certain commodities, and to induce neutral merchants to make similar guarantees as to the ultimate destination of goods consigned to them. In general it was found that agreements with neutral governments were not of much value, whereas agreements with private firms or small groups of firms were respected and carried out. Over forty such agreements were made. The main inducement was the avoidance of delay to the ship working under such guarantee, but this was supplemented by certain forms of pressure. The chief of these was British control of bunker coal, a necessary commodity which was refused to suspect ships or firms. Another important form of pressure developed in 1916 was the control of jute, a product of the British Empire largely in demand by merchants for packing all classes of goods. Finally a system of rationing was adopted, in some cases by agreement and in some cases without it, by which the imports of a neutral country were so controlled that that country had to consume her own home products instead of exporting them to Germany and replacing them by imports.

37. The entry of the United States of America into the War in April, 1917, converted America from an attitude of protest to one of support of the system, and greatly simplified the task of the Allies. Ninety per cent. of the ships passing North about cleared from America, and after the entry of the U.S.A. the War Trade Board took over complete control of American exports, rendering examination on this side of the Atlantic unnecessary. To this cause, and to the compliance of practically all neutral shipping with the demands of the Allies, may be attributed the fact that at the end of the War the so-called blockade of Germany had become a world-wide control of all trade, scarcely requiring a blockading squadron to enforce it. The 10th Cruiser Squadron, which carried out the Northern Patrol, was actually withdrawn on 30th January, 1918.

## UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE.

38. Germany made no further advance in policy for nearly two years after her declaration of the war area. During this time she made her initial effort to bring about a decision by means of the submarine campaign. It failed; partly owing to a lack of necessary numbers of submarines, partly owing to the development of methods of defence, and largely owing to the increasing restrictions placed upon the operations by the necessity for complying with the protests of neutrals.

Finally it became clear to Germany that she could not bring about any really considerable result without abandoning all pretence of keeping within preconceived bounds of law and humanity. Relying on the prediction of the Admiral Staff that England would be forced to sue for peace in six months, she threw caution to the winds and declared for unrestricted submarine warfare on 1st February, 1917. This was the final step that brought America into the War.

#### FURTHER REPRISALS BY GREAT BRITAIN.

39. Great Britain replied by the issue of a further Order-in-Council dated 16th February, 1917. The preamble quoted as justification the new German Memorandum, which it described as "In flagrant contradiction to the rules of International Law, the dictates of humanity, and the treaty obligations of the enemy." The order then declared that any vessel encountered at sea on her way to or from a port in any neutral country affording means of access to the enemy territory without calling at a port in British or Allied territory, should, until the contrary were established, be deemed to be carrying goods with an enemy destination or of enemy origin, and should be brought in for examination, and if necessary for adjudication before the Prize Court. Further, any vessel carrying goods with an enemy destination or of enemy origin, and not calling at a British or Allied port for examination, should be liable to condemnation in respect of such carriage.

40. Here again we have arrived at a position precisely similar to that of 1807. Germany said that no ship might proceed to the British Isles. Great Britain replied by declaring that no ship might proceed to Europe without calling at a British or Allied port.

### PART III.

#### COMPARISON.

41. If we now compare the two periods of war which we have described we see that the apparent parallel remains, but it is only a parallel between the methods employed, and not between the objects with which they were adopted. In 1807 Napoleon declared a blockade of Great Britain, and Great Britain declared a blockade of all the countries controlled by Napoleon. In 1917 Germany issued orders tantamount to a blockade of Great Britain, and Great Britain replied with orders even more stringent than a blockade of Germany. But the objects in the two cases were very different. Napoleon wished to cut off the *export* trade of Great Britain and thereby to ruin her. Great Britain wished to foster this trade by every means and to make it pass through England to all parts of Europe chafing under Napoleon's yoke, whilst incidentally raising the prices of goods in France to a prohibitive figure. The declarations of blockade were designed to give a certain legality to the measures employed; on both sides the actual blockades were illusory and were traversed by the respective license systems. In 1917, on the other hand, it was the German intention to destroy the trade of Great Britain, but especially the *import* trade of

food and raw materials. It was the British intention to cut off as far as possible all trade with Germany either by land or sea.

42. This fundamental difference was brought about by three main facts. First, the development of British overseas trade which rendered this country entirely dependent on imports for her very existence, and correspondingly vulnerable to sea attack. Second, the development of a new weapon, the submarine, which could be systematically used by Germany against British shipping, both import and export, in spite of the fact that British surface supremacy was greater than ever before. Third, the development of modern warfare into a national struggle, involving every person and every interest in the community, and entirely upsetting the ordinary channels of trade and finance, and the ordinary dependence on exports to pay for imports, whilst freeing this country from the necessity of cultivating markets under the enemy's control.

43. Napoleon's dictum as to the method of dealing with England remains true to-day—invasion, attack on trade, or peace. In any future wars in which this country may be involved we may still expect that attack on our lines of supply will be the enemy's chief means of exerting pressure on us, and we are unique among the great nations of the world—with the possible exception of Japan—in that success in this attack must quickly bring us to sue for peace. But the result in the last War is what it was in the great French wars, the success was not achieved. True, in 1917, the Germans were very near success, but so was Napoleon in 1809; again, there are those who say that the Germans would have reached success in 1919, but who can say to what extent the ever increasing severity of our blockade would have prevented the very developments which were said to be coming? Who can say to what extent our counter measures would have defeated the German submarine? Who can say even now to what extent the blockade actually did contribute to Germany's collapse in 1918? The fact remains that it is still true that a *guerre de course* has never yet been finally successful, and I suggest it is because this form of warfare contains a fallacy—the fallacy of trying to win a war without fighting. On the other hand we see again that the counter pressure exerted by us on our enemy takes long to act, and *must* be supplemented by the defeat of his armed forces on land. Napoleon was finally defeated at Waterloo; Germany was defeated in France and Flanders in the second half of 1918, and though it would be idle to deny that our operations against enemy trade were a very powerful factor in bringing about the final result, yet it is almost certain that they could not have succeeded alone.

44. Between 1807 and 1917 were introduced those Declarations of Paris and London which were supposed to be going to limit the actions of belligerents in dealing with neutral trade. It seems probable that the Declaration of Paris was designed to prevent a recurrence of that control of the world's shipping which was exercised by us during the Napoleonic wars. It was accepted by us because it conferred what was considered to be a priceless boon—the abolition of privateering.

45. By the searching light of war we can perceive that the Declaration of London was engineered by German ideas in the hopes of

limiting the operations of that sea power which could not be wrested from us. Though not ratified before the war began, it had received the sanction of the government of the day, and it had been urged upon us on the grounds that it conferred great benefits upon neutrals, and that we were more likely to be neutral than not.

46. With the exception of the abolition of privateering, there was scarcely a single provision of either declaration which we did not abandon when the need arose. Fear of offending neutrals, or respect for our treaty obligations, were not sufficient to withhold us from adopting measures which could be justified only on the ground of reprisals. As the national characters of wars develop, as wars tend more and more to become life and death struggles between groups of nations, so will tenderness for neutral susceptibilities have less and less restraining influence on the belligerents. In 1810 Napoleon wrote "There are no neutrals"; we may say that to all intents and purposes in 1918 "there were no neutrals"; can we not now say "There never will be any neutrals"?

47. War has become a struggle for existence in which the convenience of a neutral weighs but little against the necessities of a nation fighting for her life, and under modern conditions *any* trade with a country is of assistance to that country in waging war. Surely the only logical position to adopt is to say boldly now that, in time of war, it is our intention to exercise to the full our belligerent rights at sea, whilst observing the dictates of humanity, by making and enforcing such regulations as will cut off, as far as lies within our power, all trade with the countries with whom we are at war, whether by land or sea. This may seem an arrogant claim to make, but it has been held by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to be just as a reprisal, and to be not unreasonably inconvenient to neutrals. Surely then if neutrals can support the loss suffered from the application of such a doctrine as a reprisal, they can support it as an ordinary act of war. It is but the logical conclusion of the doctrine of Contraband of War, as modified to suit the modern conditions of whole nations in arms. It still leaves our vital trade open to attack by any nation which has the necessary maritime power. Why should we, or any other maritime nation, be deprived of the fruits of our maritime strength? Why should we withhold the exercise of this strength until our opponents have made some transgression, perhaps more technical than real, which will justify its use as a reprisal?

48. After all, it is very like what we have done in two great wars under stress of necessity and under plea of reprisals. If ever again we are placed in a similar position the government of the day would be false to their trust if they did not employ every means within their power rather than permit one moment's prolongation of that national calamity, war.

#### DISCUSSION.

CAPTAIN W. EGERTON, R.N.: I think there always have been amongst us—I am talking now of the Services—a certain number of sceptics who do not believe in history. If any of them are here to-day or read the JOURNAL containing this lecture they will see that there is an enormous amount to be learned from a



proper study of history. It seems to me that the facts brought forward to-day are most convincing—when we have a comparison extending over a very long period such as 100 years, and as a matter of fact that comparison could be taken back to wars before the Napoleonic wars—that we have a perfect right to say that the future can be forecast. In the Seven Years' War we were faced with circumstances very similar to those of the Napoleonic Wars, and so were our enemies, the only difference being that the habit of issuing decrees and doing things on paper was not then so highly developed as it became later on. In 1761 Portugal was ordered by our enemies to exclude all British ships from her ports. To her honour she refused. The same principle was exercised in the Napoleonic Wars later on and in the recent European War. To my mind it is clear that in wars of the future we shall have to say that the old proverb is true that history is always repeating itself but with a difference—in this case very little difference. The lecturer has referred to the various conferences held from 1856 onwards, and we have seen how on those occasions we deliberately surrendered our birthright. In 1856 we began by surrendering a right that we had held from time immemorial to capture enemy property at sea under any flag. We conceded that the neutral flag covered the goods. I am not prepared to say for how many years we had been upholding the principle which we surrendered in 1856. In 1897 at the Hague our delegates were commissioned under certain rather specious conditions to go further and to declare all private property at sea immune from capture. Very fortunately for us, other nations did not agree to those specious conditions, and so the thing fell through. But in the Declaration of London we were really bamboozled, because when you come to examine it you find that our enemies, as they afterwards turned out to be, got all they wanted and we gave up our power to enforce what was really our greatest weapon at sea. How was it that we let ourselves be bamboozled in such a manner? I suggest that it was due first to the fact that we did not study history; secondly to the fact that perhaps we had become unduly commercialised, and that when we thought of these things we thought of them in pounds, shillings and pence, while other nations were considering them from the fighting point of view; thirdly and fundamentally, because the people in our country, despite all lip service to the contrary, had lost confidence in the British Navy to do its job. That is not a popular idea but it comes down to that. They would not believe that the Navy could protect our trade in war. They believed that by making all merchant ships free from capture we should be able to carry on our business and that we should get neutrals also to carry on our business for us. Despite everything to the contrary I believe that there will be renewed attempts to codify the rules of war. That is in the nature of things, and the reasons that can be advanced for it are so powerful that we cannot refuse to consider them. But when we go into conferences where such things will be discussed, we ought to go with a clear idea of the lessons of the past, a firm determination to test every proposal by the light of our previous experiences in war, and we must, I think, put forward an even higher test, and that is whether they will stand the test of the unforeseen conditions of the next war.

ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT KING HALL, K.C.B. : I have a very few remarks to make but there is one point that I do think we ought to bear in mind. We have just gone through a long war, and as the lecturer has quite rightly pointed out, history repeats itself. But I happened to be at the Admiralty during the time of the Hague Conference in 1900, and it was borne in upon me that we have to remember that we are not always a belligerent, and if we are going to lay it down that every belligerent has got the right to control all neutral trade, we who are ordinarily speaking the greatest traders on the sea will have to put up with that right being exercised, very much to our detriment. A few cases of the kind arose



during the Russo-Japanese War, and I remember some ship—I have forgotten the name of it, I think it was the "Agincourt"—with regard to which the question came up whether the Russians ought to have confiscated her or compensated the owners. What is the conclusion? You may think perhaps that I am putting the case rather to our detriment. My conclusion is this: that as we recede from the war-like conditions we get of course more and more into the hands of politicians, statesmen and lawyers. These get up and think that they are going to regenerate the world. Well, the attempt has been made to regenerate the world to our certain knowledge for nearly two thousand years by Christianity, and I do not think it is going to be regenerated by Hague Conferences. What I say as an officer of some years' experience now is this, let the lawyers draw up these rules and when the time comes that we have to fight then we have got to sweep these rules overboard as we have done before. Our late enemy, Germany, fought on the principle that when national existence was at stake, necessity knew no law, and Germany was perfectly justified from its point of view. When our national existence is at stake we have got to take up the same attitude, and when these man-made laws do not suit us as fighting people we have to throw them overboard, while when they suit us as neutrals we have to adhere to them and make others adhere to them too. You may think I have finished by an illogical position, but we are ruled by illogical laws in this world, and it is what we have done in the past and what we shall do in the future. I had it also in mind to point out from what our lecturer said about history repeating itself, that history does repeat itself in the matter of bringing neutrals in on your side or against you. At the time of 1807 we were gradually working up, owing to the exercise of our naval rights, to bring in America against us. In the last war Germany by her recklessness brought in America against her. We cannot afford to do without some sort of rules which so long as we stick to them avail to prevent the neutrals from coming in against us while we are at war.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR LAUNCELOTTE GUBBINS: Speaking as a landsman I would like heartily to endorse all that has been said by the last speaker, Admiral Sir Herbert King Hall. I may say that we who are outsiders never lost confidence in the Navy even in the blackest time of the war. I have read the works written on the subject both by the Germans—Von Tirpitz and Von Scheer—and also by our own distinguished officers, but there is one book I have been reading lately and which I would commend to the attention of everyone; it is entitled "The Victory at Sea," by Admiral Sims of the U.S. Navy. I never read a more interesting or a fairer book on every side, and it should be read by everybody who wants a true perspective of the Naval operations in the great struggle.

LIEUT. KING-HALL, R.N.: I thought at one time that I might find myself obliged to disagree from Admiral Sir Herbert King Hall, but I do think that he has truly said that one has to make a distinction between what is put on paper and what is done in practice. That is a matter to keep in mind in connection with various subjects. The lecturer made the remark that it was possible that in future we should have to say that there would be no neutrals. I take it that he was considering only the case of large world wars, and there I think he is perfectly right. I do not think that in a conflict of that nature there can be a neutral. We are all much too closely linked together for there to be neutrals in such an event, and we become more linked together every day. From that it does seem that in view of a future conflict which would affect everybody in the world, those nations which are not concerned with inaugurating the conflict should have some method by means of which they could prevent groups of persons from forcing these world wars. I think that what history has shown, to a moderate extent in the Napoleonic Wars, and to a very considerable extent in the last war, would

be shown probably to an absolute extent in any future war—namely, that the neutrals would be absolutely involved in it—and a stronger argument for some form of League of Nations we could not wish to have.

LIEUT.-COMMANDER C. A. G. HUTCHISON, R.N.: The lecturer put before us the suggestion that we should ignore the neutrals and their susceptibilities in the exercise of our sea power. Well, that may be a sound way of looking at things, but nevertheless I feel inclined to differ from him. If we start a war or if we are involved in a war, with another nation, that does not mean to say that the whole world will be involved in the war at once. There will be a large number of neutrals, and it rests entirely with us as to how we conduct ourselves towards those neutrals, whether at the conclusion of that war we shall find ourselves with a large number of Allies or unfriendly nations. Moreover I feel that the basic principles of international law alone are not sufficient, and that it will be necessary to have a codification of international law. As long as we can adhere to these abstract principles and codify them into laws let us by all means do so. If the principles were taken alone, they might not be understood. Our attitude towards neutrals at the outbreak of war must be very carefully considered.

There is one other point which struck me: the lecturer told us that America did not take any active part in the blockade. I think that is too bald a statement to get about. She did assist in this blockade with her fleet or with the portion of it which was at our Main Fleet base, supporting any forces we had out for the blockade of Germany. Therefore, it is my contention that America was just as much concerned in the blockade of Germany as we were.

COMMANDER MARK WARDLAW: There is one thing perhaps that may not exactly have been dealt with in this lecture, namely, the question of "armed neutrality." A time may arrive in the future when this country wishes to remain neutral, but she cannot remain neutral—she cannot even exist—without her trade. If there are many nations fighting, it would be absolutely necessary that she should enforce her oversea trade into some country or other, and she could only do that by virtue of her sea power. I think that that is liable to be forgotten. The value of her fleet will then be apparent in order to force trade into some country or other when other belligerents are fighting and she desires to remain neutral.

COL. COTTELL: With regard to what the last speaker has said I want to bring this point before the audience. He referred to our need for a fleet to force our trade upon another people. In the lecturer's summary he did not refer to the question of our population here at the present time as compared with a century ago and our ability to live without imports on these islands. The fact that we were able more or less to live on our own products a century ago and are by no means able to now is a very big factor to take into account. We should need our fleet to keep open the bringing of food to this country rather than to force trade upon other countries.

LIEUT.-COMMANDER VICTOR H. DANCKWERTS, R.N., in reply: I think there are only two points to reply to. The first is Lieut. Hutchison's remark about principles. He said that principles were not sufficient and he wanted us to have codification and detailed agreements with all neutrals before war occurs again, simply because they would not understand abstract principles. I admit that if this could be done it would be desirable, but I do not think it could be done with success. The attempt to embody it in a code will always fail in the future because the conditions when they arise are always different from those present in the minds of the persons who attempted to foresee them. In the next big naval war there may be some completely new weapon, or application of weapons, which will make all our codes completely useless. The other point on which to reply is the

subject of America. If I gave any impression that the Americans had not done their part in the war I apologise; that was very far from being my intention. But it was their own definite statement, that they did not intend to exercise their right of capture at sea, to which I referred. They had a squadron in the Grand Fleet—a very efficient squadron, but they said definitely that they were not prepared to exercise that right at sea.

THE CHAIRMAN: Captain Egerton's remark on history repeating itself is a very just one to have made. We can carry our minds back a little further than the Continental system and still find this hold good. In the Debates in Parliament sixty years before Napoleon's power was at its height, we may find it urged as one of the reasons for joining in military alliances against France that if she became the dominant power in Europe the effect would be that she could close all the Continental ports to our trade. Therefore we took certain action in Europe to ensure that no one Power should obtain the hegemony of the Continent. Another point is this: if history repeats itself, we have got to take a certain amount of instruction from what it tells us as regards the attitude of neutrals. When we have exercised what has appeared to the neutrals to be an undue amount of pressure on trade, armed neutralities have come into being against us; we have had to modify our attitude towards trade in one case, because, on account of the Armed Neutrality and the danger of bringing in other Powers against us. Thus we could not exercise our pressure to the full degree as some speakers have suggested that we should. Then again we have been told that Napoleon with his Continental system by his disregard of certain considerations brought Russia in against him. This again was a case of not giving weight enough to the neutral. We are asked to-night to consider whether there will be neutrals in future wars. If history repeats itself, as we are reminded that it does, it is unanswerable that there may be neutrals, and except in the case of those blocks of Powers fighting against each other, such as we had in the Napoleonic War and in the last war—except in such cases as those, where the neutrals were weak and small—the neutrals standing on one side in smaller wars will be bound to exercise a considerable amount of pressure. If the belligerents were to take too high a line with such neutrals there would be danger. To my mind there are bound to be neutrals. We have had to consider neutrals in the past; and I do not see why we shall not be so bound in the future. Among other points brought out by the lecturer, there is the question of commercial regulations and licenses. It is a curious thing that whenever these very extensive regulations and limitations of commerce crop up, some means of getting round them come along. They are either supplemented by agreements or dodged by agreements. Nothing was more remarkable in the war of 1812, as shown in Admiral Mahan's history of that war, than the extensive licensing system which grew up in order to get over the restrictions and harm to commerce. In the late war we saw agreements made with neutrals in the same way. We have had a very interesting discussion and some valuable remarks have been made. I would like to conclude by expressing the thanks of this Institution to the lecturer for an able and well thought-out paper. He has given us a great deal to think about, and a great deal also that is well worth thinking about.

AIR-COMMODORE H. R. BROOKE POPHAM: I rise to propose a vote of thanks to Admiral Richmond for presiding this evening. The selection is particularly suitable on this occasion because the lecture has centred chiefly on historical matters, and Admiral Richmond is an authority on British naval history, and the author of one of the best books on a certain period of naval history ever published in this country.

The vote of thanks was carried by acclamation and the meeting terminated.

## CAMOUFLAGE AND COVER FROM VIEW

By BREV. MAJOR O. W. WHITE, D.S.O., Dorset Regiment.

THERE is no doubt that the art of camouflage was brought into prominence during the late war, and by some is considered an entirely new departure in the science of war.

In any case it is obviously a very important study, and one of which a thorough knowledge of the main principles is essential for all ranks and all arms.

The age of the art of camouflage and its normal consequence, cover from view, could be followed to the most remote period of history.

A very striking and perhaps not very well known one was during the wars waged by the Spaniards to free their country from the Moors. On one occasion it is narrated in chronicles of the period that the Spaniards were besieged in a mountain town. The Moors were not actively pressing the siege, but were in superior numbers.

During a heavy storm one night a portion of the town wall was undermined by the action of a rain-filled torrent and collapsed, exposing a large and practicable breach.

The Spanish commander, a man of great resource, immediately collected all available sheets and blankets, and having had them sewn together and roughly daubed with mud and paint, raised a screen in front of the gap.

The Moorish patrols riding their rounds next morning did not discover the imposture, and the garrison were able, undisturbed, to make another wall and retrenchment covering the gap. No doubt many more examples can be thought of at once.

Camouflage, according to the war pamphlet on the subject, lays down that concealment in the sense of hiding from view is not the primary aim. At the same time cover from view is automatically such an important branch of the subject that they are treated together in this paper.

From an Army point of view in pre-war days, camouflage practically consisted of nothing but (i) attempts to render positions inconspicuous or invisible by covering and concealing all signs of work; (ii) siting such trenches and positions so as to obtain the maximum of fire with the minimum of visibility from the enemy; (iii) rendering the soldier inconspicuous by clothing him suitably and teaching him to take every advantage of cover from view, as well as cover from fire.


The instructions for teaching this were conveyed in various official manuals, and nowhere were official instructions given treating this subject as an important and separate subject.

Under the old conditions this perhaps did not matter much. The Army could shoot and take cover well and, the air service not being


so advanced, observation from the air did not have to be seriously considered.

Now, however, we have a totally changed situation. The principles of war are unchanging, but the conditions under which we have to apply them have been seriously affected.


### Examples of Shadows




A solid such as a  
dump of boxes.




A "Standard" hut.



A hangar with  
sides to the ground  
no cast shadow  
at sides



A special hangar  
all sides sloped to  
the ground to eliminate  
all cast shadow  
(partially complete)



Hangar as above toned  
to agree with locality.  
A. Dummy path to agree with  
high light of ridge.  
B. Road.  
C. Real hedge heightened and  
thickened.  
Entrance to hangar screened.  
and Real Fields.

### Representation of Objects by Shadow




Shadow cast by a  
hollow vehicle such  
as a railway truck  
looking from above.

Double Screen (side overhead)  
shadows will always be distorted in  
one way but the other though distorted  
will be misleading.

A. Area of shadow.



Screen of fine net and  
opaque material to  
cast a similar shadow  
the net required to  
obscure ground without  
cutting out the much light.



To consider one principle only—that of surprising one's opponent. The commander who wishes to defeat his enemy by surprise has new difficulties to meet, and consequently new conditions to aid him.



Reconnaissance is simplified, and this helps the side seeking to avoid surprise.

Mobility by means of omnibuses and lorries is increased; this helps the attacker by simplifying his concentration.

Tanks can do away with the necessity for long preliminary bombardments.

All these new conditions, and many others, affect the application of the old principles.

There is one thing, however, which is vital both for defence and attack, and that is the knowledge of the intentions of the enemy, which good reconnaissance and good intelligence gives the commander.

Everything points to the increased importance of the air service in this service of information.

Now, one can combat the enemy's activities by keeping command of the air, by the older methods of deceit, and by camouflage.

It is impossible to guarantee absolute command of the air, it is far harder to gain and maintain command of than the sea, and one fast scout machine dashing out from the enemy's lines might easily snatch most vital information in the shortest time. Besides, aeroplanes are far more easily and quickly built than warships.

Now every weapon devised has always been followed closely by some antidote which has practically negated the improvement in the weapon. This process is bound to go on indefinitely.

We are at present confronted with a prospect of infinitely mechanical warfare. The soldier on horse or foot is gradually being ousted by the tank or other mechanical device. Nevertheless, this must take time, but with the imaginable limits to air transport before us, it must be still longer before the battles and conquest of the ground can entirely be settled by combat in the air or by landing invading armies from aerial transports.

In reconstruction, such as the Army is now undergoing, it is more vital to work for the near future than plan for the indefinite and remote.

In the next twenty years we may expect still to find armies fighting upon earth. There will still be infantry, guns, engineers, and administrative services, though no doubt a very large proportion of the infantry and guns will be transported in or fight from tanks.

Under the general heading of tanks one of course groups all fast moving vehicles, whether armed or not, which can actually enter the field of battle.

These armies fighting on earth will be assisted and attacked by flights of aircraft of all kinds. The eyes of the army will be transferred from the earth to the air, and although it may be argued light fast moving tanks may become the cavalry of the future, yet nothing can break the pre-eminence of the air service for the duty of reconnaissance and intelligence.

We must also realize the great increases which will be made in chemical warfare which tend to add to the vital importance of surprise.

Taking these assumptions as the basis on which to work, what lines ought to be adopted to assist us deceive the enemy and gain full advantages to ourselves?

One, and it is believed one of the most important, of these is the proper teaching of camouflage and the use of cover from view. Concealment is the natural antidote to improved powers of observations.

It is necessary to consider what is really essential in this art and what is only applicable to certain or local conditions.

Now camouflage, like all important aids to war, can be considered under two heads:—

(a) Strategically, which includes the bases and lines of communication.

(b) Tactically.

It is proposed, therefore, to discuss these two headings and submit a definite proposal for the lines on which instruction for the regimental officer and soldier should be based.

Considering strategic camouflage. This involves conveying a false impression to the enemy as to the position and movements of the mass of our army, the object being to produce in his commander a certain train of thought which will cause actions or delays from which one can gain advantage. It must be remembered that at the outset of any operation we, with our small expeditionary force, are always likely to be forced upon the defensive, or anyway to have to fight for time. This only makes the power to deceive more necessary.

Now it has been suggested by a very eminent artist who was employed during the late war that the Germans and Austrians made use of mimicry on an enormous scale to conceal the concentrations of their troops and to protect their communications. He cites various examples with details, and certainly the writings of German leaders since the war when referring to their concentrations lend great weight to his deductions. The writer was, however, not fortunate enough to be able to have examined the areas referred to after our advance.

It is obvious, however, that it is within the bounds of possibility so to treat large areas.

We are faced, however, with our small Army, with the necessity for having a mobile, as well as small as possible, machinery to deal with such situations, and at the beginning of a war, at any rate, we shall not have the time to carry out large works. This rules out covering in, in mimicry of the landscape, areas for our concentration.

The other alternative is to mislead the enemy by making him think we are elsewhere, and merely conceal our actual troops as much as possible.

We all know, now, of the dummy ships which misled the Germans as to the position of certain units of our Battle Fleet. It is suggested that by camouflage properly applied we can do the same on land. The old ruses of war—leaving fires burning, tents standing, etc.—still hold good, but we want more. Train moves can help, but rolling stock is generally short and vital for actual supplies and the real moves. We know that from the air—and for the moment we are only considering

the air—the objects seen are represented by light spots and shadow, the shadow giving the impression of solidity to the object which casts the shadow. Also shadows are misleading, as they can convert an excavation into an erection to untrained eyes.

Troops on the move in an air photo show as a block with a definite shadow. Encampments, transport, and so on, have each their shape and shadow.

There seems no insuperable obstacle within the bounds of easy transport and rapid erection to prevent, after due study and experiment, the making of a dummy army consisting entirely of screens to cast shadows, a few vehicles to produce dust, and a few men to look after them, which will absolutely deceive an air observer and give a result when photographed guaranteed to deceive. The presence of large masses of tanks and mechanical transport with an army render this task easier, as they could be more easily represented by lights and shadows than bodies of men on foot or horse. It will be argued that screens to represent troops, etc., by shadow will only show true representation of such bodies when the sun is in position to cast the shadow at the right angle.

The answer to this is that even when the shadows will not exactly represent bodies of troops, etc., they will cast such a medley of light and shadow as to deceive the enemy by their inability exactly to read them and lead him to suppose they are screens for the concealment of actual troops, the presence of whom he will therefore suspect. Any air observer will confirm how difficult it often is to recognize troops, and very often the photograph discloses what the eye has not observed. This all helps the camoufleur. Granted these means to mislead the enemy and make him place the army wrongly, what can be done strategically to render the real force invisible?

The first thing without doubt is to teach every officer and man the principles affecting cover from view. This is dealt with in the consideration of tactical use of camouflage. The second is to take every advantage of natural cover, and add to it by powers of concealment to be given to every unit.

With increased air warfare it may be taken for granted that towns, villages, woods, and perhaps even isolated buildings, will become the target for concentrated and vindictive bombing.

Troops exposed to this will suffer in *moral*, and lose efficiency through disturbed rest.

We can avoid this in three ways:—

*Firstly*, by avoiding such spots and concealing troops as much as possible in the open.

*Secondly*, by making full use of the hours of darkness.

*Thirdly*, by artificial darkness or fog.

We have reaped some of the advantages of artificial fog in smoke barrages and smoke clouds by sea. Why not go a step further and by experiment produce a cloud which will conceal us from the air—it may be chemically possible to produce such a smoke cloud light enough to float anyway a few feet above ground level. This would remove the

disadvantages of such semi-darkness from our own troops. The essential quality of such fog is that it should appear natural, and therefore can only be used where the geographical surroundings are such that mist and fog are normal.

As regards the first alternative. It appears one of the best means to secure this is by using nets to eliminate shadow and produce the sense of uninterrupted view and distance. Those who have taken part in theatricals know how nets of varying mesh are used to produce the effect of distance. Our camouflage nets in the last war sought to eliminate shadow amongst other objects.

If every unit were equipped with sets of nets, one of thick mesh and the other finer, or some variation of this, it is quite possible to conceal personnel from the air without obscuring the general details of the ground.

Some such means as this would also eliminate the colour difficulty which is always the stumbling-block where opaque screens are used. The colour tones of the ground would show through, and the photograph be therefore less affected. Then, too, nets are less affected by wind or rain. If this is thought impossible, then actual sheets painted and marked as plough-land, might be substituted, but these are far heavier. It would require two to three lorry loads of material, including supports, to cover in the area required for the close bivouac of a brigade. When using nets, allowing for close bivouacking, it ought to be easily possible to carry the necessary cover for the unit in not more than two vehicles of unit transport.

There is still a further way open to trial, and which it is believed would give good results.

Certain kinds of ground, particularly gorse, dark soil, low scrub, and certain types of roots show up very dark on a photograph. It would be very interesting to experiment as to the neutralizing of shadow of individuals and objects standing or moving on such grounds, thereby gaining invisibility, not by putting cover over, but by altering the colour of the ground under them. The background, whilst dark enough to obliterate the shadow, must be light enough to tone in with the object upon it. This has, of course, obvious disadvantages, but it is suggested as a line along which to work.

If actual provision of sheets of dark colour are impracticable, it should be possible to increase existing patches of dark ground, increase the real shadow of the hedgerows and trees and other natural objects, thereby affording cover from the enemy's observation. One advantage of this method would be that it is less liable to detection from oblique photography than the overhead screen. For example: Suppose in a definite area where it is desired to conceal troops temporarily, there is a hedge casting a shadow six feet wide when the sun is low. If this shadow were increased by laying a dark material to twelve feet, we could halt a considerable body of men along it. It would be unlikely that the enemy would know the exact height of the hedge, therefore they would be unable to criticize the width of the shadow in the air photos. We have not raised anything in the air, therefore the oblique

photo would not give it away, and the only absolutely essential precaution would be to see that the edge of the false overlapped the edge of the true shadow at all times.

Photographs taken in dull days would of course expose this, but then again, although the dark strip would be evidently not shadow if nothing showed on it, it might be disregarded, or merely considered as a strip of cultivation.

This method, like all other methods of camouflage, would have to be applied with discretion.

The actual examples on which this reasoning is based, apart from study of aeroplane photographs, are:—

(a) The facts that concentrations of troops in the Italian mountains were rarely, if ever, discovered when they were made on the shadowy side of the hills. The author once studied a "shell area" map prepared by the Staff of an Italian Division, giving all due regard to the shape of the ground, which rendered certain areas "dead." It was very interesting to note how few shells were marked as falling in areas which were at that time of year in shadow for the greater portion of the day, although there was as much occupation of the shadowy as of the sunlit portions of the area.

(b) The fact that camouflage generally, and tents in particular, tended to dark colours to lessen the contrast with their shadows.

When considering this it is well to remember that "the eye only sees what it knows," and this is almost as applicable to the trained observer as the beginner. If we can produce a resemblance to some object, natural or artificial, without any contrasts or peculiarities round it to draw attention, that object will in nine cases out of ten be accepted by the observer at its face value, and not further examined. In fact, one may go as far as to say if one can make the surroundings natural, or leave them without incriminating clues, an addition to the landscape, provided it is reasonably true to nature, no matter what it is, will pass unnoticed.

There is another saying almost as true, to the effect that "the expected is never suspected." If we see an object, natural in appearance and in normal position, it requires a very high standard of training in the observer to analyse it. The mind subconsciously accepts it, and the eye and attention drifts to some other point.

It is suggested these are the lines on which advances should be made in strategic camouflage in the forward area.

A second and important part of strategical camouflage is the concealing of bases and lines of communication depots, so as to diminish the number of targets the enemy will have to operate against by air, and also, by concealing what is collected there, mislead him as to the size and amount of the stores and troops in the area.

For this purpose general mimicry is the obvious solution.

The erection of the necessary hutting, preparations for sites for dumps, and laying of railway lines takes considerable time and requires much labour. There should be no reasons why the planning and erection of the necessary hutting should not follow sound camouflage lines.



The small fields, market gardens, etc., which surround a town are admirable for the purpose of camouflage. Study of any air photo of such areas will show how a hangar can be made similar to cultivation. The same applies to the erection of dumps which are not in actual or in only occasional use.

It is of course very hard to camouflage by mimicry a dump the contents of which are constantly being handled, but such dumps could be easily housed under hangars.

The statement in the pamphlet on camouflage that it is impracticable to conceal aggregations of huts should not be taken as an irrevocable law.

Already built huts and campments are practically impossible to camouflage, but there is no impossibility in making the camps from the first on sound camouflage lines.

This principle applies equally to camps on the lines of communication.

Now in regards to tactical camouflage, including cover from view.

The official pamphlet on camouflage, though primarily applicable to trench warfare, gives much that is applicable to all operations. Tactically, that is in the actual field of battle, as far back as the heaviest field artillery gun positions, we want, first, cover from view, then means to render what we cannot cover from observation either invisible or apparently harmless. Area shoots from the map may be very destructive at times, but in the long run they do not justify the expenditure of ammunition.

It would be of interest to know whether the German habit, at one time, for this type of fire was partly adopted to destroy suspected camouflaged shelters. It is hard otherwise to account for shoots into certain unoccupied areas.

Tactical camouflage requires to be more carefully undertaken as the enemy's observers are nearer, and the hostile low-flying aeroplane frequent visitors.

Here it is considered the object sought should be, having trained the soldier to take full advantage of natural cover and the use of nets, to obscure detail and eliminate shadow rather than to endeavour to block out of view altogether. The use of shadows and artificially-toned backgrounds will not be of as much avail as farther back, because the observer will be closer, and his study of the area more concentrated, more up to date, and more regular.

In moving warfare the time will not be available for very elaborate means. The essential thing therefore is to teach the officer and man to be able to hide himself and use his arms with the minimum exposure both to fire and observation.

If we assume that the tank of some sort will bulk largely in the field of battle we are assisted in a way, as such a vehicle can always carry its own screens to use at rest. When on the move a tank or any large vehicle is practically impossible to hide, although there is no doubt much can be done from a visibility point of view by amending the shape of the present tank so as to present a less pronounced outline.

The dark shadow under the front and belly of the present tank catches the eye at once and facilitates the aim of the enemy.

Guns, too, carry their own nets, but greater simplification is required here, and the fitting of the camouflage net should become easy and rapid. Nets should be such that they can be raised and fitted so quickly that no appreciable increase in the time required to get into action is occasioned. The above may sound impracticable and labouring the point, but there is nothing impossible in the suggestion, and the advantages are obvious.

The infantryman, as already indicated, must be taught to use natural cover, and should only require camouflage when halted or when digging in. This is more difficult, as the enemy's observation is still closer and his fire more accurate. Under these conditions of actual combat cover from fire becomes the more important. It is not considered that any camouflage that the soldier can carry would be worth the loss of mobility except in trench or siege warfare.

These are, of course, a different and separate branch of the subject.

Having thus considered the objects to be sought we now turn to training.

Camouflage as a separate art was a War baby, and as such, the Royal Engineers, who can and are prepared to deal with any form of military science, became the foster parents. It may be or may not be desirable to retain camouflage as an R.E. branch, but it is certainly desirable to form a definite school for the study of camouflage, at which all arms of the service should be instructed.

The objects of the school should be threefold :—

(a) To pursue the study of camouflage, carry out experiments, and perfect the system of strategic camouflage. Also carry out tests on a large scale with troops during the training and manœuvre season.

(b) To issue a handbook which will embrace all the necessary teachings on camouflage and cover from view now included in other publications.

(c) To train unit officers and other ranks in tactical camouflage and cover from view, these school-instructed officers and other ranks becoming the unit instructors.

The unit training should become part and parcel of the individual, platoon, company and higher training.

To allow of reaching the requisite standard it is suggested the following syllabus would meet the case :—

#### 1.—*During Recruits' Training.*

Two lectures on camouflage and cover from view, illustrated with aeroplane photographs. One lecture on the general principles of aeroplane photographs and the effect of backgrounds and tones of colour on visibility to the eye and camera. Four parades on the means of taking cover from observation from air and ground. How to avoid

being spotted by obliterating or avoiding the making of tracks, disadvantages of destroying or altering landmarks, and necessity for avoiding unnecessary movement when exposed to observation.

Total (minimum)	Three half-hour lectures .....	1½ hours.
	Four one-hour parades .....	4 hours.
		<hr/> 5½ hours.

## 2.—*Individual and Platoon Training with the Unit.*

Training to be carried out by lectures during the non-training season, and practically as part of other parades during the training season.

*Subjects Taught by Lecture.*—What is noticeable to the air or ground observer. How to avoid attracting notice. Aeroplane photographs. How to read them and how to discover camouflage. What mistakes to avoid. What is natural and what is not. Importance of shadows. The construction or erection of simple camouflage contrivances. How to use backgrounds to escape observation. "Track" discipline.

*Practical Instruction.*—Both by demonstration and actual practice. How to take advantage of ground when moving and at the halt. What attracts attention when observing, and so what to avoid. How to avoid making or to obliterate tracks already made. How to use shadows as cover from sight. Wherever possible the Air Force should assist in this training either by taking N.C.O.'s and men up while parades are in progress or photographing work done.

The actual construction and erection of camouflage.

An example of a platoon training exercise is given in Appendix I.

*Company Training.*—How to avoid observation on the march and at rest. Camouflage of camping grounds. Use of ground in the actual battle. Siting of trenches and works so as to gain full advantage of field of fire and cover from view. Use and erection of larger camouflage. All instruction prefaced by a short lecture or demonstration.

*Battalion Training.*—Use of ground in battle. Use and erection of unit camouflage. Siting and plan of unit camps and bivouacs to minimize risks of observation. The battalion should also attend demonstrations by another unit operating against an enemy, one unit taking full advantage of ground and camouflage and the other neglecting them. While giving due weight to the importance of using all cover from the enemy's observers in air and on ground, stress must be laid on the absolute necessity of allowing no anticipated hostile action rendering an attack "sticky." As long as the troops on the move are in formed bodies under the immediate control of leaders (e.g., artillery formation) these leaders should take every advantage of a covered line of approach, but an advance or attack must not be delayed on account of the lack of such cover. Further, once extended, the enemy's aircraft and observers must be disregarded.

Before closing this brief survey of what it is suggested are profitable lines for training and study, it may be as well to refer to certain authorities at present existing.

(a) *The Official Manuals*.—(i) "Field Engineering," where the chief uses of cover from view are given and general principles touched upon.

(ii) "Infantry Training." At the time of writing the new edition is not available. Instructions as to cover from view and the best hiding points from hostile aircraft are given.

(iii) Training manuals of the other arms where similar references are made to this subject.

(b) *War Pamphlets*, especially those on camouflage and screens.

(c) *Unofficial Publications*, such as (i) Solomon's "Strategic Camouflage"; (ii) German and other writers who refer generally to the systems of concealing concentrations.

Surprise will always be one of the most effective means of victory, and no army can afford to neglect means to attain it. Many of these suggestions may at first sight appear impracticable, but they represent a few avenues worthy of exploration, and it is only by experiment and training that we can hope to gain success.

#### APPENDIX I.

##### *Tactical Camouflage.*

Suitable exercise for instructing platoon in concealment from the air and ground.

*Idea.*—(This idea should be explained to the platoon on parade.)

This morning we are showing by demonstration and example how to move across country and halt, so that we are as little seen as possible.

Each section in turn will start from a given point and march to there (indicating the point on the ground).

The rest will watch. Observers, as no airmen are available to-day, have been put in those two trees over there with glasses. They cannot see the starting point, so they will not be able to pick you up from the first moment.

Each section will move at normal march rate and as if you were moving in artillery formation in the attack.

On the completion of all the moves, all sections will join me at the foot of the trees where the observers are, on the signal to close.

Results of the observers' notes will be given and compared with the notes each section has made of the other sections' movements.

## THE DANGER OF CATCH-WORDS AND PHRASES.

By COLONEL H. ROWAN-ROBINSON, D.S.O.

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THERE are but few proverbs for which another proverb contradictory in some sense cannot be found. Similarly there are but few sayings of great leaders which are not contradicted to some extent in their own works. And this not only because proverbs are uncertain guides or because "Great thinkers can think very wrong," but because each saying is only meant to be considered with due regard to circumstance and application. In fact, what may be the very pith of wit and wisdom in a particular case may prove sadly lacking in point or depth when generally applied, a possibility which the fancy, captivated by the point of wit or the turn of phrase, fails to apprehend. This is a truth that may be turned to profit by the spread of inspiring catchwords among the rank and file, but in it lurks a danger when matters of leadership are involved. It behoves, therefore, great thinkers and writers to ponder deeply before passing to their followers some sonorous phrase of all-embracing commitment or some crisp and clean-cut sentence which may, or may not, embody a universal principle. Bacon says somewhere in his *Novum Organum* that "the mind is fond of starting off to generalities, that it may avoid labour." And he might have added that man prefers second-hand generalities to those of his personal production trusting the author to have made the necessary enquiries as to their aptness as well as to value.

That military speakers and writers are no less blameworthy in this respect than those of other professions, the pedants that led Prussia to Jena and France to Sedan furnish damning evidence. A constant watch must, therefore, be kept against the mastery of words. They are the servants and the instruments, and as such must be rightly directed and applied. It was the habit of a certain officer, killed in early flying days, to study all new works emanating from the War Office, to underline every rolling phrase of uncertain meaning and compass, and to beard the authors in their dens for exact elucidation. It was vain for them to press the point of stupidity, for he was an obstinate man who would be satisfied with nothing less than a full grip and who held that there should be a distinct gap, in point of clearness of indication, between a War Office instruction and a Browning poem. His persistence was possibly of some value. Certainly modern General Staff publications are, for the most part, models of clear and concise expression.

The danger in words is all the greater with phrases conceived in days of stress or battle when time is so closely rationed that even thoughtful minds may accept the status of the speaker as guarantee for the worth of the statement. It is mainly with examples of this



type and of recent origin it is proposed to deal. It is idle indeed to delve deeply into past pages for confirmation of the contentions made, for history, with the cold logic of events, treads out the faulty aphorism except where the causation of some disaster by its use needs explanation.

It is not pretended that the Allies suffered from a belief in catchwords to a greater extent than did the Central Powers. A large portion of the criticisms made here and elsewhere, especially when they deal in any way with psychological factors could be applied to all parties, and this is confirmed by extracts from German military writers. For instance, Ludendorff says, "Our want of judgment that prevented us from realizing the hollowness of catchwords . . . was, and is, our undoing. I had always hoped the German people would see through phrases, catchwords . . . to an appreciation of the situation which corresponded to hard facts. I was mistaken. Phrases, catchwords, and criminal misrepresentations had more and more influence. . . ."

#### DISTRIBUTION IN DEPTH.

At the second battle of Cambrai, which followed hard upon our own brilliant success in that neighbourhood, the Germans broke through our front line and then penetrated, without meeting any further serious opposition, deep into our territory. The British Division mainly concerned had to cover an extensive front, and, in order to carry out its task, was obliged to put most of its infantry into the front line. There was no second position on which to fall back, and there were no reserves worthy of the name available to restore the fight. A few odd units, headquarters and such-like, hastily collected, maintained, here and there, a gallant defence; but they were as rocks by a sandy shore to the inrolling tide, and the rising waters quickly covered them. An Infantry Brigadier, indeed, put up a fine show of this sort, and was successful not only in stemming the hostile torrent in his locality, but also in eventually extricating his gallant, if motley, force. On the whole, however, it was evident that something was wrong with a system of defence that allowed an enemy to achieve such an easy victory. Clearly the principal mistake lay in having all the eggs in one basket—that is, all the infantry in the front line. Without outposts in front or reserves in rear, it is impossible to hold a position against a determined and skilful foe, however deep the trenches or wide the wire entanglements. A drastic change of system was, therefore, made, and embodied in the instructions issued for the operations in the Western theatre in the Spring of 1918. Peculiar conditions—the heavy British losses in Flanders, the extension of the British front, the transfer of large German reinforcements from Russia, the impending arrival of the American Army—entailed during this period a defensive attitude.

As was to be expected a return to more normal methods was urged, and special stress laid on the need for greater distribution in depth. Unfortunately, however, there was a rush to a new extreme. And, just

as it is unsound to string out a whole force in one straight line parallel to the enemy line, so it is equally unsound to place them in a straight line perpendicular to it. These are the two extremes, both equally indefensible. The phrase, "Distribution in Depth," was, however, on every lip. Possibly the alliteration was partly to blame, and possibly there would have been less of a song had it been a case of distribution in height or width. However that may be, a study of the early battles of 1918 induces the belief that some at least of the disasters of those dark days were due to the excessive hold which this particular phrase had taken on our minds.

The case for distribution in depth as then argued was that an enemy may at any moment, by a crushing superiority in men and material, penetrate a line on a given front. If the defender is distributed along the line without any great reserves, the battle is practically over once that line is penetrated. If, on the other hand, the defender holds the front line lightly, has a number of carefully selected strong points in support of it, machine-gun posts arranged chequerwise or echeloned in depth, a number of other lines in rear of the first and a reserve of not too modest proportions, then the enemy's difficulties will only really begin after he has taken the front line or system of trenches. If he be lucky enough to win any further success, he will surely have to pay heavily for every yard gained till, finally, with his formations broken up by the strong points and his strength seriously impaired by losses in the attack of one or more strongly-defended positions, he will probably succumb to a vigorous counter-stroke.

This, generally, was the underlying idea of the defensive plan matured during the winter following Cambrai and put into execution in the Spring of 1918. It was based largely on the methods adopted by the Germans in Flanders in 1917. Yet in spite of its apparent soundness, and in spite of many well-considered variations in its interpretation, it appears only in one case to have been genuinely successful. On the 15th July the Germans attacked General Gouraud near Rheims, drove in his outposts, but failed to expel him from his battle-position. In this case, however, the defender had managed to obtain exact information of the enemy's plans, and was therefore enabled to execute satisfactory counter-measures. Where fortune was not definitely on the side of the defender, the defence failed.

What were the causes of failure?

In the first place, a succession of lines built behind the main line does not, for reasons discussed in another paper, add greatly to the strength of the defences.

In the second place, though the scheme generally adopted of an outpost line, strong points and a battle position was sound enough, the detailed application of the schemes left something to be desired, and it is on this point it is intended mainly to concentrate discussion.

The outpost line was thinly held—so thinly that it could not hope to resist any serious attack. The enemy would probably take it in the first rush. The troops in the front line were well aware of this, and knew that if a great attack occurred during their tour of duty, three

fates only could await them: death, wounds or imprisonment. Now this is not fair on a soldier. It is not right to place him in a position in which he can neither win a victory nor escape with honour. The chances should not be all against him. And matters were not improved by the literature that trickled into the trenches—cheap papers with sensational headlines proclaiming the transfer of 100,000 Germans each week from East to West, and the probability of a sudden onrush in the near future of some hundreds of thousands upon a short British sector held by as many tens of thousands. It is outside the point at issue, but it did the soldier no good, and it is surprising that rumours so detrimental to morale were allowed to slip through the close meshes of the press censorship.

It may be objected that the Germans carried out a similar plan for several months successfully in Flanders. There were, however, important differences between the two cases. The chief problem the Germans had to solve was how to minimize the losses that were being caused by our overpowering artillery fire. They settled on a mobile form of defence—a lightly-held front line which, after inflicting severe casualties on our advancing line, should fall back, while counter-attack divisions, kept in a state of constant readiness but clear of the worst of the shell fire, should come up and restore the situation. This method proved effective, because on our part it was impossible to effect surprises, or to execute rapid movements. The result of continuous rain and tornadoes of shell having been poured into a naturally boggy soil made a slow, often a creeping, advance inevitable, and, during this process, the enemy was able to inflict severe losses on our troops struggling through the mire and to bring up his counter-attack divisions. Further, during a great part of the operations in Flanders registration and artillery bombardments were still in vogue, a fact which rendered surprise out of the question. It will thus be seen that, unpleasant and difficult as was the task of the German front line troops, they were not in an wholly impossible situation. Against ours, on the other hand, in the Spring of 1918, the enemy was able to concentrate secretly, effect surprise, move rapidly across the short stretch of good ground separating the opposing trenches, and to continue his rapid movement after overwhelming our front line system.

Our soldiers therefore proved wholly right in their conjectures. Hardly a man succeeded in escaping from the front line in the first of the great German offensives. And worse! Their comrades in the battle-position were uncertain owing to ignorance of their fate and the prevalence of fog as to whether the figures looming up suddenly in the mist were retiring friends or advancing foes—a circumstance that greatly diminished the value of their fire. This is part of an ancient and ever-recurring problem: is the piquet, is the support, is the outpost line to hold its ground and be reinforced, or is it to fall back on the main body? In open warfare the problem is fairly simple. By day the outposts occupy points which give good observation; by night or in thick weather they hold the approaches. In either case, retirement, if intended, will follow a plan known to the troops of the main body, and then, given efficient organization, the task of the outpost is not

especially difficult of fulfilment. Trench warfare, however, presents the case under a different aspect. The outpost line of the type adopted in 1918 could not always establish itself in positions of observation and was too weak to offer serious resistance. It was liable either to be overwhelmed on the spot or to be driven mixed with enemy troops on to the battle-position. It was thus unable to fulfil all the normal functions of covering troops. There were, however, two important rôles it was called upon to play:—

1. To keep the main body of the hostile artillery at such a distance from the battle line that, after capturing the outpost line, his guns must change position in order to prepare the assault on the battle line.

This rôle is difficult. For the outpost line, if pushed very far forward, will be beyond support by the main body, even against minor enterprises, and will have to be covered by a considerable force of artillery advanced in front of the battle line and, therefore, liable to become involved in the defeat of the outposts. Further, the art of camouflage and improvements in gunnery may enable an enemy to concentrate the mass of newly-arrived artillery close up to the front line and, therefore, probably within effective range of the battle line.

2. To allow the troops in the battle line full notice of the attack.

Outpost troops in open warfare fulfil this function by resistance, but in trench warfare of the type under consideration, less by resistance than by mere position, i.e., distance from battle line. It is a useful advantage, of course, but gained in this instance at great expense, for it entails the loss of the outpost troops and of the batteries covering them. And when the attack is made in the dark or in a fog there is the difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe.

The use of strong points, on the other hand, which was also, to some extent, a part of the German system already mentioned, appears absolutely sound. These small fortresses were intended to break up the hostile attack, and, being built for all-round defence, were to be held until relieved by a successful counter-attack, they fulfilled their task admirably, and that without in any way handicapping the troops in their rear. They failed, indeed, through no fault of their defenders, to ward off defeat, but they added many a bright page of glorious endeavour to the history of the British Army.

There is one point of importance to be borne in mind in this connexion. A counter-attack may easily succeed in recovering the main battle line, but it will have considerable difficulty in passing the heavily-wired trenches to the relief of the strong points beyond unless very careful previous arrangements be made for the quick provision of the necessary gaps. If the counter-attack fails to reach the strong points, the latter will eventually be lost, for they cannot hold on for ever within the enemy's territory. The counter-attacking troops, if unable to regain the original outpost line, should link up the strong points into a new forward position.

It is suggested that all the advantages of the outpost line would be retained and all its disadvantages obviated, if it were used solely by



patrols furnished from the strong points. A few devices would be necessary to create the impression in the enemy's mind of a line strongly held, and a few dummy strong points might be interspersed to cause the enemy to distribute the fire of his artillery to a greater extent than otherwise necessary. Dummy battery positions, from which roving guns would fire at intervals, would furnish the artillery part of the scheme forward of the battle line. The enemy would carry the outpost line without difficulty, but would make no captures of men or material there. He would fail in the early stages of the battle against most of the strong points, and, with disordered forces and without the full support of his artillery, he would proceed to the attack of the main battle line. The defenders of the latter, supported by the whole of their own guns, and certain that none of their comrades were mixed up with the advancing enemy, could be trusted to give a very good account of themselves.

The general conclusions to be drawn in the matter are:—

1. That distribution in depth is sound, but only up to a certain point.
2. That in trench warfare an outpost line should be held only for purposes of observation and deception, and should be patrolled by troops furnished from the strong points in the vicinity.
3. That strong points thoroughly justified their construction.
4. That the battle position should be the main line of resistance, and should be well provided with supports and reserves.
5. That the counter-stroke should aim at restoring not only the battle position but also the line of the strong points.
6. That a succession of lines behind the battle position are of no real value.

#### PRECEDENT AND CONVENTION.

Long before the Great War a certain officer was appointed a Chief Instructor at one of our Educational Establishments. It happened that he was of the same rank but junior in respect of length of service to two of his assistant instructors, and the two latter were shortly to be promoted. As the instructional duties included a large amount of parade work, it was clearly inconvenient from the disciplinary point of view that the two seniors should serve under the junior. To obviate this difficulty the Chief Instructor applied for a temporary grading in higher rank, explaining the case, and pointing out that the temporary rank would carry with it no increase of pay, and that therefore a distinct gain in efficiency would accrue without any corresponding disadvantage.

The reply was in the negative on the grounds that compliance with the request *would create a precedent*.

The point of the story is that no statement was made as to whether the precedent was a sound one or not. Some great authority had probably said, "Create a precedent and you will rue the consequence," or something of that sort, and it became the vogue for the moment not to create a precedent. Actually, after all three officers mentioned



above had been promoted, the rule of giving temporary higher rank to officers in such appointments was introduced, probably under pressure of a number of similar demands from other quarters. The maxim had better have been "Before creating a precedent, examine on all sides the probable consequences."

In any case we are a conservative army and very much averse, as a rule, from creating a precedent. The formation, for example, of the Artillery Mounted Rifles in South Africa was regarded with horror by a large number of gunners. The Commander-in-Chief required fewer guns but more mounted troops, therefore his action was no more unnatural than is the employment of sailors ashore. But it was unconventional; that was the trouble.

There was but very little change in tactics between Ramillies and Waterloo, but what mighty changes between Waterloo and, say, Arras! A strong adhesion to convention was the natural product of slow-moving times, but it is a dangerous matter in these hurrying days of scientific development. However close a touch be kept with new invention, there are bound to be surprises in the form of every new war, and it is well to be prepared to shed conventions and forego precedents at the shortest of notice. Marshal Foch advises that leaders in difficulty should put to themselves the question of Verdun or Verdun: "What are the conditions of the problem?" When they are clear, the means of solution should be adopted free from any prejudice but that of principle.

#### THE SLUR OF "NARROW-MINDEDNESS."

The standard by which the truth of generalities is commonly gauged is that of their application, satisfactory or otherwise, to the conditions of peace. A man fond of fighting is regarded as a menace to society, an army as an unpleasant necessity. The killing of brother man, the derailing of trains, the sinking of ships, excite abhorrence. But once war is declared there is an immediate change of attitude on all sides towards such matters. An avoidance of soldiering, a distaste for fighting are no longer acclaimed as virtues. There are, however, other upsets of moral values that do not jump quite so quickly to the eye. Men, for instance, who during the war nursed a deadly hatred for the Hun and all his works, who would have none of that race or name in office high or low in a British domain were constantly charged with being narrow-minded. And for long they accepted this as a slur upon their mental capacity and outlook on life. Eventually, however, they realized that a broad-minded, tolerant man is, while a state of war exists, a very vicious person, and that narrow-mindedness is an angel they had harboured unawares—a virtue, in fact, when the fate of nations is at stake, of outstanding merit. It is clear now that each mind should narrow its field of vision in its own sphere to a slit, through which the immediate destruction of the principal opponent can be kept in view. The private soldier should think solely of the man at the end of his bayonet until he is done with; his Company Commander envisage only the immediate objective—a stretch of trench or

an enemy battery; the Commander-in-Chief should look to the enemy main body. Of leaders in war there were none so narrow-minded as Nelson and Napoleon. They saw the enemy and they longed to bring him to battle. "There are many fine generals in Europe, but they see too many things at the same time. I see only one—the enemy masses," said Napoleon, after his experiences in 1796 when he had seen his adversaries setting their broad minds to thoughts—Beaulieu of crushing a detachment, of covering Genoa and of a junction with Nelson, Colli of covering Turin and of avoiding defeat, Alvinzky of relieving Mantua and of beating the French.

A favourite phrase at the War Office in 1914 was: "*This war is too big to allow us to consider the individual.*"

Someone had probably invented it when pestered by a thousand officers each urging special reasons why he in particular should be immediately despatched to the front. There was so much to be done, and done quickly, that it seemed absolutely necessary to handle people *en masse*. The phrase was, therefore, gladly accepted by hundreds of harried Staff Officers as a handy weapon with which to hammer the applicants who were worrying them in similar fashion. In fact, the whole War Office was practically forced to adopt it owing to being organized only for dealing with a small force and having to minister actually to the needs of millions. The phrase is only refuted here because it has, of course, no relation to fact and for fear it should crystallize later into a recognized principle. The original commanders and staffs of the Expeditionary Force did not come under its terms because they had all been selected and pushed over to France before its invention; otherwise, according to a literal interpretation, any old Commander-in-Chief might have been appointed to the Army in France. A good many anomalies, however, cropped up latter. An officer, for instance, who was an Oriental and Greek scholar, who had been successively Consul at Van in Armenia, an instructor in the Balkan Gensdarmierie and Military Attaché at Athens and Constantinople was sent to France to be attached to the Belgian Army just at the time when his services would have been invaluable at the Dardanelles and Salonika. That was a glaring case, the knowledge of which became public property, but there were numerous others: first-class scientists, interpreters in every language, and specialists of all kinds, of whom the nation was to feel the desperate need later, sent out to be killed in the infantry in those early days.

The phrase would never have cropped up had the law of Conscription been in force at the commencement of the war, for, in that event, all individuals of special attainments—and the bigger the war the more is this necessary—would have had their allotted places in the National war-machine.

#### THE EXHAUSTION OF RESERVES.

The necessity for exhausting the enemy reserves before striking a decisive blow has long been a favourite theme of military writers. It is claimed, for instance, that the operations in Flanders in 1917 steadily exhausted the German reserves, and thus prepared the way for our

victorious advance in 1918. Unfortunately, they had precisely the same exhausting effect upon our reserves; so when the Germans drew fresh reinforcements from the East before the American troops became available, they were able to inflict on us a serious defeat.

Again, it is claimed that Marshal Foch was correct in exhausting the enemy reserves in the summer of 1918 by a series of limited offensives instead of making an early bid for a decisive victory. The enemy commanders support the claim to some extent, for they complain bitterly in their reports of the drain upon their man-power caused by the succession of hammer-strokes delivered by the Allied Commander. Nevertheless, they managed to keep their end up till the armistice was signed; and some of the German troops in the front line were still fighting with skill and devotion when the curtain was rung down after the last military act of the great drama. Flowers and garlands were heaped upon the returning warriors to lay stress upon this fact, and to suggest to the world that here was an army forced indeed to withdraw from unequal conflict, but an army that had never known defeat in the field. Actually, of course, it had been frequently defeated, its losses in men and material had been enormous, eclipsing all previous records in war, but to nations accustomed to spectacular tragedies, such as Jena, Waterloo, and Sedan, where the fate of nations and dynasties was settled at a single blow, there was an absence of finality in the Allied successes. It was easy, therefore, for the German leaders to point to such of their troops as remained staunch and disciplined to the end and to say to the people, "These be the gods that had saved ye, but for the Fainthearts at home." Hence the continued aggressiveness of the German; hence the long Bermondts adventure; hence the Kapp revolution and the constant militarist unrest in Germany. The world might be a better place and have a brighter future if an early attempt had been made to beat rather than exhaust those reserves.

It is as well to be quite clear as to the meaning of the term in question. In battles, whether of encounter, or of attack and defence, the Commander on each side usually retains at his disposal a body of men, commonly called a reserve, with which to strike a decisive blow or, with less fortune, to stave off a defeat. In the encounter battle each Commander endeavours to destroy his opponent. In the process he tries to throw him on the defensive, and, perhaps sub-consciously, to enforce the deployment of his reserves for the maintenance of his position. Then, the enemy reserves being, so to speak, exhausted, he finds a weak joint in the enemy armour, and hurls his own reserve intact at the decisive point. Similarly with the attack-and-defence battle.

The issue is often dependent on a struggle of will-power between the two Commanders: Weyrother's plan at Austerlitz did not consciously include any intention to exhaust the French reserves, but actually the effect of his attack was to cause repeated demands upon them, with which the Emperor flatly refused to comply. Napoleon wanted every available man ready for that moment when his adversary should have committed himself so deeply as to be a ready prey to the counter-stroke. Again at Ligny, the constant pressure of the French

troops had forced Blücher to throw all his reserves into the firing line before Napoleon struck his decisive blow. Here, possibly, the object of the preliminary attacks, delivered while the Emperor was accumulating a striking force from his advancing troops, included, *inter alia*, exhaustion of the enemy reserves, but it did so only because the conditions of the conflict demanded the evolution of the battle-plan during the battle. The essential preliminary was reconnaissance—*on engage partout et on voit*. Once the situation was clear, the plan was made, and the blow delivered. Napoleon himself exhausted his reserves in fruitless endeavours to break the thin red line at Waterloo; but this was the last cast of a despairing gambler, and Wellington can certainly not be credited with planning this exhaustion in order to place the French Army at the mercy of the advancing Prussians.

The implication in the above examples is that the process of exhausting the enemy reserves often forms part of the normal play of battles, especially of battles of the slogging type. As a means to victory it may, in a protracted struggle, be sub-consciously sought by a commander, but it seldom enters into his original plans. Nowhere is it met in the great battles of history where the military art has found its highest expression. At Jena, at Salamanca, at Sedan, at the last battle in Palestine, the victorious leader aimed at the immediate destruction of the hostile army, inclusive of reserves.

The whole matter is, indeed, intimately bound up with skill in leadership and with opportunity. A skilful commander making full use; with the object of winning a decisive victory, of the weapons of surprise, concentration and rapidity, will destroy the enemy's reserves and need not, therefore, worry about exhausting them. Surprise is particularly important in this respect, for it hits the morale of the enemy commander and deprives him of the balance of judgment needed for correctly disposing his reserves to meet the emergency. On the other hand, the absence of opportunity to effect either a surprise or any signal feat of leadership—a condition prevalent at Wagram, Hochstadt, and during the recent trench warfare—is a cause of protracted, and often indecisive, struggles which include in their compass the gradual attrition of reserves in the locality on one side or the other. If a victorious effort, such as that at Arras, had been pushed to its logical conclusion, the success obtained would have been largely enhanced. It could scarcely, however, have been decisive, for, no surprise having been effected, the enemy commanders, though shaken by the magnitude of the defeat, were clearly alive to the needs of the situation and able to dispose their reserves accordingly. Where, however, surprise figures largely in the ingredients of victory as on the 8th August, 1918, and the success is pressed home, the enemy leaders will be lucky to find any reserves to handle.

"Exhaust the enemy reserves before striking the decisive blow!" It reads at first like the enunciation of a platitude or, at any rate, a fairly obvious principle. But it will not bear examination. Nor, indeed, is any special principle needed. Bring into play the great factors of surprise, concentration, and rapidity, and reserves will fall as ripe corn to the sickle.



## THE CZECHO-SLOVAK LEGION.

By **LIEUT.-COLONEL B. G. BAKER, D.S.O., F.R.G.S.**

"THE story and adventures of this small army is indeed one of the greatest epics in history." These were the words used by Mr. Lloyd George in his congratulatory cable to Professor Masaryk, now President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, on the success of the Czecho-Slovak forces against German, Austrian and Bolshevik troops in Russia and Siberia.

Their achievement ranks among other instances of "high endeavour," such as the crossing of the Andes by Pizarro's adventurous band, the march of the Serbs to Durazzo in 1912, and the retreat of that indomitable remnant of the same fighting race which sank exhausted on the shores of the Adriatic in 1916 to rise again in strength and re-conquer its own country.

Again, there is something faintly reminiscent of Sismondi's "History of the Italian Republics" in the narrative of the wandering Legion of Czechs and Slovaks who, like Xenophon's Ten Thousand, struggled towards the sea, not as the latter homewards, but rather further afield to greater dangers and difficulties. If the story of this Legion recalls that of the Condottieri of the Sixteenth Century, it is rather on account of the romantic atmosphere that coloured the doings of both. There is a further similitude in the fact that the Czecho-Slovak Legion and the peripatetic armies of the Sixteenth Century were practically moving States. But here all resemblance ceases. It is only to the glamour of distance and surroundings—the Renaissance and Italy—that the bands of the Condottieri owe their romantic reputation. In reality they were hired ruffians led by the ablest and least scrupulous of the lot, they fought with no particular distinction, being so encased in armour that the element of danger was reduced to a minimum, and they were generally indifferent to the cause they fought for. Czechs and Slovaks who formed the Legion were moved by the mighty force of patriotism, their ideal the liberation of their race after centuries of oppression. Thus inspired, they overcame dangers and difficulties which might well have daunted men led by less glorious vision.

Space does not permit of anything but a general account of the doings of the Czecho-Slovak Legions, for there were two, one raised in Italy, another, the one at present under discussion, in Russia. Moreover, the Ministry of War in Prague is still collecting material towards the compilation of the history of the legions.

Those who have been on the Italian Front may have noticed a set of sturdy fair-haired men in the Italian field grey and the felt hat of the Alpini, the star of Savoie was replaced by the lion-device of the Czechs



on a tab of red and white, the colours of Bohemia. These were men of the Czecho-Slovak Division raised as a consequence of the "Congress of Rome" in April, 1918, among the Czecho-Slovak prisoners of war taken on the Italian Front. Chiefly instrumental in this was General Stefanik, one of those really great men of whom the war produced so many and of whom the great majority have remained unknown to the general public. General Stefanik had been in Russia and, with Professor Masaryk and other Czecho-Slovak patriots, had organized the Legion in that country.

The conception of the Czecho-Slovak Legion, which came into existence in Russia, may be dated back to the day on which Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, thus drawing into the strife its great Slavonic neighbour Russia. The forces of the Dual Monarchy were mobilized and among them the 28th Regiment of Infantry, nicknamed the "Children of Prague." An account by an officer of that regiment sheds light on the state of the heterogeneous Austro-Hungarian Army which ventured on war. The 28th Regiment was escorted from its barracks through the streets of Prague by a German regiment, bayonets fixed. Wherever the 28th went the same precaution was necessary, and when, after a good deal of confused marching and counter-marching, the "Children of Prague" arrived at the front, German and Magyar regiments took up positions on either flank of them. In spite of these precautions, which considerably complicated minor tactical problems, the 28th went over, with band and Colours, to the Russians during the battle of Limanov in December, 1915. On other parts of the front there were similar occurrences and by the spring of 1916 some 100,000 Czecho-Slovaks were dispersed over Eastern Russia and Siberia in concentration camps. The Russian authorities were slow to make use of the offers of service by practically all the prisoners of war; only some companies of scouts were formed, who called themselves "Druzina," or "those who fight to the death," and these fought with the Russian Armies.

By Easter, 1916, the number of Czechs and Slovaks thus engaged amounted to a brigade only, out of a number of available fighting men increased to nearly 200,000 in consequence of Brusilov's offensive. Yet the Russians hesitated to avail themselves of this force, probably because the Czecho-Slovaks were found to be good and reliable workmen, useful in the munition factories and on the land. Strange to say, it was the Russian revolution, allegedly directed against militarism and the break-up of the Russian Army, which drew the Czecho-Slovak prisoners of war together into a military organization. The way had been well prepared by the National Council, with which the remotest concentration camps were in constant communication. Professor Masaryk had returned to Russia shortly after the revolution in that country, and towards the end of May, 1917, induced Kerensky to authorize the formation of a Czecho-Slovak Army. By the end of June the first division had been formed; it is significant of the spirit that informed the Czechs that the first regiment was named after John Huss.

The Czecho-Slovak forces concentrated round Kieff, where was also the National Council, to all intents and purposes a Provisional Ex-Territorial

Government, and here within a few weeks a striking force of two divisions had been created. But things were going from bad to worse in Russia. Kerensky had made his pilgrimage of propaganda round the Russian front in May, endeavouring to galvanize the Russian forces into some semblance of an army in being. Then came his disastrous offensive which settled the question of Russia's further participation in the Great War once and for all. A Czecho-Slovak brigade took part in the offensive at Zborow, on their right a Finnish division, on their left Russians. The Finns moved slowly but got in, the Russians moved not at all; so the impetuous attack of the Czecho-Slovaks, which accounted for over 3,000 prisoners, fifteen guns and much other material, was wasted. Captured positions had to be given up for want of support, and a general retirement was imperative. With the failure of Kerensky's offensive began a new phase of the war. The Czecho-Slovak Council had to alter its plans. The original intention of employing its national Army against the old enemy the German, became impossible, the hope of regaining freedom for their country by breaking the Austro-German front was out of the question. Russia was no longer a military power and victorious German Armies were advancing *via* Jitomir on Kieff intent on destroying the only organized military force opposing them, the Czecho-Slovak Legion. There was only one thing to do—to move this Legion to the sea so that it might eventually assist the Allies on one or other of the Western Fronts. Two ways suggested themselves; one northward to Vladivostock. The Bolshevik revolution of October, 1917, had broken out in the meantime and had brought consequences which added considerably to the difficulties of the Czecho-Slovak authorities. There was a Government at Petrograd, another at Moscow, some smaller ones scattered about on one or other of the routes to be taken, and the Czecho-Slovak Government, with its Army, was concentrated within the territory of the Ukrainian Government. So by the end of 1917 the position was extremely awkward, especially as the Ukrainian Government was entering into preliminary peace negotiations with the Central Powers; a move was imperative. The route to Murmansk, that deserted region, was out of the question; there were no supplies, no adequate rolling stock on the railways, and everywhere along the line were Bolsheviks assisted by Germans, and prepared to make trouble. The only way, therefore, was to make for Vladivostock in the hopes of finding transport to Western Europe. The Ukrainian and Russian Bolsheviks gave consent to the withdrawal of the Czecho-Slovak forces reluctantly, but it was hardly expedient for those disorganized bodies to withstand a compact and determined military organization. And so began the historic "Retreat of the Hundred Thousand."

The distance to be covered between the Russian Front in Galicia and the sea at Vladivostock is some 6,000 miles as the crow flies. This tremendous enterprise of conveying two divisions, with artillery, train and such purtenances as belong to an ambulant State, divided itself automatically into three distinct phases. First, the withdrawal of the troops from the Galician Front and their concentration in the Kieff

area ; secondly, the transport of these troops to the trans-Siberian railway at Pensa ; thirdly, their removal by that railway to Vladivostok. Each phase of the operation met with great and peculiar difficulties.

The concentration round Kieff was endangered by the attitude of the Ukrainian Government, which was already negotiating peace with the Central Powers. Ex-Kaiser Karl had, moreover, asked the Ukrainian Government to induce the Czech Legions to return home by an offer of general amnesty and of autonomy for Bohemia. The Czechs, however, recalled in the history of their race many instances of Habsburg promises and therefore were all the more determined to get away to the sea and to the Allies. The Ukrainians themselves were distinctly hostile and inclined to obstruct the concentration of the Czecho-Slovak forces.

There was also a belt of German-speaking colonists in Volhynia, through which the columns had to pass, and those colonists were able to give information to the Austrians and Germans of the Legion's movements. It is therefore not surprising that German and Austro-Hungarian troops set out in pursuit of the Czecho-Slovak forces. The first encounter between pursuer and pursued took place at Jitomir, which German detachments had reached in armoured cars ; three or four divisions were following up. The Czecho-Slovak forces managed to shake off the advanced parties of their pursuers, got safely across the Dnieper after a series of out-post skirmishes and then prepared to face the second phase of the retreat.

This required a considerable amount of rolling-stock, there was no time to stand on ceremony, discussion was not encouraged, and within a surprisingly short space of time sufficient transport was collected to make up seventy long trains. Luckily the "Red Guards" of Soviet government had already accustomed station-masters, engine drivers and other railway men to recognize force, so that the Czechs, once their German pursuers were shaken off, managed to get away with comparative ease. Two lines were available in the direction of Pensa, one *via* Poltava, Kharkov and Kursk, another over Bakmatch and Bjelopol. The first division, moving by the northern route, was forced into a rear-guard action, which lasted four days, between Neishin and Bakmatch, as the Germans had come up on the right flank of the retiring Legion. The action seems to have been particularly interesting. The Germans, having been concentrating with great precision from 7th to 10th March, were suddenly attacked by the Czechs and badly hit. The action continued until 13th March, when the Germans, despite reinforcements, were completely held up and suffered considerable losses, while the Czechs got away with a loss of 400 killed. The German story of 11,000 Czech prisoners is untrue ; there were no prisoners. Strange to say, a detachment of Bolsheviks assisted the Czechs, notably good shooting being done by a battery of "Reds" which happened to be wandering around that way. The Germans fell back on their positions at Gemel, and the Legion, its reputation considerably enhanced, proceeded on its way.

The "Reds" seem at first to have been very puzzled at the turn events were taking in their country, with German armies and a Czech

Legion roaming about in it. They settled the problem by flight on the approach of the Czechs, and this enabled the latter to collect a good deal of useful material on their way. One of the Legion's chief anxieties was money; there were only some 30,000 roubles in the regimental treasure chests at Kieff. However, there was deposited in safe hands in Moscow a further sum of three million roubles, and this was retrieved by two officers and two men who in the guise of Russian soldiers accomplished this hazardous task. Thus by the middle of March the retreating Legion which had set out from the Russian front in the middle of February, was well under weigh and amply provided with funds and material.

But there was trouble, in plenty, ahead. The German-Austrian pursuers had been shaken off, but the Bolsheviks became increasingly troublesome. There were armed encounters at practically every station along the line, with "Red" detachments acting either on orders from the Governments of Petrograd and Moscow, or on their own initiative. They did not, as a rule, offer prolonged resistance, but became more formidable as time went on, and some semblance of cohesion united the scattered "Reds," which were joined by German and Austrian ex-prisoners, armed by the Soviet Government. By this time, too, the long convoy converging on the trans-Siberian line, had begun to lengthen out unduly. It had been decided to let an advanced party of two regiments proceed with all haste to Vladivostock, where it arrived towards the end of April, but the rest of the Legion had got held up all along the line, in small parties of a battalion or so, with the rear-guard some five thousand miles away.

Serious trouble arose at Cheliabinsk in the beginning of May. An echelon of the Legion had just arrived there when it was followed up by three train loads of ex-prisoners, German, Austrian and Magyar, who joined the garrison of 2,000 Soviet troops. A scuffle between Czechs and Germans led to a general fracas; the Czechs promptly seized the railway station and telegraph, whereby they incidentally obtained proof of Trotsky's intentions towards them and communicated with their other echelons. Then the Czechs set about capturing the town of Cheliabinsk itself (70,000 inhabitants); they managed, by forestalling a Bolshevik attack, to surround the three barracks in the town and to capture the whole of the "Red" garrison. The inhabitants of Cheliabinsk indulged in public rejoicings over the discomfiture of the Bolsheviks. Other operations of a similar nature had to be carried out at Zlatoust and Miyashkoi, as also on the line Perm—Ekaterinenburg. The detailed account of these minor operations will make good reading some day.

By the end of May the rupture between the moving State of the Czecho-Slovak Legion and the Soviet Government was complete. At this time there were about fifty echelons on the line from the Volga region to the Irkutsk district of Siberia, and those in European Russia were fighting continually, now forcing their way, some of them on foot, across the Ural mountains, now harking back to assist other echelons, collecting material to replace losses, and generally engaged much as the

armies of the Condottieri, but with absolute order and hard-set purpose. Practically the whole of the Pensa—Perm—Cheliabinsk triangle and down the line as far as Omsk, was the scene of constant conflict between the Czecho-Slovak Legion and its adversaries, till on 3rd June the last of the echelons had crossed the Volga at Sysran, taken up a defensive position in the Samara area, and thus prepared for the final phase of the retreat to the sea.

This phase was perhaps even more trying than its precursors. As the advanced echelons passed eastward, fighting for each station on their way, the distance between them increased and communications between them and the group holding the Volga to the Ural line were in a state of constant interruption. Luckily Bolshevik attempts to blow up the thirty-nine tunnels east of Irkutsk were frustrated by a march of the Czechs of some 140 miles through the mountains to Lake Baikal, which ended in a complete surprise and defeat of the "Red Guards" concentrated there.

There were many such stirring events, constant skirmishing, with an occasional battle of several days, large towns captured and freed from Bolshevism for a time, before the Czecho-Slovak Legion reached Vladivostok. And even here there was further trouble, for Bolshevism was rampant and had to be beaten down. But the Legion had won through, had got to the sea and into touch with the Allies. Let us hope that the latter may appreciate the enterprise at its full value—at least in its broader aspect. First, the vastness of the undertaking and the pluck and endurance to carry it through, to say nothing of the power of organization it demanded. Then the result of the operation, which, by engaging hundreds of thousands of Germans, Austrians and Magyars armed by the Bolshevik Government, prevented the return of these ex-prisoners to Europe, where, on the western front, they would have neutralized the arriving Allied reinforcements from America.

"The story of the adventures and triumphs of this small army is indeed one of the greatest epics in history!"





## THE AFFAIR OF THE 1st DECEMBER, 1916, AT ATHENS.

By MAJOR T. E. COMPTON.

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ON 1st December, 1916, as a climax to the Greek Court's hostility to the Entente, Greek regular troops opened fire on Allied naval landing parties engaged in a "pacific demonstration" at Athens.

It was the first time that King Constantine had dared to oppose the Allies by force; and although the promises of his Government had not always been kept, the incident that had provoked the "pacific demonstration"—the formal refusal of the Greek Government to disarm—was the first occasion on which an Entente demand had been flatly rejected.

The failure of our gallant Rumanian Allies, betrayed by the Russian Imperial Government for its own ends, to make head against the combined attacks of Mackensen and Falkenhayn, had undoubtedly raised the hopes of the King in the ultimate success of his Imperial brother-in-law, and had encouraged him to refuse to surrender the arms and ammunition (not required by his army on a peace footing) called for by the Allied Powers. It was, in fact, the bad news from Rumania that had caused Admiral Dartige du Fournet, Commanding-in-Chief the Allied squadrons in the Mediterranean, to demand without further loss of time the delivery, by the end of November, of 10 batteries of mountain artillery, to be followed, during December, by the cession against compensation of 6 more mountain batteries, 16 field batteries, each with 1,000 rounds per cannon, 40,000 Männlicher rifles with 220 cartridges per rifle, 140 machine guns with ammunition, and 50 transport motor wagons.<sup>1</sup>

The French Admiral, as already mentioned, was the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Naval Forces in the Mediterranean; but he had no free hand in the negotiations with Greece. That country was still nominally neutral, and the Ministers of France, Great Britain and Russia were still at their Legations. Admiral Dartige had, therefore, to work with them diplomatically, but he received his orders from the Minister of Marine in Paris. He has recently published a book,<sup>2</sup> in which he describes in great detail his relations with the Legations and with the Greek Government. The French Naval Attaché at Athens, who was also Chief of the Intelligence Bureau, was independent of the Commander-in-Chief and corresponded direct with the Minister of


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<sup>1</sup> In order to leave room for concessions, the quantities demanded were somewhat exaggerated.

<sup>2</sup> "Souvenirs de Guerre d'un Amiral," Plon, Paris.

Marine, Admiral Lacaze. The latter appears to have depended chiefly on the Naval Attaché for advice, and, in consequence, the orders Admiral Dartige du Fournet received from Paris were at times contrary to the opinions he had expressed in his despatches. This made the Admiral's position difficult, especially as all personal intercourse being at an end between the King and the French Minister at Athens, it was left to him to interview King Constantine with regard to the execution of the demands upon which the Allies were now insisting.

Doubtless the King tried his best to get concessions out of the Admiral. The Greek Fleet was surrendered, and French naval officers had been appointed to control the post office, railways, and police; but with regard to the arms and ammunition, the King appears to have



obtained a promise from the Admiral that he would propose guarantees that this *matériel* should in no case be used by the Venizelists for seditious purposes, and further that, in exchange for the surrender of the arms, the controls over the Greek Administration should be relaxed. These guarantees were approved of by M. Bénazet (a member of the Army Committee of the French Chamber of Deputies on a mission to Salonica), who had been authorized by the French Government to negotiate with King Constantine. At the end of October M. Bénazet submitted a draft agreement to Paris which included these points. His proposals, however, were not sanctioned. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the French Naval Attaché was alone responsible for their rejection. In all probability M. Venizelos was consulted, and in any case the Allied Governments, after the delivering up by the royalists of

Forts Ruppel and Cavalla to the Bulgarians, could hardly have guaranteed King Constantine's throne against the wishes of the majority of his people. The King had dissolved the freely-elected parliament, which was hostile to his policy, and its constitutional leader, M. Venizelos, was at Salonica engaged in forming the nucleus of a Greek National Army, which he foresaw was destined, one day, to turn the scale in favour of the Entente against the Germano-Bulgars in the Balkans. The great Cretan was heart and soul with the Allies. His co-operation, militarily considered, already beginning with the enlistment of three volunteer divisions, was of the greatest value—as events have subsequently proved—and as the War proceeded, it was to him, and not to the pro-German Court, that the support of the Allies must logically and inevitably go.

Admiral Dartige does not seem to have quite appreciated the situation in this sense; but he invariably carried out his orders with perfect loyalty, even when he could not agree with the wisdom of the policy adopted. He never wanted to be there. As Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean he thought he ought to have been allowed to detail one of his vice-admirals for the special duty of coercing the Greeks.

About the 20th October, in order to protect the Venizelists and the Allied sailors, on leave ashore, from hostile demonstrations by the Epistrates<sup>1</sup> (who for many years past had played an active rôle in the affairs of Greece and had now been won over by the pro-Germans, in great measure owing to their disinclination to be called up for active service), the Admiral had occupied the town hall and the theatre with companies of bluejackets drawn from the battleships "Democratie" and "Provence" (flagship), which were subsequently transferred, by arrangement with the Greek War Minister, to the Zappeion, a big exhibition building situated near the Legations and close to the royal palace, where the Court was in residence. For this reason the Zappeion, in the subsequent troubles, became, as it were, the headquarters of the Allied Forces in Athens.

On 23rd October the Minister of Marine had telegraphed: "Je vous invite à tenir énergiquement la main à l'exécution de tous les engagements en y employant les forces nécessaires qu'il y aurait avantage à composer, non seulement de nos compagnies de débarquement, mais de celles des navires anglais."

Previously, in June, 1916, when active measures had seemed to be necessary, he had telegraphed that in no case should the bombardment of Athens be contemplated.

Thus, when verbally instructed by the French War Minister, General Roques, who passed through Athens from Salonica (13th to 16th November) to claim and enforce the surrender of the above-mentioned arms and munitions, a demonstration by bluejackets and marines, landed from the Fleet, was practically the only means of applying pressure at the disposal of the Admiral Commander-in-Chief. There was the blockade, certainly, that he might have recommended,

<sup>1</sup> Associations of Army Reservists.

and as things turned out it would perhaps have been better for him had he done so; but this measure had not been proposed to him, and, in his own words, "before reducing the whole population of Greece to a state of semi-starvation and completely alienating their sympathies, all other means of action should have been exhausted."

The Minister of Marine approved the proposed "pacific demonstration"—pacific, presumably, in the sense that it was intended to occupy certain positions (for the purpose of impressing public opinion), which operation it was hoped might be accomplished peaceably—and notified the arrival at the Piræus of two battalions of Colonial infantry, which were placed at the disposal of Admiral Dartige du Fournet.

But as the time drew near to the 1st December, the Greeks became more and more excited and the Legations anxious. The Admiral had two interviews with the King, but it is not true, as imagined by the author of a very clear account of the events of 1st December, 1916, in and in the neighbourhood of Athens, published in the *Correspondant*,<sup>1</sup> that King Constantine arranged the whole "demonstration" with Admiral Dartige du Fournet, and then took advantage of his information thus obtained to lay a trap for the landing parties. What he did do was to give assurances in writing, through the Court Marshal, that public order would be maintained, provided that neither the Entente police nor the landing parties should arrest, or interfere with, Greek subjects, and that, moreover, the Venizelist partisans "abstained from committing any act of violence, excess or abuse that might provoke reprisals."

Obviously, the latter proviso was far from being assuring. Otherwise, the promise was categorical. Had it been observed, the sanguinary conflicts of the 1st and 2nd (against the Venizelists) of December would not have taken place. The Allied landing parties did not open fire until after they had been traitorously attacked, and it is unlikely that the Venizelists were guilty of any intentional provocation. They were, however, treated in a most savage fashion.

The Admiral reported everything by telegraph to the Minister of Marine, dwelling particularly on how the absence of guarantees had tended to produce the unsatisfactory situation. He evidently hoped that he might be ordered to postpone coercive measures; but all he got in reply was to the effect that the bearing of his observations were not understood, and "n'avez-vous pas toute latitude?"

It is no wonder, after all that had passed, that he felt astonished. But here, again, he might perhaps have taken the opportunity of postponing the contemplated action until the point was settled definitely whether he had or had not the power to offer guarantees, and thus to have fixed some share, at least, of the responsibility for it with his superiors. In an interview, after his supersession, the President of the Republic and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that they had both been quite ignorant of his ultimatum to Greece. Yet it is easy to be wise after the event. Had he taken this course he might have been censured for want of energy.

<sup>1</sup> 10th May.

As the situation presented itself to him on 30th November, the Admiral considered that he was bound to carry out the demonstration, which had been approved by the Minister of Marine, and for which the necessary orders had been issued. The Greek troops, it is true, in and about Athens, numbered at least 12,000, with artillery; but the King had promised to maintain order, and hitherto he had always given way under pressure, as, in the estimation of the French Intelligence Bureau, would be the case now. Behind the "demonstration," in reserve, there were the possible bombardment of Athens and the blockade. But the bombardment was an extreme course, only to be undertaken in case the retreat of the force was compromised.

#### ADMIRAL DARTIGE DU FOURNET'S PLAN.

The Admiral had his flagship, the "Provence," in the harbour of the Piræus, and lying off Salamis, besides other craft, the following battleships and cruisers: "Verité" (flagship of a vice-admiral), "Justice," "Patrie" (flagship of a rear-admiral), "Mirabeau," "République," "Waldeck-Rousseau," "Ernest Rénan," "Edgar Quinet," "Vergniaud," "Voltaire," "Bruix," "Jurien de la Gravière," "Exmouth" (flagship of Rear-Admiral Hayes-Sadler), "Duncan," and the Italian cruiser "Libia."

From the crews of these warships he had organized a landing force of three battalions, each commanded by a capitaine de frégate, with Capitaine de Vaisseau Pugliesi-Conti, who had had valuable and distinguished service with the Fusiliers Marins in Flanders, in supreme command.

- No. 1 Battalion comprised the companies of the armoured cruisers "Waldeck-Rousseau," "Ernest Rénan," and "Edgar Quinet."
- No. 2 Battalion the companies of the battleships "Verité," "Justice," "Patrie," and "République."
- No. 3 Battalion those of the "Mirabeau," "Vergniaud," "Voltaire," "Duncan," and "Exmouth."

To cover the disembarkation, secure the base and act as a reserve, a special force was formed for the Piræus and hills commanding it, consisting of detachments from the "Provence," "Bruix," "Jurien de la Gravière," "Libia," and the two Colonial battalions, placed temporarily under the Admiral's orders, one of which had disembarked on 30th November. The objectives and itineraries of the three battalions (which force, unnecessarily large for merely a "pacific demonstration," was far too weak, without artillery, for the purpose of intimidating the pro-German Court and Army) were ordered as follows:—

The main objective was the occupation of the hills commanding Athens, from the Observatory to the Philopappos inclusive, the Zappeion was to remain occupied, and secondary objectives were a Powder Factory on the road from Athens to Eleusis (see map) and a Cartridge Factory south of the Boulevard Syngros. The military engineering establishments at the Rouf Barracks were to be picketed,



with what object is not clear, but probably in order to keep the most direct line of communication open with the Piræus.

The Colonial battalion, 700 strong, had, as already mentioned, landed at the Piræus on the 30th and had occupied the heights dominating the town. At 2.30 a.m. on 1st December detachments from the "Provence," "Jurien de la Gravière," and "Libia" occupied the Mole.

The disembarkations continued during the night, and the march of the three columns began before it was light. The 1st Battalion took the road to the Theseion and Observatory, via St. Etienne, detaching the "Waldeck-Rousseau" company to secure the Powder Mill on the Eleusis road. (It did not, however, as we shall see, get farther than the Rouf Barracks, a part of which it occupied and defended successfully against repeated attacks.)

The 2nd Battalion marched by the main road, via St. John, to the Theseion, Observatory and Philopappos.

The 3rd Battalion took the more southerly route, known as the Boulevard Syngros, to the Zappeion, detaching the "Vergniaud" company and a company of British Marines towards the Cartridge Factory. Captain Pugliesi-Conti, in a motor-car, accompanied by a staff officer, followed the 2nd Battalion.

The columns came up against Greek infantry patrols on all the roads, which retired after short *pourparlers*.

At the Rouf Barracks, however, more serious opposition was threatened, and the 2nd Battalion halted there for the best part of an hour. A body of Epistrates in plain clothes, but armed with rifles, had taken possession of a barrack-room. Their attitude was so menacing that Captain Pugliesi-Conti had them surprised and arrested before they could make use of their arms. The barrack-room was subsequently occupied by the companies "Ernest-Rénan" and "Edgar Quinet" of the 1st Battalion, who, making use of engineer equipment, solidly fortified it. The original intention had been to merely guard these buildings from the outside to prevent Greek troops from assembling there; but when the latter threatened hostilities, this situation necessitated other measures.

The 2nd Battalion resumed its march at 8.30 a.m. to the Observatory and Philopappos heights via the Theseion. Admiral Dartige du Fournet was himself on the Philopappos, having left his flagship at 8 a.m. with two staff officers. In his book he explains why, as follows: "The Commander-in-Chief considered that, although no resistance had been as yet encountered, the situation remained serious. Information had reached him of marked agitation and partial mobilization of the Greek Army. He esteemed his presence necessary on shore, not that he had any intention of exercising himself the command of a detachment of 2,500 sailors. But he thought he ought to be on the spot in order to be in a position to decide rapidly whatever steps might be advisable."

Captain Pugliesi-Conti in his report describes the situation at the time, about 9 a.m., thus: "The Powder Mill was occupied. The Rouf

establishments were guarded by two companies of the 1st Battalion. The 2nd Battalion, augmented by two companies (the 'Voltaire' of the 3rd Battalion and the 'Provence' brought up from the Piræus) occupied the *ensemble* of the Hills of the Nymphs, from the Observatory to the summit of the Philopappos, where a Greek infantry company was posted. The 3rd Battalion had occupied the Zappeion, but a strong Greek detachment of regulars opposed progress towards the Cartridge Factory. The 'République' company of the 2nd Battalion had not yet reached the hills."

Captain Pugliesi-Conti had therefore now with him on the heights the companies of the "Verité," "Justice," "Patrie," "Voltaire," and "Provence." The Greek company on the Philopappos was thus entirely at his mercy, but its commander, nevertheless, adopted an exceedingly bellicose attitude, and, as will presently transpire, it was not eventually disarmed without bloodshed.

We must now follow the adventures and desperate experiences of the "République" company, the treacherous attack on which unit, when isolated, was the signal for a general fusillade and open hostilities by Greek troops upon the Allied landing parties.

But first we may note that Admiral Dartige du Fournet, having failed to induce the Greek captain to retire his company, left the Philopappos and proceeded to the Zappeion, where he could make use of the telephone and wireless telegraphy. At the Zappeion he endeavoured to communicate with the Greek Premier by telephone, and at 10.30 a.m. sent a message to him by Commandant Sarrou of the Intelligence Bureau, requesting that the company should be retired from the Philopappos. By the time this message had been delivered, however, firing had become general, and the company on the Philopappos had been disarmed and made prisoners after a short but serious resistance, in which there were several casualties on both sides.

The "République" company became isolated in this wise: After the halt at the Rouf Barracks, while Captain Pugliesi-Conti proceeded to the heights in his motor-car by way of the Theseion, the 2nd Battalion made its way direct over the Electric Railway, principally, if not entirely, by the road which leads over the Poulo-Poulo footbridge to the Philopappos. It apparently escaped the notice of the officer commanding this battalion that his transport would not be able to follow the troops, but would have to go round by the Theseion. The "République" was the rear company of the battalion, and before it had crossed over the Poulo-Poulo footbridge a messenger arrived with the news that the transport—consisting of carts carrying the men's hammocks, officers' canteens, medical equipment, and musical instruments—had been seized and taken away by Greek troops while it was on its way to reach the heights and rejoin the battalion via the Theseion. Lieutenant de Vaisseau Thibaudier, of the "République," at once took his company back to the main road (see map) with the exception, however, of his machine-gun detachment, which he sent to the Philopappos. Arrived on the main road he found himself opposed by a Greek company, whose captain declared that his orders were to

prevent any French sailors advancing by this road by, if necessary, opening fire upon them.

At Lieutenant Thibaudier's request he was allowed to see a superior officer, who confirmed his subordinate's statement, and further announced that the transport would not be returned. Placed in this awkward and invidious position, the gallant Frenchman refused to retire and sent to the Philopappos for orders. But he soon saw that he would be surrounded if he remained long where he was, and no orders reaching him (his messenger had been stopped at the footbridge), while the tramways continued to bring reinforcements to the Greeks, about 10.30 a.m. he began his retirement towards the footbridge, three-quarters of a mile distant, with the intention of joining the 2nd Battalion on the Philopappos.

The footbridge over the Electric Railway at Poulou-Poulou was found to be unoccupied, and Lieutenant Thibaudier had already got three sections over it when a machine gun opened on the fourth section, killing the Lieutenant instantly and knocking over seven of his men, who were all eventually killed also, as the machine gun continued to fire on the wounded.

Enseigne de Vaisseau de Badens now took command of the company and repulsed a Greek attack with magazine fire, killing ten. This repulse checked the attackers' ardour, and de Badens was able to place three of his sections under cover in skirmishing order, protecting his front and flanks, while the fourth section engaged in house-to-house fighting. A messenger had succeeded in reaching Captain Pugliesi-Conti on the Philopappos, who, as soon as he heard the firing, despatched the "Provence," company of bluejackets to the aid of their comrades of the "République," and proceeded himself towards the scene of the action, accompanied by his staff officer, the Lieutenant Le Luc. But a burst of firing from the Philopappos obliged him to retrace his steps. In his report he describes the situation as follows: "We had some difficulty in regaining the Philopappos, having to pass under the fire of machine guns and of several companies installed on the Acropolis. I considered the situation of our troops difficult enough.

"The 'République' company was surprised. The 'Provence' company, seeking to extricate it by a flank attack, found itself fired into from behind by Epistrates under cover in the Observatory; the line of retreat was swept by machine guns. I directed, therefore, these companies to withdraw towards some crests which I thought good for resistance. They were, however, unable to reach them on account of the heavy fire, but succeeded in occupying positions which flanked our line and prevented it from being turned by armed bands. . . 70 Greeks had been made prisoners by the 'Patrie' (on the Philopappos), after several had been shot down. The other companies (of the 2nd Battalion) were in position facing east and engaged with the enemy (on the Acropolis), and it was at this moment that Enseigne de Vaisseau Bouygues of the 'Verité' was killed, while giving a good example of calm bravery."

Except for being surrounded and having no means for replenishing ammunition, or obtaining supplies, the French position on the Philopappos was, at 2 p.m., for the time being satisfactory, when suddenly the Greek bugles sounded the "cease fire."

In front of the French line facing the Acropolis was a small advanced post, consisting of the machine-gun section and a few riflemen of the "Justice" company, in a half-finished trench, which had been taken in reverse by Greek machine-gun fire from the Observatory. The commander, Enseigne de Vaisseau Vadon, had been killed, and on the "cease fire" sounding, the senior N.C.O., a *quartier-maître*, for some reason or other, but entirely on his own responsibility, hoisted a white flag. Upon which a crowd of over 2,000 Greeks, civilians and soldiers invaded the hill and made the garrison of the advanced post prisoners.

Captain Pugliesi-Conti was obliged to take energetic measures to convince his men that the white flag had been displayed without orders. He shouted to the line to remain steady, and to those men in front of it to come up the hill. He also announced his intention of reopening fire. The Greek crowd then took to its heels, and the combat recommenced. Lieutenant de Vaisseau Schascher was wounded. It was now about 4.30 p.m.

The Zappeion had been under fire since about 11.30 a.m., when several men were wounded under the peristyle in the presence of the Admiral; and about 4.40 p.m. a projectile from Greek artillery in action on the Stadium Hill passed through the telephone room while Captain Douseam, the Admiral's aide-de-camp, was using the instrument. Admiral Dartige du Fournet thereupon sent an order to the Fleet, by wireless, to open fire on the Stadium Hill, which point could be easily ranged on without endangering the monuments of Athens. Nevertheless, a 12-inch shell from the "Mirabeau" burst close to the royal palace, creating great alarm among the inmates, who took refuge in the cellars. Soon after this incident hostilities ceased on the part of the Greeks, and an aide-de-camp of the King brought a message to the Zappeion promising the immediate surrender of six batteries of mountain guns, and making no opposition to the maintenance of the French garrison at the Zappeion. In consequence the Admiral, at 7 p.m., signalled to the Fleet to cease fire. Sixty rounds had been fired, including four of heavy calibre, by the "Mirabeau."

The Admiral was in rather a fix. He had demanded the delivery of ten batteries, and on the Greek Government refusing compliance, he had made his demonstration, which had been met by armed resistance. He had then, about 11.45 a.m., acting on a happy inspiration, signalled to the Fleet to open fire on the Stadium. But before this order could be carried out—there was delay on account of the "Provence" requiring confirmation that it was really the Admiral's order—the King, through the intermediary of Prince Demidoff, the Russian Ambassador, offered the immediate delivery of six batteries. With what his superiors judged an unfortunate compliance, Admiral Dartige du Fournet decided to accept this offer, and counter-ordered the bombardment, although his crews had been treacherously fired upon and

their transport seized. French prestige had suffered, yet instead of enforcing reparation by bombardment, he was now ready to accept two-fifths less mountain artillery than he had originally demanded, in order to be able to withdraw his men without further casualties.

Firing having broken out again in the afternoon, as already related, at 6.45 p.m., the Admiral was in a far worse position than had been the case at noon, for night had fallen and his casualties were heavier—60 killed (6 officers) and 140 wounded. It was of urgency to succour the wounded and extricate his main detachment on the Philopappos, which was surrounded by vastly superior forces.

For these reasons it may have been wise to accept the King's offer at this time; but this remark does not apply to the previous acceptance at 12 noon.

The cases of General Dyer and Admiral Dartige du Fournet have something in common. Each of these officers was placed in a most difficult position, and both of them were censured for the action taken—the former for doing too much, and the Admiral for not making use of all the means at his disposal for obtaining complete satisfaction of his demands; or “at least inflicting an exemplary chastisement with the guns of the Fleet.”<sup>1</sup> In his book (chapter xviii) Admiral Dartige du Fournet gives some reasons why, in his opinion, an effective bombardment would have been difficult: ancient monuments would need to have been respected, the Allied Legations, colonies of Allied nations, and the civil population might have suffered; but all this does not explain why he did not do at 12 noon what he subsequently ordered at 4.45 p.m.<sup>2</sup> Why make the demonstration at all if he was not prepared to back it up with a bombardment, if attacked, in order to extricate the landing parties?

As it was, these latter—all except the Zappeion detachment—got back to their ships during the night, most of the wounded being taken to Greek hospitals. The Admiral regained his flagship on the morning of 2nd December. The Zappeion detachment followed later, escorted by Greek troops.

On the flanks of the “demonstration” of the 1st December a certain amount of fighting took place, due in each instance to the initiative of the Greeks. On the left flank, after occupying the Powder Mill on the Eleusis road with a detachment, the Waldeck-Rousseau company was heavily engaged in an endeavour to open up communication with Rouf. One officer was killed, and the attempt had to be abandoned, the company remaining on the defensive for the rest of the day.

On the right, where the British Marines formed part of the force detached from the 3rd Battalion for the purpose of occupying the Cartridge Factory, a Greek commander appears to have treacherously

<sup>1</sup> Report of Vice-Admiral de Bon, Chief of the Naval General Staff.

<sup>2</sup> It is to be remarked also that on the evening of the 1st December, at the Zappeion, the Admiral informed the Allied Ministers that he intended to ask for authority to bombard those parts of Athens containing military establishments, but no historical monuments.



attacked after Lieutenant de Vaisseau Dévé (the senior Entente officer) had been informed that no hostilities need be feared. Trusting in this announcement the detachment was engaged at dinners, or *dejeuners*, when the firing was first heard, but the men had finished their repast before being themselves attacked. It is possible that this order (to attack) was given by a battalion commander bringing up reinforcements, as it was a company commander who gave his word to Lieutenant de Vaisseau Dévé that there was nothing to fear.

The French (the "Vergniaud" company) and half the Marines retired on the Factory. The other half company of Marines had occupied a hill commanding the Factory.

The Greeks occupied some houses and the Cemetery. Some Greeks were in the Factory, which was stormed and occupied, Lieutenant Dévé being killed. There were other casualties, and the entrance was under fire. At this juncture a British sergeant had the happy idea of making a hole in the wall at a place not under fire—the south wall—through which wounded and combatants entered, and the place was put in a state of defence.

As the Greeks had no desire to attack it, and the Entente troops did not think it worth while to attack the Greeks in houses and Cemetery, having no artillery, active hostilities were necessarily suspended. Certain civilians brought water to the Factory, and in the evening the Greeks allowed the wounded to be taken to hospital.

Altogether, the affair of 1st December, 1916, was, for the time being, a blow to French prestige, and the unfortunate Venizelists at Athens suffered horribly on account of it; but King Constantine thereby gave the Powers a reason for dethroning him, which his friends among them could no longer resist. Six months later, in May, 1917, M. Jounart, with full powers, and furnished with adequate means and the necessary instructions, put an end to the crisis.



## THE IRISH REBELLIONS OF 1798 AND OF TO-DAY : A COMPARISON.

By BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. N. WATTS.

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THE parallel between the inception and maturing of the Irish Rebellions of 1798 and that which, breaking out prematurely in Dublin on Easter Sunday, 1916, began to assume, in 1919, its present formidable aspect, is very striking.

Both were the sequels of activities of societies whose object at first—outwardly at any rate—was not a resort to armed resistance to the domination of Great Britain but, in the case of the United Irish Society in the eighteenth century, constitutional reform of the Irish Parliament, and in that of Sinn Fein, the establishment of economic and political conditions, involving self reliance and development from within on the economic side, and abstention from the Imperial Parliament at Westminster, with passive but not active resistance or physical force on the political side.

In both cases these activities were driven underground, so to speak, by the precautionary, or repressive, measures—according to the point of view—adopted by Dublin Castle ; and in both cases the leaders of the movements, when armed rebellion was decided on, invoked the aid of the Foreign Power of the day with which Great Britain was, or was shortly to be, at grips—France in the eighteenth and Germany in the twentieth century.

With the actual resort to force the parallel between the beginnings of the two rebellions ceases, for although it might appear that it could be carried farther by a comparison of what the Protestant Yeomanry did early in 1798, and the unlicensed "reprisals" of to-day, the illegal shootings and flogging of suspected sympathisers with the United Irish movement, by the Yeomanry, began before the Rebellion of '98 broke out, and were a contributory cause of it ; whereas the "reprisals" now carried out by Crown Forces were not resorted to till after nearly a year of murders of constables, attacks on police barracks and, later, assassination of military officers and soldiers by the forces of the Irish Republican Army.

In '98 the hounding down and executions of suspects, Protestants as well as Catholics (to the anger of Lord Cornwallis as Viceroy), were the acts of irresponsible junior officers of the Irish Militia and newly raised Yeomanry, and drove the men of County Wexford, very few of whom had hitherto joined the "United Irish," into armed revolt—the

most notorious of these officers being one Lieutenant Heppenstall, known as the "walking gallows" owing to his indiscriminate executions.

Many of the reprisals of to-day it is true have been carried out, without licence, by junior officers and even the rank and file, but they did not drive Sinn Fein into rebellion; and with regard to official "reprisals"—whatever one's opinion may be as to their expediency—they also were adopted to keep in check a rebellion already in full swing.

Finally, the nature of the fighting in 1798 was very different to that lately taking place. In '98, as to-day, many brutal murders of loyalists and members of the Crown Forces by the rebels occurred, but on the whole the United Irish—badly armed and led as they were—put up straight fights in the open.

The Sinn Feiners, armed with modern weapons, well organized as a fighting force and well directed, confined themselves to a campaign against solitary individuals and to ambushes in superior forces of detachments of soldiers and police, rarely engaging Crown Forces in the field.

#### 1798.

In order to understand the causes of the Irish Rebellion of 1798 it is necessary to trace the origin and development of the political organization—the United Irish Society—whose leaders eventually fomented and planned it; a rebellion which, had it received the promised and attempted foreign support asked for, might well have been successful and have materially affected the result of the long struggle with France—and Napoleon—upon which Great Britain had entered.

When, in June, 1791, "The United Irish Society" was founded in Belfast by Samuel Neilson, a Belfast merchant, and organized by Theodore Wolfe Tone, a member of the Irish Bar, Ireland was in a welter of contending factions; in Ulster the Presbyterian "Peep o' Day Boys" were opposed by the Catholic "Defenders"; in the south the landlords and tithe proctors suffered from the nocturnal attacks of "The White Boys" and "Ribbonmen"; while, amongst the upper classes the lay and clerical gentry of the "Catholic Association" on one side, and the Protestant aristocracy, who formed the Whig Club, on the other, were in bitter antagonism.

The object of the society at its inception was to put an end to the existing discord by uniting the conflicting parties in an effort to "counteract English influence, the greatest danger of Irish liberty," by a reform of Parliament, which should include Irishmen of all denominations. In November, 1791, a second United Irish Club was started in Dublin and the movement made slow though steady progress, except in County Wexford where, till 1798, it gained few adherents.

It was conducted on constitutional lines till 1794, working openly, with the sole (ostensible) objects of securing equal rights to all Irishmen, and "placing Ireland on a footing of equality with England," but after the dispersal of the Dublin branch by Government agents, followed, on 4th May of that year, by the arrest of its officials and the seizure of

its papers, the "United Irish" became a secret and military society, bent on throwing off English domination by force of arms.

"Representation of all the people of Ireland" was substituted in the test, or oath, exacted from all members of the society, for "Reform of Parliament," and the enrolment of men by baronies and counties, and the appointment of officers of all grades, took the place of petitions and publications.

"The unit was a lodge of twelve members with a chairman and secretary, who ranked as captain and corporal respectively." "Five lodges formed a company, and the officers of five companies—ranking as captains—constituted a Baronial Committee"—(Kavanagh's "The Insurrection of 1798"). From these Baronial Committees were formed the County Committees, the members of which ranked as colonels.

Each Province had a Directory, the appointment of officers above the rank of colonel being vested in an Executive, or National, Directory of five members in Dublin—the supreme authority. Orders of the Executive were conveyed to the rank and file by an elaborate but, as it proved, quite futile system of secrecy owing to the large numbers of Government agents who joined the society and divulged its plans. These decisions of the Dublin Executive were communicated to only one member of each of the Provincial Directories and by him, in like manner, to a single member of a County Committee, and so on down the scale. The most prominent of the leaders of the movement, at this period, were Lord Edward Fitzgerald (a son of the Duke of Leinster), Theodore Wolfe Tone, Neilson, Rowan, Arthur O'Connor (a nephew of Lord Longueville), Thomas Addis Emmet, and Doctor McNevin.

It is outside the scope of this article to trace the subsequent fate of these men, except that of Wolfe Tone, who was the prime mover in the attempted invasion of Ireland by the French, and was, by his ability and energy, the most formidable of them all.

In 1795 Tone fled—or was allowed to leave—the country in consequence of having become implicated, the previous year, in a scheme of the French Government for an invasion of Ireland. After a short stay in America he proceeded to France, where he arranged with the French Foreign Minister De la Croix, Carnot (the Organizer of Victory), and General Hoche, for the despatch of an expeditionary force to Ireland.

The force, consisting of 15,000 men under General Hoche (Grouchy, Hardy and Humbert being his subordinate Generals and Wolfe Tone a Chef-de-Brigade), sailed from Brest on 15th December, 1796, with an abundance of arms, ammunition and guns, in a fleet of forty-three vessels.

Owing to fogs these scattered and several, including the Admiral's flagship with Hoche on board, returned to France. Nevertheless, by 20th December thirty-five out of the forty-three ships of the fleet reached Bantry Bay, but, in the absence of the Admiral and Hoche, no attempt was made to disembark the troops immediately, although calm weather prevailed. This was soon succeeded by violent gales, which forced the

ships to cut their cables, stand out to sea, and return to France without having landed a man.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile the increasing severity of the Government caused many Protestants as well as Catholics, who had hitherto held aloof, to join the "United Irish" and, by the end of 1796, 500,000 men had taken the test or enrolled. Of these the numbers who were armed with pikes, or firelocks, have been variously estimated at from 125,000 to 300,000.<sup>2</sup>

Wolfe Tone, after the failure of Hoche's attempted invasion of Ireland in December, 1796, went to Holland and induced the Government of the Batavian Republic to fit out an expedition, under Admiral de Winter and General Dandaels, to invade Ireland. This expeditionary force consisted of about 15,000 men, carried by a fleet of sixteen ships, and was ready to put to sea on 8th July, 1797, but, being weather-bound for four weeks, the project was abandoned. Nothing deterred, Tone once more approached the French Government, with the result that during 1797 orders were issued for the assemblage of an "Army" at Boulogne for the invasion of Great Britain. The project, however, was abandoned in May, 1798, and the troops diverted to Egypt.

Meanwhile the English Government and its sympathisers in Ireland had been preparing the way, in and out of the Irish Parliament, for the Union which came about in 1800, at the same time using repressive—and it must be confessed provocative—measures against the "United Irish."

Matters began to come to a head in March, 1798. With a view to concert for the conduct of the Rebellion, which they decided was shortly to take place, the Leinster delegates, thirteen in all, assembled on the 13th of that month at Bridge Street, Dublin. This meeting was raided by Government agents, the books were seized and some of the members—Emmet, Bond, Henry, Hugh Jackson, McNevin and Sweetman—were arrested; while warrants were issued for the arrest of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Sampson and McCormick. [Fitzgerald was caught and wounded while resisting apprehension on 18th May, and died in Newgate, Dublin, on 4th June.]

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<sup>1</sup> Accounts differ as to the quality of the French troops employed on this expedition. D'Alton in his "History of Ireland" states that it was composed of soldiers who had seen service and could be relied on. Kavanagh in "The Insurrection of 1798" asserts that most of the rank and file were men released from the galleys whose presence was so little desired in France that they were not allowed to land there on return from Bantry Bay, but were kept on board ship till sent on the abortive expedition for the invasion of England which landed at Fishguard in Wales on 23rd February, 1797, and surrendered the same day.

<sup>2</sup> Leckie gives the numbers of "United Irish" at the beginning of 1798, as 110,000 in Ulster, more than 100,000 in Munster, 70,000 in Leinster; according to him very few enrolled in Connaught.

To meet the growing unrest the Government as early as 1793, had increased the regular Army to 20,000 men and, in the same year, an Act was passed to embody 16,000 Militia. These forces were subsequently augmented till, towards the end of 1796, there were in Ireland 80,000 Regulars and about 80,000 Militia and Yeomanry.



On the 30th March martial law was proclaimed and the tension increased till, on 21st May, further arrests of leaders of the "United Irish" were made, precipitating the outbreak of the Rebellion, which took place in Dublin on 23rd May. This attempt consisted of a feeble attack on Newgate Prison, and was speedily stamped out; but on the same date insurrectionary bands all over the country commenced to attack small bodies of British troops and isolated barracks, with at first some success in spite of the fact that a large proportion of the rebels were only armed with pikes.

It is not proposed to deal here with the guerilla warfare which ensued, except to point out that in the northern counties the efforts of the rebels were feeble and desultory, in contrast to the formidable proportions the insurrection assumed in the south, notably in County Wexford, where, owing to the small number of adherents till early in 1798 to the United Irish Society, only about 500 regular troops and some recently embodied Protestant Yeomanry were stationed when the Rebellion broke out. There is no doubt that it was the oppression and brutalities of this Yeomanry which drove the people of County Wexford to take up arms, and it is a curious fact that while for the most part the Irish people in the purely Celtic counties remained quiescent, the non-Celtic men of County Wexford, descended from Normans, Welsh, Flemings and even Cromwell's troopers, should have put up a resistance which necessitated the employment of considerable numbers of regular and auxiliary troops (Militia and Yeomanry), and which, had it been equally determined in other parts of Ireland, and aided by a simultaneous landing of French troops, might well have altered the history of that country.

The Rebellion of '98 failed, and the leaders of the movement were scattered, imprisoned or hanged. Wolf Tone, in spite of its complete failure, persisted in his efforts against the Government, and, returning to Ireland to organize a fresh attempt, was captured in French uniform on 12th October, 1798, and sentenced to be hanged on 12th November. On 11th of that month, however, he cut his throat with a penknife in prison, dying of the wound on the 19th.

#### 1916—1920

To turn now to the Irish political movement of the twentieth century, which has resulted in the far more formidable Rebellion lately raging. The forerunner of Sinn Fein was the Gaelic League, founded in 1897 to revive the Irish language and literature. This society has always been, officially, non-political, and at one time had Unionists among its supporters.

Sinn Fein, as a policy, began with the publication, in 1904, in the *United Irishman* of a series of articles entitled "The Resurrection of Hungary," and those acquainted with the struggle of Hungary for equality with Austria will grasp the root idea of the movement, which at first, as already stated, was economic and political and not armed resistance

Mr. Arthur Griffith may be said to be the father of the movement to which he recruited, soon after it was started, Mr. McNeil (previously and subsequently identified with the Irish language movement) and many others.

De Valera, the President of the so-called Irish Republic, belongs to a totally different school to Griffith and McNeil, and only came into prominence during the "rising" of 1916, as Commandant of the Republican Forces—or rebels—operating about Bolland's Mills and the Mount Street area in Dublin.

The Gaelic League undoubtedly prepared the way for Sinn Fein, for although it is not till comparatively recently that Griffith realized the importance of the language as a national regenerating factor, very many came into the language movement led by his teaching. Very early in the Sinn Fein movement the influence of the Fenian and physical force element began to make itself felt over even the more sober orthodox Sinn Feiners, and especially over the younger members like Pierce and De Valera, so that German spies and agents for some time previous to the outbreak of the Great War found a fertile field in Ireland in which to sow the seeds of open revolt when opportunity should occur, and it is now established that had there been a serious British naval reverse, enabling German transports to put to sea, a formidable German force would have been landed in Ireland. As it was, German money and a certain number of arms were sent to the western and southern coasts, where, in return, German submarines obtained fuel under Sinn Fein organization.

For a long time after the foundation of Sinn Fein that society and the Gaelic League rather flowed along in parallel channels, sympathetic but quite distinct, though the opposition of the late Nationalist Party to both—so I am informed—drew them ever closer together, and made their personnel more and more identical.

With the *débâcle* of the Nationalist Party at the polls and the proclamation of an Irish Republic the mask was thrown aside, and the spring of 1916, when things were not going well for the Allies on the Western Front in France, was deemed a suitable time for open rebellion.

The outbreak of Easter Sunday, 1916, in Dublin, though determined, was premature and did not spread to any extent to the provinces, and it was not till 1919 that the recent Rebellion began to take its later form, financed by sympathisers in America and probably in Germany.

## A PERSIAN CITY DURING THE GREAT WAR.

By HAJJI BABA.

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"The dogs bark, but the caravan passes on."

—Old Proverb.

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IN Western Persia in the Autumn of 1914 the most noticeable signs of the Great War were the gradual rise in prices, the irregularity of the mails, and the exodus of Germans from Persia *via* Baghdad instead of the usual Caspian Sea route. Since the Kalhurs and Galkhanis were at that time exacting heavy blackmail from all caravans and travellers on the Kermanshah—Qasr-i-Shirin road, most of these Germans had an adventurous time. Two from Teheran were kept in chains for several days at Sar-i-Pul, severely beaten, and forced to pay eighty tomans.

The first German political agents to arrive in Kermanshah were Schunemann and his assistant, Paschan. They established themselves there early in 1915. The former came ostensibly as German Consul. He had been in Persia for years, at first in Azerbaijan with the Lepsius Mission, which conducted schools and orphanages for Syrians and Armenians. He was a carpenter by trade, but shrewd and well fitted for the difficult task assigned to him. At first the representatives of the allies, which included the British and Russian Consuls and a Russian captain in charge of several hundred Persian cossacks, did not regard the presence of Schunemann as a menace, but they soon became aware that these Germans were spending money lavishly and had gathered round them a formidable body of armed retainers. They maintained their own bodyguard, and paid large sums to influential men simply to remain neutral in case of trouble.

They also bought at high prices from the tribal chiefs guarantees to furnish certain numbers of men, both horse and foot, when called upon. These pioneers of German propaganda were quickly followed by others of the same mould, most of whom travelled with consular passports. They visited all the gendarme posts and got into close touch with the Swedish and Persian officers. Some pretended to be engaged in scientific pursuits and one, who afterwards became prominent in southern Persia, was making a collection of insects. An important item on their programme was the circulation of cleverly prepared literature.

Early in the spring of 1915, Husain Raouf Bey, with a force of about two thousand, partly regulars belonging to the 37th Division and the remainder Jof and other Kurdish tribesmen, crossed the Persian frontier and came up as far as Kerind. The people of the

district protested against this advance and some of the chiefs, including Ali Akbar Khan of the Sinjabi tribe, telegraphed to Teheran for permission to drive the Turks out. The government, however, paid no attention, and so the allied representatives left Kermanshah about the middle of April and went to Hamadan, which gave Schunemann and his clique complete control of the district. The Turks had not been long in Kerind before the people of that neighbourhood, angered by wanton acts of violence on the part of the soldiers, attacked the camp. Ali Akbar Khan rode from Kermanshah to Kerind in one day to take part in the fight. Many Turks were killed, but Husain Raouf Bey with his guns drove off the attackers and looted the village. As this was not down on the programme at all, Schunemann went to Kerind and persuaded the Turks to go back to Mesopotamia. In spite of this episode the Germans pushed their preparations as rapidly as prudence would permit. They brought in quantities of arms and ammunition. Officers arrived and began to drill the native levies. The gendarme officers, both Swedish and Persian, openly affirmed their allegiance to Germany, and thousands of Kurds, Lurs, and Persians were soon in German employ and in process of being trained *to fight Russia*. It is curious to note that the hostility of the Swedish officers of the gendarmerie to the allies was not realized in India for some time.

In the summer of 1915 the British and Russian consuls attempted to return to Kermanshah. Accompanied by a few cossacks and their own personal Persian retainers, they got as far as Kangavar, but Schunemann arrived at Sahneh about the same time with a force of several hundred Lurs and refused to allow them to proceed. After a delay of more than a fortnight, and much fruitless negotiation for a suitable Persian escort, the consular party was attacked. The Persian guard holding the village did not show much fight, and Schunemann was soon master of the situation. The consuls returned to Hamadan and the Germans to Kermanshah. This little affair gave Schunemann great prestige and did more to link the people of the district with Germany than any vaunted victory on the western front could have done.

Matters came to a climax about the end of November. The gendarmes confiscated the British banks in Hamadan, Sultanabad, and elsewhere, and the allied representatives in those places had to flee. The Russians had troops in Kazvin which, together with other places in northern Persia, they had garrisoned before the war. They at once despatched a force to Hamadan and sent movable columns to Kum and Isfahan. The design at Kum was to capture the German propagandists fleeing from Teheran, but the refugees were too quick for the Russians. The Isfahan column was intended to stop German intrigue in those parts, and apparently succeeded. The Germans, with their gendarmes and levies, met the Russians near Aveh and were severely handled, whereupon they evacuated Hamadan, while the Russians crossed over the mountains to Asadabad.

In January, 1916, the Germans brought up about two thousand Turkish troops to the Bidsurkh Pass, some five miles east of Sahneh,

with a view to checking the Russian advance. This time the Turks gave guarantees of good behaviour to the Kerind people, who in return gave them safe conduct. The tribes were now so entangled in the German net and so afraid of the Russian cossacks that they welcomed the assistance of the Turks in the inevitable struggle.

This force was what Von der Goltz Pasha had designated the "Baghdad Group" and was composed partly of the remnants of the 37th Division and partly of irregulars.

In mid-January, 1916, they attacked the Russian advance guard, which consisted of about 350 cossacks and infantry, and compelled them to evacuate Kangavar and retire to Asadabad. These were the first Turkish troops to encounter the Russians in Persia.

For the first six weeks of 1916 life in Kermanshah was full of excitement, and murders and highway robberies occurred constantly in open daylight. The province was controlled by Nizam-es-Sultaneh, a former governor of Luristan and now the principal tool of the Germans, who sat at the head of a sort of mock parliament in the city. On the 22nd February, however, there was a rude awakening, for on the 20th the Russian 1st Caucasus Cavalry Division, supported by the greater part of two battalions of infantry, had advanced from Asadabad. On the 21st they took the Bidsurkh Pass, and most of the Germans left Kermanshah the following day. The city was panic-stricken. The Swedes and Germans had everywhere circulated tales of Russian cruelty and violence, and for two days the Baghdad road was black with people moving down towards Mesopotamia. The last of the Germans and Swedes arrived from the front on the afternoon of the 23rd. They had very little transport and were therefore obliged to leave behind most of the stores collected at Kermanshah during a whole year. They had quantities of rifles and ammunition in their headquarters, and one of their number was told off to stay behind and blow up everything. They were still struggling with their personal belongings, and trying to load them on the few animals at their disposal, when the sound of the Russian artillery was heard from Kara Su bridge. This was soon accompanied by rifle fire, and the Germans and Swedes mounted and rode off without waiting to destroy anything. As the sun was setting the remnant of Turks entered the town. They were only a few hundred strong, and were haggard, hungry, and dropping with fatigue. The Russians had been pounding them all the way from Sahneh. They went into the government house, planted a gun on the roof, and refused to go any further that night. The Russians spent the night on the banks of the Kara Su and sent in a message demanding that a deputation under a white flag should meet them early in the morning and surrender the city. There was much running to and fro, and the next morning while it was still dark, a humble procession marched out to the Kara Su, bowed to the ground before the Russian cossacks nodding haughtily on their horses, and surrendered the city; at ten o'clock on the 24th February, 1916, the Russians entered. Kermanshah remained in their hands for the next four months. This force, which numbered about 4,000, consisted



principally of cavalry and included one or two crack regiments "resting" from other fronts.

The cossacks followed up the Turks and Germans as far as Kerind, but did not attempt for some time to advance any further. If they had continued their pursuit and had made a demonstration towards Baghdad it might have changed the whole situation at Kut, as the Turks would have been obliged to detach an appreciable force to prevent them from joining hands with the British. The reason for their delay at this critical period is difficult to understand, the more so because at that time the ration strength of the Russians in this theatre exceeded forty thousand. The Russian excuse for not advancing was the rainy weather and their lack of transport. In the meantime the Baghdad Group withdrew from Persia and rejoined the Sixth Army which was still investing Kut.

In May, when Kut had fallen and the weather was getting hot, the Russians advanced towards Khanakin. They were without helmets and many of them were still in winter clothing. The cossacks rode round Khanakin, cut the Turkish communications, captured a few convoys, sabred some Turks and had them photographed, but the attack on Khanakin itself was a failure. The Russian artillery was now inferior to that of the Turks, and the Russians had to retire. The Turks, having taken Kut, were now able to detach a large force to operate against the Russians, and the XIIIth Army Corps, consisting of the 2nd, 6th, and a composite division, together with an independent cavalry brigade—all weak units—was sent into Persia to pursue them. This corps suffered considerable casualties on the way up to Kermanshah. The Russians made a good withdrawal and left practically nothing of value for their enemies. The Turks entered Kermanshah on the 1st July. There was an engagement lasting several hours on the hills to the south-east of the city. The Russians fell back stubbornly across the Kara Su, and the Turks in attempting to follow them up were repulsed. The Russians then established themselves about sixteen miles east of Kermanshah. The Turks entrenched opposite them and then rested during the fasting month of Ramazan.

At the beginning of August, when the Turks were preparing to advance, the ammunition dump at their headquarters in Kermanshah, took fire, and many camels, mules, and donkeys, and several persons, were blown to pieces. The sound of the bursting shells made the townsfolk think that the Russians were bombarding the town again, and the Germans, who had opened a bank and a supply depôt, turned over their money and were on the point of leaving when they found out what had happened. Driving the Russians before them, the Turks marched to Hamadan in six days, arriving there on the 11th August, 1916. As a result of this fighting about two hundred Turkish wounded were brought back to Kermanshah. The troops quartered in Hamadan consisted of the 2nd Division (1st, 5th and 6th Regiments), the 6th Division (16th, 17th and 18th Regiments), and the 44th Regiment. The people of the city were pleased when they came in, but still more pleased when they went out.

The Turks now had a great many sick. All sorts of diseases were rife among them, especially cholera, typhus, and malaria. They had eleven hospitals in Kermanshah, with an average of two thousand sick in them all the time. There were only five doctors to look after these hospitals, and there were practically no medicines. The equipment in the surgical hospital was marked "British Red Cross," and was captured in Kut. During the nine months of the Turkish occupation there was probably never a day without some deaths, and the mortality once rose to thirty a day. The Turkish commander, Ali Ihsan Bey, published an order threatening to hang all the doctors if the record did not improve. When the Turks left Kermanshah their cemetery contained at least 2,500 dead. In addition to the Anatolian Turks, who were of course the backbone of the Turkish force in Persia, there were Arabs, Jews, and a few Armenians. There were also about six hundred Algerian and Moroccan Arabs captured from the French by the Germans at the beginning of the war. None of these nationalities succumbed to disease as did the Anatolian Turk.

The Turks had not been in Kermanshah long when the Germans again arrived on the scene. Nizam-es-Sultaneh and his cabinet also came back and re-established themselves there. The Germans tried to re-organize the gendarmerie and the battalions of levies, but the people were more wary. They were willing to take German money, but they flatly refused to fight. They were afraid of being drafted into the Turkish army, and since the action at Aveh they had a wholesome dread of Russian shrapnel and Russian cossacks.

It was remarkable how the Persian regiments would melt away when the Germans tried to put them into any position that seemed at all dangerous. The Germans became very disheartened and some of them did not hesitate to say that their mission was a failure. Early in 1917, there were persistent rumours of an impending British advance in Mesopotamia, but the first definite indication in Kermanshah of the march of events in that region was the hurried evacuation of the Turkish hospitals. It took a fortnight to get away the sick and to remove the grain and other essential supplies the Turks had collected in that city. They had practically no transport of their own, so they commandeered thousands of donkeys from the inhabitants. If a man were too ill to ride a donkey by himself he was held on by soldiers walking on each side of it. Men and animals died like flies all along the road.

On the morning of the 9th March the sound of Russian guns was again heard on the Hamadan road, and by noon they were firing from the Kara Su bridge. That afternoon the Turkish main body withdrew into Kermanshah, having previously blown up one of the arches of the bridge, and the guns of their rear-guard shelled the Russians all that afternoon and throughout the next day. Late in the afternoon of the 10th the Russians crossed the river by a ford, but were thrown back. The Turkish army evacuated the city during the night, and on the morning of the 11th March their rear-guard, still shelling the Russians, was seen disappearing over the hills.

Once more Kermanshah was under the Russians. They pursued the Turks as far as Pa-i-Tak, where Ali Ihsan Bey held them up for more than a week till his preparations for crossing the Sirivan river were complete. When the weather grew hot, the Russians evacuated Qasr-i-Shirin and the adjacent country, but they retained a garrison at Kerind through the summer until their animals had eaten or destroyed the harvest. The effect of the revolution was already very noticeable in the discipline of their troops. Officers were disobeyed and even threatened, and the men did as they pleased.

The Russians had a great deal of trouble with the Kurds. The tribes were at first willing to make friends, but the now undisciplined soldiers committed various acts of violence and roused the anger of the Kurds. The Galkhani tribe was especially active, and Russian convoys were attacked and camps raided constantly. The Russians in retaliation looted various villages along the road, Kerind itself suffering severely. In August a meeting was held with the tribal chiefs and a truce was arranged, but both parties were distrustful, and when the Russians went to Mesopotamia in the autumn to join the British they avoided the main road and marched by way of Gilan.

From time to time, all through the summer and autumn, parties of Russians left for home, but they were still in evidence in the beginning of 1918 when General Dunsterville's force began to arrive. They evacuated the city soon afterwards, and for the next three years Kermanshah enjoyed the blessings of British occupation. Fields were cultivated that had not been touched for years; travellers came and went without fear of molestation or blackmail; and once more the old road rang with the music of the caravans.

From this brief record of events it will be seen that within a space of three years the quaint old Persian city of Kermanshah was occupied twice by the Turks and Germans, twice by the Russians, and once by the British, which, considering that Persia was a neutral country, affords a striking indication of how widespread and continuous was the havoc wrought by the Great War.



## THE BRITISH GERMAN LEGION, 1855-1856.

By LIEUT.-COLONEL ARTHUR EGERTON, D.S.O.

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INSEPARABLE as any mention of Scutari must be to the historian from the name of Florence Nightingale, it is here in this quiet cemetery, in the shadow of the great monument erected by "Queen Victoria and her grateful countrymen," that the "heroic dead" sleep.

Here, with the blue waters of the Sea of Marmora lapping the cliff, and with their feet pointing towards the distant hazy Anatolian hills, they rest in peace.

Amongst the few headstones now left to commemorate the gallant deeds of over 9,000 officers and men who fell in the Crimea, may be noticed one built of more enduring material, which has withstood the ravages of time.

It is but a broken column, neglected and standing somewhat forlorn in the north-east corner of the cemetery; and faintly and with some difficulty one can discern beneath the lichen and the overhanging creepers the names of Lieutenant Cople, Doctor Keitel and Lieutenant Heinrich Grosse—of the German Legion.

It may not, therefore, be without interest to recall at the moment the circumstances under which Great Britain for the second time made use of these mercenaries to assist her when in a difficulty.

The situation in the Crimea in March, 1855, had become serious; war had been going on for some months, and there was a very great shortage of men for the necessary reinforcements.

Moreover, the enemy's fortifications at Sebastopol seemed as impregnable as ever, and there was an absolute inability of the French, our gallant Allies, to do more than maintain their positions. We find about this time Lord Palmerston writing to Lord Panmure, Secretary of State for War, in the following despairing tone: "We are 40,000 men short of the numbers voted by Parliament. We must resort to every possible means and every possible quarter to complete our force.

"Let us get as many German and Swiss as we can, let us get men from Halifax, let us enlist Italians, and let us forthwith increase our bounty without raising the standard. Do not let departmental or official or professional prejudice and habits stand in our way; we must override all such obstacles. We *must* have troops. War cannot be carried on without troops; we have asked Parliament for a certain amount of force, and we have pledged ourselves to the opinion that such a number is necessary. We shall disgrace ourselves if we do not make every effort to raise that amount."

Many articles appeared in the Press at this time urging the Government to forthwith raise a Legion in America ; they were of opinion that 10,000 men could be enrolled there easily, and that there could be no question that the soldiers so obtained would be anything but of first class material.

*The Times*, in a leader, was enthusiastic as to this grand opportunity. It said that the troops so raised would be mostly men of German origin, formed of emigrants to the States ; that they had been inured to military discipline, and possessed a practical knowledge of arms ; and, further, being generally of mature age and vigour, it seemed likely that they would supply the class of troops the country then was in need of.

It ended up a powerful article with the following extraordinary words : " If the Americans can show us the way to take Sebastopol, we should be quite ready to learn, and give them every credit for the lesson."

It does not seem that patriotism ran at a very deep level in those days ; rather one can detect the note of expediency and a desire to shift our legitimate burden.

It would be inexact to say that in 1855 Great Britain was destitute of men, or that the sources of recruiting had become exhausted by a twelve months' campaign. The reason of the desperate deficiency is perhaps to be found in the common ideas of those days, that it took two years to make a soldier.

It is also possible that the recollection may not have entirely faded of Peninsular days, where the stories of the treatment and the iron discipline imposed on the voluntary soldier had been handed down from father to son. It may at any rate have had some effect on the recruiting problem of the time, and may explain the certainly luke-warm attitude adopted by the young men of that day.

Again, there had not been wanting from the seat of war, rumours of terrible neglect and incapacity during the first winter in 1854.

When Florence Nightingale, the " ministering angel," and her small band of devoted nurses arrived at Scutari, facts about the incredible lack of foresight by the authorities began to leak out ; the amputations without chloroform, the absence of bandages, the cast-iron biscuits for dying men ; these stories may well have served to put a check on the nation's ardour.

Discipline in the days of the Crimea was brutal, and reminds one more of the pressgang days of Nelson. In " The Life of Florence Nightingale " we read that she constantly had occasion to complain of the quality of the food served out in her poor improvised kitchens to some desperately wounded man, only to be met with the remark " that it was quite good enough for those brutes."

In England, in 1857, it was the current opinion of the time that the soldier was by nature a drunken animal.

Be the reason what it may, necessity knows no law ; the voluntary system in England had broken down, and levies had to be raised somewhere ; moreover, it was known that Russia was in a similar predicament



and was vigorously engaged in a recruiting campaign in Denmark and all Scandinavia.

To the Duke of Cambridge must be given the credit for any practical and tangible offer to raise these foreign troops. In April, 1855, having then but recently returned from the Crimea, he wrote to Lord Panmure, proposing the idea of the Legion, and at the same time offered to drill them himself, and return to the Crimea as their commanding officer at the earliest opportunity. It is perhaps a curious point of view that he was strongly of opinion that they should take the form of cavalry, and it is difficult for us now to read aright the mentality of a great soldier who should have preferred mounted soldiers, when the only question appeared to be the reduction of a great armed fortress.

Yet one recalls that, when in the early days of the Boer War, reinforcements were much needed to deal with the mounted Boers, the authorities on the spot cabled to the effect that infantry would be preferred.

The project soon assumed a corporate shape and recruiting commenced in May, 1855; depots were formed at Heligoland, Shorncliffe and Haslar, and training centres at Aldershot, Colchester, Hythe, Tarlingham and Brown Down.

Recruiting continued on to 31st March, 1856, and during that period 441 officers, 539 N.C.O.'s and 8,702 other ranks joined the Colours. There was in addition a receiving depot at Niagara in Canada, which provided a large body of men and forwarded the recruits to Halifax as they came up. The original terms of their enlistment was for the duration of the war; they should not be under 5 ft. 2 in. in height, nor over thirty-five years of age. Concurrently with the formation of the German Legion, the task of forming the Swiss and Italian contingents was taken in hand. In respect to the supply of clothing and appointments, all the Foreign Legions were on the same footing as British regiments of the Line, and their arms were furnished from public store.

It has been found impossible after this lapse of time to obtain a picture showing the dress of the Legions, beyond the small engraving which appears as the frontispiece of this number.

They are here shown in the ordinary red tunic, black or grey trousers, white belts and heavy fur cap or helmet served out to all ranks after the first Crimean winter.

The German Legion in the Crimea therefore differs from those who so gallantly fought for us in the Peninsular days, as a glance at Mr. Beamish's book on the subject depicts them in all the glory of their own national uniforms.

Queen Victoria constantly displayed a deep and absorbing interest in these fellow-countrymen of the Prince Consort's, and she was solicitous that their name should be changed from the Foreign Legion to that of the German Legion. "I am sure," she writes, "that this will have a good effect in Germany and help the recruiting; the German papers have been taunting them with not being allowed to bear their own names."

The Duke of Cambridge was appointed their Colonel-in-Chief, and by the end of March, 1855, Lord Panmure was able to inform Lord Raglan that he hoped soon to have some thousands of these seasoned and matured soldiers at his disposal. He considered that they might be invaluable for the outpost line, but, the delay already having been so great, he personally hoped that Lord Raglan would have secured Sebastopol before they could arrive.

Considerable dissatisfaction was displayed at this time as to the terms that were being offered to these soldiers by the Government; the bounty was to be £6, but out of this the recruit had to pay nearly half that sum for his necessities.

The Duke of Cambridge was successful in having what appeared to him a grave injustice set right, and he was ever anxious that the agreement should not be worded so as to imply a breach of faith.

The first detachment, 2,000 strong, under Brigadier-General Woolridge, left Southampton for the seat of war in October, 1855, and consisted of Jäger and Light Infantry Battalions.

General Simpson, the Commander-in-Chief, was informed that they should be attached to his Light Cavalry Division; in any case the German and Swiss levies were to be kept apart, and it was thought that the Swiss might be more likely to fraternise with the Highlanders than any other corps. The contingent under the command of Colonel Kinloch landed at Scutari in November, and were much admired by all the officers who saw them; the Prince Consort especially expressed himself delighted at the good reports received of his fellow-countrymen and frequently so informed Lord Panmure.

Though originally meant as a reinforcement for the Light Division in the Crimea, the contingent had arrived so late in the year that it was found impossible to hut them all there conveniently; they were therefore landed at Scutari, whilst a camp was found for the Swiss at Smyrna.

It is interesting to note that the strength of the British German Legion at the seat of war early in 1856 was 138 officers and 3,615 men, and consisted of the 1st Jäger Battalion and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd German Light Infantry. These are the only representatives of the Legion that ever went overseas, though the total force included 1st and 2nd Light Dragoons, the 1st to 5th Light Infantry and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Jäger Battalions.

The establishment provided in the case of the cavalry for 23 officers, 4 surgeons, 1 veterinary surgeon, 1 paymaster and 1 dispenser, 29 sergeants, 24 corporals, 11 trumpeters and 329 privates. In the case of the infantry the establishment provided 10 companies for each battalion, the personnel including 3 field officers, 10 captains, 15 subalterns, 76 N.C.O.'s and 779 other ranks.

It is very significant that the names of many English officers occur in the musty pay rolls of this Legion, now stored in the Public Record Office; at least six of the infantry battalions had British commanding officers, whilst almost without exception their adjutants came from the Regular Army.

The following commanding officers' names appear on the Muster Rolls until disbandment in November, 1856:

Lieut.-Colonel E. K. Murray, O.C. 1st Light Dragoons.

Lieut.-Colonel Wm. Cameron, O.C. 3rd Light Infantry.

Lieut.-Colonel John Humfray, O.C. 4th Light Infantry.

Lieut.-Colonel James Bathurst, O.C. 5th Light Infantry.

Lieut.-Colonel Jocelyn, O.C. 2nd Jägers.

Lieut.-Colonel H. O. Bowles, O.C. 3rd Jägers.

From early in the year until March, 1856, there is an engaging silence in all official documents as to the activities of this much advertised Legion, though Lord Panmure is not slow in reiterating to the Prince Consort that his venture would yet bear fruit enough to satisfy even the most captious.

Beyond the fact that 173 of the Legion had died at Scutari, probably from Crimean fever, which was very prevalent that winter, there is no mention which is worthy of record.

Peace was looming large in the future and both the Queen and Lord Panmure were concerned as to the ultimate disposal of the Legion.

So deeply did she feel for these mercenaries of German birth that we find, almost before hostilities had been concluded, Her Majesty writing to the Secretary of State for War: "As the Queen fears Peace seems now pretty certain to be concluded she is very anxious to impress upon Lord Panmure the question of the German Legion; she trusts there is no doubt they will be provided for in the Colonies as these poor men have many of them lost their nationality, and the Queen is certain that it would be very bad policy to act ungenerously towards them."

Reverting again to the subject on the very same day she says: "It must not be forgotten they have gone to very great expense, and probably will find themselves in a very painful position in their own country for having ventured to enter the Queen's service. If therefore they were not considered or treated with generosity the effect on the Continent would be most mischievous as regards this country."

Lord Panmure's regret was of a different nature. He fully explained this in a letter to Lord Codrington, in which he pointed out the chief drawback to the sudden peace and the consequent demobilization was that the foreign levies had had no trial in the field.

It is evident that the situation as regards these levies was causing some anxiety to the authorities at home. The Government were aware that not alone the country of origin, but the whole world, were looking on with a critical eye as to their future disposal; they also knew that any hint of an unsympathetic attitude would be highly resented and re-act to the good name of the country.

Lord Clarendon was no less insistent. "Let me beg of you to be in no hurry in letting go your Foreign Legion. I hope there will be no disbanding yet, and above all that we shall behave liberally to them. Our name and fame in Europe will depend on it."

The men of the British German Legion who had entered into the service of Great Britain were entitled by the terms of their enlistment to receive a gratuity at the close of the war, and to be sent to their country of origin at the public expense.

It was found, however, that public opinion abroad was very antagonistic towards them, and that there was a strong probability the men might not meet with a favourable reception at their own homes.

In this position of affairs it was suggested, in so far as regarded the German Legion, that it might be advantageous to themselves and useful to the Colony if they were established as military settlers at the Cape of Good Hope; a settlement on these lines formed one of the first subjects of recommendation by the Board of General Officers appointed to consider the Report of the Crimean Commission in July, 1856.

The scheme provided that officers and men who volunteered for the purpose should be settled on land in suitable stations along the borders of Kaffraria; the conditions were that they should preserve their military training and be liable to any military service when called upon, and further that they should assemble every seven years for a limited period of training.

In consideration of this undertaking Great Britain agreed to allow them a commuted allowance of pay for three years, which in effect was practically equivalent to half pay whilst employed with the Field Army.

It cannot be asserted that England was acting wholly in a philanthropic spirit towards these soldiers of fortune by the initiation and terms of such a scheme, for as a matter of fact it was evident that rather she was endeavouring to kill the proverbial two birds with one stone.

On the one hand the necessity was pressing and urgent that something should be done for these men, whilst on the other it was a matter of common knowledge that the whole border of Kaffraria was seething with unrest, with every prospect of an early native rising.

In these circumstances it is not a matter of surprise that Sir G. Grey, Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, hastened to tender his most grateful thanks for these military settlers, intimating at the same time that the Colony had voted £40,000 to prepare for their reception.

By July, 1856, the last of the troops had been satisfactorily evacuated from the Crimea, and by September, when the colonising scheme had germinated and taken a hold on the public imagination, evidences were not lacking that it was necessary some action should soon be taken.

Lord Clarendon expressed himself in delighted terms as to the proposed scheme, as affording the most satisfactory prospect of "getting finally quit of our legionary plagues." He was of the opinion that such an undertaking would sustain the name and fame of Great Britain in Europe, which, he bitterly remarked, the Press of the day and the so-called patriots had worked so hard to destroy.

"They have made," he said, "Europe believe that we have neither Army nor Navy, and if they could now show that we have cheated the men whom we decoyed into our service it would be a *coup de grâce* for us all."

The Queen was also much pleased and gratified. She considered they might be settled in a manner useful to the Colony; in a financial sense the scheme was not improvident; and in a way honourable to us in the eyes of the Continent, to which "we cannot attach too much importance."

As we have indicated, the presence of these foreigners in England was now becoming distinctly detrimental; their usefulness had passed, and the Duke of Cambridge, their sponsor and champion, was one of the first to urge on the authorities the question of their immediate dispatch. He said he was very anxious to see them and their followers well cleared out of Colchester; that they were becoming daily more turbulent and disagreeable, and that serious riots had already occurred in Colchester and Brown Down.

It was towards the end of November, 1856, that the first contingent, 1,000 strong, left Southampton in the transports "Culloden" and "Sultana" arriving at Cape Town on the 28th January, 1857; a further contingent sailed very shortly after, raising the total number to 2,351 officers and men, 378 women and 178 children.

They were in the first place quartered at East London, and the Governor in reporting their arrival took great exception to the paucity in numbers of the females accompanying the party.

He warned the Government that there might be great restlessness and even immorality, and he went so far as to say that on this account alone they would as a military force be quite useless to the Colony. Later on he somewhat modified his opinion, writing that the settlers were taking up their vocations, that their conduct was satisfactory, and that the experiment of sending them out would no doubt prove a successful one.

Careful investigation however proves that though the German Legion as sent to South Africa contained many excellent men, it also contained many desperate characters collected from all over Germany; even under the strict control adopted at the outset they committed eight or ten most desperate murders and other offences of a most grave order were disclosed from time to time.

Little more remains to be said. In South Africa they were divided into three regiments, with distinct districts in Kaffraria; at the same time some transferred voluntarily to the Frontier Military Police, where they were a great success.

Their dress at the time had evidently been much neglected, as they are described as wearing tattered red, green and blue uniforms; in fact the soiled and worn uniforms that had done service overseas.

It is curious to note that in all papers dealing with these emigrants, particular stress is laid on the fact that they were very musical, a national characteristic of the German on every highway of the world.

All villages and settlements were given German names, such as Berlin, Frankfurt, Potsdam, etc., and many of these can be traced and remain to this day. It is also not unlikely that the descendants of these



emigrants were the early pioneers of German South-West Africa, whilst it is certain that many fought for us and took our part in the Boer War of 1900.

The names of Steinacker's Horse, Von Brandis and many more are familiar, whilst German names fighting against us in that campaign are numerous, as are also those taken as prisoners of war.

In 1857, 1,030 of these military settlers volunteered for service in the Mutiny, and a battalion of rifles was formed and actually landed at Calcutta; whether they ever saw a shot fired in anger is doubtful, but the casualties from fever and cholera were so severe that only 350 returned some six months later to South Africa.

From the records we note that the total cost to Great Britain of these settlers, from 1857 to 1861, including their transport, was £198,000.

For their services in the Crimean campaign the German Legion received no medal, honour nor mention; the medal zone was drawn as for troops who landed in the Crimea alone, and there was no provision as there is in these days, for those on the lines of communication. This order, it will be remembered, operated very harshly on the troops even in the Crimea, for after Sebastopol had fallen on 9th September, 1855, the grant of the medal ceased to all ranks.

It is with a somewhat melancholy satisfaction that one visits this peaceful cemetery at Scutari, with the rosemary and the ramblers growing thick over the half dismantled stones, and the sun shimmering on the blue water of the Bosphorus; melancholy, as one reflects that with added surgical knowledge, adequate nursing, stores and sanitation, half at least of these lives should have been saved for further usefulness.

At the same time it must be with a feeling of intense pride to every Britisher to read in the simple unmarked grassy mounds, the story of unexemplified heroism, devotion and duty faithfully performed.

Almost in fancy one can read the message; the words of the great Athenian, and which are carved in stone on Wagon Hill:

"Ye who pass by here, mourn not, for we died doing our duty,  
and rest here content."



## COMBINED STAFF OR COMBINED STAFF COLLEGE.

By MAJOR C. F. STOEHR, R.E.

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MR. CHURCHILL has suggested that in the future we may need officers, or at least some officers, who will take war of every description—by sea, land and air—as their province, and it appears to have been these remarks which provoked a debate in the House of Lords on 5th May last year. It is clear from Lord Curzon's reply to the debate that the whole subject of the co-ordination and higher direction of our armed forces is still under consideration, so that a few thoughts on the subject may not be out of place.

Our Foreign Policy is determined on by the British Cabinet, strengthened for this purpose in the future, it is to be hoped, by the addition of Dominion representatives, so as to form a truly Imperial Cabinet, and backed by periodical Imperial Conferences.

The co-ordination of policy and armaments is, or should be, obtained by the presence on the Committee of Imperial Defence of the Prime Minister and political heads of the departments concerned.

It does not appear, however, that the Committee is altogether suitable for the combined direction of a war, or, in fact, that we possess any suitable organ for the purpose, and it is doubtful whether it is absolutely suitable for devising our war policy in peace time. For according to Lord Fisher (*vide* his "Memories") the professional head of each fighting service should give his advice to his political chief beforehand, and be silent at the committee meetings unless his opinion is asked for, and that constitutional practice requires this procedure. But this means that each service gives its own professional opinion, and that it is left to the political chiefs to co-ordinate them.

It appears that we need co-ordination between the services to the following extent:—

- (a) Between the professional heads of the services to the extent of understanding the powers and limitations of the other services and agreeing on a common policy, both in peace and war.
- (b) Schemes worked out as far as possible in peace time for all combined operations the possible necessity of which can be foreseen.
- (c) A body of officers accustomed to working out such schemes.
- (d) Actual practice from combined manœuvres.

It is clear that if Lord Fisher's ideas are correct (a) will not be attained in the Committee of Imperial Defence. The remedy appears to be the formation of a sub-committee consisting of the head, or

perhaps two heads—Chief and Sub-Chief of the General Staff in the case of the Army—of each of the three services, for the purpose of hearing and, if possible, reconciling each others' views, with the object of offering similar advice to their political chiefs. The Army should speak with one voice only, that of the C.I.G.S., on all matters that come within his province; General Falkenhayn resigned when he found that the Kaiser had consulted Hindenburg about the situation on a front where Hindenburg was not in command, and General Seeley showed a complete misconception of the General Staff when, as Minister of War, in reply to a question whether the General Staff agreed with some opinion of his, he said that some of them did. In the same way all the fighting services should, as far as possible, speak unitedly on questions of common interest.

The previous working out of combined operations is an important matter. It seems likely that one of the main reasons for the celerity and smooth working of the landing of the Expeditionary Force in France, and the slowness and inefficiency at the opening of the Gallipoli operations was the fact that the former operation had been foreseen and presumably worked out, while the latter had not. At the same time the troubles due to the bad embarkation work of the Gallipoli Expedition could have been avoided if there had been a staff accustomed to dealing, at least on paper, with such expeditions.

It should be the duty of the sub-committee suggested above to lay down what combined operations are to be studied. The work could be done by selecting officers from each service for each operation, and the investigation would itself develop in time a number of officers who knew something of the subject. But something more systematic is desirable, and this would be found either in a combined staff, or in a staff college for the purposes of—

- (a) Studying combined operations in the past and the principles governing each operation.
- (b) Working out schemes for the future, based where possible on the actual conditions, but necessarily as a rule on assumed conditions.

Taking the latter first. As only one subject has to be studied the course would probably not need to last more than a few months, and each class could be small. It would be desirable to include all who were likely to hold high commands in the future, and also officers not too senior to hold medium staff appointments, such as G.S.O. 1 and 2, or A.Q.M.G., within a few years of doing the course. It would therefore seem advisable to form a class partly of officers of about forty years of age and partly of officers who had recently passed through the Staff College or were in the nearest equivalent position in the Navy.

The study of an operation has three processes: the collection of information, the planning of the operation, and the working out of the details. The last two would be the province of the Staff College, the intelligence departments supplying all the information required; the process of study would have the advantage of bringing to light any deficiencies in our information.

Such a Staff College would apparently fill a gap in our existing system without altering or interfering with any part of it. The same cannot be said of any sort of combined staff. It may be said that the professional heads of the services are too busy with the work of their own services to work out a common policy without the aid of a special staff. This may prove to be the case, but it does not appear so at first sight. While naval and military operations are mostly inter-dependent to some extent, there are few that are so in more than their outlines. The actual work will generally be either purely naval or purely military.

Take, for example, the much-discussed question of the possible invasion of Great Britain. The stating of the maximum force which an invader could land is a purely naval matter; the dispositions to deal with such a force before it could do any vital damage is purely a military one. The problem is essentially a combined one, yet there is no apparent necessity for any combined staff to deal with it; the only point about which combined work might be necessary would be the rapid circulation of information which would be first obtained by the Navy.

The same is true of any overseas expedition unless the landing has to be made in face of the enemy, or, for any other reason, rapidity in disembarking is of special importance. The size of the force necessary to achieve the object in view is a purely military problem. The provision and guarding of the shipping is a purely naval and shipping one. The two results must be compared and reconciled, but that is a matter for the heads of the services, not of a subordinate staff. The great decisions must be taken at the top, the working up of the material can be done by separate staffs, because the work of the services will be separate.

If it is beyond human capacity for each chief of staff to do this work in addition to the work which he has at present, then his work must be lightened, by appointing a deputy chief of staff, for instance, or by separating operations from training. The Prime Minister has a far greater complexity of subjects to deal with than any head of a department, yet he survives.

It is only for the study of fighting on land within range of the Navy's guns then that a combined staff is required, such as the Dardanelles landing, or the projected landing on the Belgian coast. But the situations to be dealt with can rarely be foreseen during peace time, as they are not part of the strategical deployment, but depend on the enemy's action. In peace time, therefore, they can only be dealt with academically, the factors in the problem being assumed. For this reason they appear more fitted to be dealt with by a staff college than by a staff. When during a war a combined operation of this nature, based on the actual conditions, is contemplated, a combined staff will naturally be formed to deal with it.

The above applies to the Army and Navy, and also to the Air Force so far as it carries out independent operations. For the Air Force operating with the Army or Navy the case is different. Its advent, even in the auxiliary part which it will have when in

combination with the Navy or Army so far as the future can be foreseen, has considerably modified both sea and land warfare. It appears necessary, therefore, that both in the Navy and Army Air Force officers should form part of the Operations Directorate and, for purposes of combined training, of the staff of the larger commands. This, however, is quite different from any scheme for a combined staff which shall direct the activities of a service from outside it. Still more does it differ from any proposal for a new breed of officer who shall be familiar with war by sea, land, and air. No man can be a really good staff officer except in an environment to which he is accustomed, and the routine of which is thoroughly familiar to him. And to expect any man to be a good staff officer to Navy, Army or Air Force indifferently, or to direct the movements of all three, is to expect an impossibility. Even Napoleon failed when he interfered with his admirals.

One more point. It is clear from Colonel Callwell's reminiscences of the War Office in war-time (*Blackwood's Magazine*) that the War Cabinet played at being strategists, and initiated schemes for examination by the staff, such as the proposal to move six divisions from France to Alexandretta in the autumn of 1917, and recall them in time for the renewal of operations in France in the following spring. Now this is quite wrong. A consistent plan cannot be carried through unless all minor issues are subordinated to it. The civilian may think of a scheme quite practical and desirable in itself—the Alexandretta one was hopelessly impractical—but which ought not to be carried out because it is inconsistent with the main plan. But if the civilians are allowed to initiate plans some civilian of strong character will think of some scheme, find out that it is practical, and then proceed to push it through, perhaps to the ruin of the main plan. Probably the most striking points of General Falkenhayn's revelations are, first, the very small margins, both of men and time, on which he was working, collecting half-a-dozen divisions with difficulty to carry through some essential offensive, and, second, his resolute refusal to embark on any offensive which was not essential.

The civilian heads of the Government have two tasks in relation to our armed forces in war-time, both of supreme difficulty. The first is to reconcile the strategical plans of the Chiefs of Staff with the home situation in its widest sense, embracing the temper of the nation and the resources available, and with our foreign policy. The second is to reconcile differences of opinion between our own Chiefs of Staff, or between them and the Chiefs of Staff of an allied country. If, going beyond these limits, they attempt to initiate operations, we shall see repeated in the next war the worst mistakes of the last one.



## OLD MEMORIALS OF BRITISH SEAMEN AND SOLDIERS IN LONDON.

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SO many memorials are now being erected to commemorate the Great War, it is thought that it may be of interest to draw attention to some of the older monuments in and about London.

In the aisles of Westminster rest the three soldier kings Edward I., Edward III. and Henry V. Upon the plain tomb of Purbeck marble of the English Justinian is inscribed the motto, "Pactum serva"—"Keep the promise"; it alludes to the vow he extracted from his feeble son to carry his bones across the border in the van of his victorious Army, and written on the stone is "Edwardus Primus, Scotorum Malleus"—"Edward I. the hammer of the Scots."

Petworth marble covers the remains of Edward III., and beside it lies the cross hilted sword, seven feet in length, which was borne before him as he rode a conqueror over the fields of France.

There is no more beautiful Chantry in St. Peter's than that of Henry of Monmouth, the hero of Agincourt; upon a wooden bar, stretched across between the octagonal towers, richly adorned with carved work, are suspended his shield, saddle, and bruised helmet, dented and shorn of its golden crown and crest by two strokes of a battle-axe.

Lord Admiral Thomas Seymour, who was beheaded in 1549 on Tower Hill, is buried in St. Peter's Church within that fortress.

In the old Church of St. Dunstan's, Stepney, a motley piece of marble commemorates Sir Thomas Spert, Knt., Comptroller of the Navy to Henry VIII. and founder of the Trinity House, and that Corporation erected the monument in 1622. He commanded the "Henri Grace-a-Dieu," and it was under him that the arsenals of Woolwich and Deptford were founded.

Captain Edward Fenton, the companion of Sir Martin Frobisher, and captain of the flag-ship at the destruction of the Armada, was buried in the Church of St. Nicholas, Deptford, in 1603.

The noble monument of Sir Francis Vere, General during the wars in the Low Countries in the reign of Elizabeth, in Westminster Abbey, should be seen by every visitor to that building. Sir Philip Sydney, who fell at Zutphen, was buried in old St. Paul's.

Sir Walter Raleigh, historian, warrior in Ireland, planter in Virginia, searcher for El Dorado, plague of the Spaniard, tracker of the Orinoco and pursuer of the gold laden galleon, who was beheaded in Palace Yard on the morning of 29th October, 1618, and his body lies buried beneath the altar of St. Margaret's Church, Westminster; his head, which had suffered no harm from foeman's sword or frequent storm, is buried in West Horsley Church. No monument recorded

the man whose genius ennobled the nation, whose spirit and counsel struck terror into the heart of Spain, until 1844, when a brass plate was set up by subscription over one of the doorways of St. Margaret's.

Of all the large clan of Smiths, there was no more illustrious member than "John Smith," Governor of Virginia and Admiral of New England, who lies in St. Sepulchre's Church near Snow Hill, and an epitaph of portentous length gives a veracious account of his travels and exploits.

In the Church of St. Giles in the Fields lies the brave John, Lord Bellasys, who raised six regiments, horse and foot, in the Civil War, and fought at Edgehill, Newbury, Naseby, and Selby, in the Sieges of Reading, Bristol and Newark, as a gallant Cavalier. Though twice imprisoned, often wounded, he survived the miseries of the Usurpation, and at the Restoration was appointed Governor of Hull and Tangier, Lord Lieutenant of the East Riding and Captain of the Guard of Pensioners; in the reign of James II. he was First Lord of the Treasury.

Sir Nicholas Crisp, another faithful Cavalier, lies buried in the Church of All Saints, Fulham, and at Fulham was born Sir Arthur Aston, who repulsed the right wing at Edgehill and was mercilessly put to death at the Siege of Drogheda; Cromwell's sword, which he wore on that day, is in this Museum.

Fleetwood is buried in Bunhill Fields; and Blake, the Soldier Admiral, is laid in the Churchyard of St. Margaret's, Westminster.

Prince Rupert is buried in St. Mary's, Twickenham. He was an admiral at the age of 24 and raised a mill in Hackney Marsh for the purpose of boring guns.

In St. Mary's Woolnoth Church is a large monument to Sir Philip Phipps, Knt., who in the year 1687 discovered among the rocks off the Bahamas on the north side of Hispaniola, a Spanish plate-ship which had been under the water for forty-four years, out of which he took gold and silver to the value of £300,000, which he faithfully brought to London, where it was divided between himself and the rest of the adventurers. He was knighted by his admiring Sovereign and became Governor of the State of Massachusetts.

In the Church of Holy Trinity, Minories, is interred George, Lord Dartmouth, Master of the Ordnance, Master of the Horse and Governor of Portsmouth. He received £10,000 for the reduction of Tangiers, and in 1687 was appointed Admiral of the fleet designed to intercept the Prince of Orange; he fell with his party and died a prisoner in the Tower.

The infamous Colonel Blood is buried in St. Margaret's, Westminster.

In Henry VII.'s Chapel is laid Edward Earl of Sandwich, who fought in the "Royal James" at Solebay, and seeing destruction imminent, bade his officers and men take to the boats, himself wounded retired to his cabin. A fortnight afterwards, distinguished by his "George," his body was found floating on the sea; he received a pompous funeral but no monument records the mighty dead beneath, but his first lieutenant, Sir Charles Harbord, has a tablet in the south

side of the nave. It is an impressive coincidence that the greatest soldier and sailor of their age lie in the same narrow cell—Monk and Sandwich.

In St. Anne's, Westminster, is interred General Sir John Lanier, having commenced his career in civil warfare by taking the Castle of Edinburgh, and fighting some battles in Ireland was killed at the battle of Steenkirk, 8th August, 1692, and another of William III.'s followers, Henry, Earl of Romney, is buried in St. James', Westminster.

Richard, Viscount Molesworth, who saved the Duke of Marlborough's life at Ramillies, is lying in St. Mary Abbot's, Kensington.

The body of General George Monk lay in state in 1670 at Somerset House, before it was removed to his grave in the Abbey. His monument was designed by Kent. On the left of a Rostral Column stands the General in plate armour without his helmet. A suit of armour and a bayonet used by Monk are in the Tower.

The unfortunate Duke of Monmouth was beheaded on Tower Hill, and he is buried under the altar of St. Peter's ad Vincula.

Queen Anne erected a monument in the Abbey over the grave of Sir Cloudesly Shovell, who was lost on the rocks of Scilly on the night of 22nd October, 1707; he raised himself by his zeal and energy from low estate to be Rear-Admiral of Great Britain and Admiral of the Fleet.

In 1734 the soldier Duke of Argyll was interred in the Abbey, and a monument is erected to his memory in Poets' Corner, and Marshal Wade is commemorated by a monument by Roubiliac in the nave of that church. The Duke of Cumberland, whose name is little loved in Scotland, lies buried in Henry VII.'s Chapel.

Admiral Vernon, the hero of Porto Bello, is also buried in the Abbey, and his monument by Rysbrack is in the north transept.

General Wolfe was buried in 1759 in St. Alphage's, Greenwich. The sword which he wore on the Heights of Abraham is in this Museum. Parliament voted his monument (£3,000) in the Abbey, by Wilton. It is a tasteless mass of marble and bronzed lead.

Lord Ligonier, who distinguished himself at Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, Malplaquet, Dettingen, Fontenoy and other battles, is buried in the Chapel of St. John the Baptist, in Westminster.

Opposite the hall door of Lord Falmouth's house, 2, St. James's Square, may be seen two pieces of cannon driven into the ground, they are trophies won by his ancestor, Admiral Boscawen, in Anson's action off Finisterre.

Bacon is the sculptor of the monument in the Abbey to Admiral Kempenfelt who went down in the "Royal George" when she was lost off Spithead in 1782.

Admiral Sir George Pocock, who took Havannah, is buried in St. Mary's, Twickenham—a tasteless mass of marble by Bacon records his name; and in St. Paul's a monument to Lord Heathfield, the defender of Gibraltar, by Rossi, was erected at a cost of £2,100.

Flaxman's monument to the memory of Earl Howe, immortalized by his great sea victory of 1st June, 1794, is also in that Cathedral; it cost £6,300.

Bailey's monument of the Earl St. Vincent and Westmacott's statue of Lord Duncan are also in the north transept of St. Paul's.

Captain George Vancouver, who circumnavigated the world in 1790-95, is buried in Petersham Churchyard, where there is a monument to his memory.

Parker, the mutineer, is buried in St. Mary's, Whitechapel.

In the midst of a furious charge of French cavalry on the plains of Alexandria, a musket ball pierced the thigh of Sir Ralph Abercrombie. He gallantly concealed his wound from his troops until, exhausted, he was carried on to the "Foudroyant." Within seven days he died of its effects. National gratitude for his services voted him a monument (£6,300), and it is erected in the south transept of St. Paul's.

Under the great arch which separates the choir from the area of the dome of St. Paul's, is erected Flaxman's monument of England's naval hero; it cost £6,800. He is buried in the crypt, in the midst of a circle of eight columns beneath the dome. His coffin was formed out of part of the mainmast of "L'Orient," presented to him by his friend, Sir Benjamin Hallowell, which Nelson had carefully preserved until the time of his death. The square sarcophagus of black and white marble in which it is laid, was prepared for the burial of King Henry VIII., and laid up in the tomb-house of St. George's Chapel at Windsor, by Cardinal Wolsey.

The part of the quarter-deck of the "Victory" on which Lord Nelson fell, is now in the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution. Prince Albert munificently presented the coat and waistcoat in which Lord Nelson died, to Greenwich Hospital. Monuments have been erected in Trafalgar Square, the Guildhall, Dublin, Edinburgh, Norwich, Bristol, Glasgow, Liverpool, Canada, Barbados, and on Portsdown Hill to this revered man.

Whilst anxiously watching the battle at the memorable retreat to Corunna, Sir John Moore was struck from his horse by a cannon-ball: no sigh betrayed the agony of the wound; and while he was borne from the field, his sword became entangled and entered the mangled flesh. "It is well," said the dying hero, "I had rather it should go off the field with me." In the midst of his agony his thoughts were for the safety of his officers and men; once only his voice faltered, it was when he spoke his mother's name. He feebly articulated the words—"I hope my country will do me justice," and expired. He was laid in a grave dug in the citadel of Corunna. His sash by which he was lowered into his last home and other of his relics are in the Royal United Service Museum.

Soult to his honour erected a grave-stone to his memory, and the British Parliament voted the monument in St. Paul's. It is by Bacon, and cost £4,200.

Sir Thomas Picton is interred in St. George's, Hanover Square, and his memorial is erected in St. Paul's.

Colonel Gurwood, the Editor of "Wellington's Despatches," is buried in the Church of St. Peter-ad-Vincula in the Tower.

In the transepts of St. Paul's will be found the monuments of Major-General Dundas, who died 3rd June, 1794, by Bacon, cost £3,150; Captain R. Faulknor, killed on board the "Blanche," 5th January, 1795, by Rossi; Captain W. Miller, by Flaxman, erected by his companions in the "Theseus"; Captain Cooke, of the "Bellero-phon," by Westmacott, cost £1,575; Marquis Cornwallis, by Rossi, died 5th October, 1805, cost £6,300; Captain G. N. Hardinge, of the "St. Fiorenzo," who died off Ceylon, 8th March, 1808, by Mannina; Major-General Mackenzie and General Langworth, who fell at Talavera, 26th July, 1809, cost £2,100, by Manning; Colonel Sir W. Myers and General Hoghton, killed at Albuera, 16th May, 1812, by Kendrick, each cost £1,575; General Craufurd and General Mackinnon, killed at Ciudad Rodrigo, 18th January, 1812, by Bacon, cost £2,100; General L<sup>e</sup> Marchant and General Bowes, slain at Salamanca, 27th June, 1812, by Chantrey, cost £1,575; General Sir T. Brock, slain at Queenstown, October 13, 1812, by Westmacott, cost £1,575; Colonel Hon. E. Cadogan, fell at Vittoria, 21st June, 1813, by Chantrey, cost £1,575; General Gore and General Skerrett, fell at Bergen-op-Zoom, 9th March, 1814, by Chantrey, cost £2,800; General Hay, killed at Bayonne, 14th April, 1814, by Hopper, cost £1,575; General Ross, slain at Baltimore, 12th September, 1814, by Kendrick, cost £1,575; General Gillespie, killed at Kalunga, 13th October, 1814, by Chantrey, cost £1,575; General Packenham and General Gibbs, killed at New Orleans, 8th January, 1815, by Westmacott, cost £2,100; Sir W. Hoste, buried at St. John's Wood, by Campbell, erected by his brother officers; and Sir Thomas Jones, R.E.

In Westminster Abbey, Sir Richard Bingham, who fought at Lepanto, Major Creed who fell at Blenheim, 1704; Colonel Bringfield, killed at Ramillies; Colonel Townshend, slain at Ticonderoga, 1759; Sir Richard Fletcher, R.C., killed at the storming of St. Sebastian; the Hon. Major Stanhope, and Major General Manningham, who fell at Corunna, 1809; Captain George Bryan, of the Coldstream Regiment of Guards, killed at Talavera, 1809; and Major Rennell, the Geographer, who died in 1830. In St. Margaret's, Westminster, which we have heard described in reference to the huge overshadowing pile of the Abbey, as resembling a sloop of war lying alongside a three-decker, is the monument of Captain Sir Peter Parker, Bart., who was killed on the coast of America, 30th August, 1814, while in command of H.M.S. "Menelaus," serving on shore at the head of a party of seamen and marines. The monument is erected to his memory by his officers and crew.

Men are soon forgotten, and there are few public memorials of those who have served their country by land and sea; many buried in the ruddy graves of the battle-field have their only monument in the hearts of loving friends and descendants.

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\* This article has been compiled from the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE of 1851.  
—A. L.



## **The HISTORY of the SUPREME WAR COUNCIL 7th NOVEMBER, 1917—11th NOVEMBER, 1918.**

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[Note.—The article epitomised below appeared over the signature of Capt. C. Bugnet, in the February, 1921, number of the "Revue Militaire Générale." It is thought that it may serve as a corrective to a certain sensational work on the same subject, recently published in England, which appears to have crept from among the "best sellers" of fiction to put on the sober guise of history. In this case, however, as in that of the ass who donned the lion's skin, the voice betrays the true nature.]

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### **THE INTER-ALLIED CONFERENCES PRIOR TO THE INSTITUTION OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL.**

ALTHOUGH it was clear from the first day of the War that the Central Powers held a great advantage in their unified command, it was only after a long time and much trouble that the Allies succeeded in achieving a similar unity, which proved to be one of the main factors in their victory. The first steps in that direction were taken by the French Government, which on 10th July, 1915, called an Inter-Allied Conference at Chantilly; from this came the plan for the September offensive in Artois and Champagne. A similar Conference met on 5th, 6th and 8th December, 1915, attended by the Commanders-in-Chiefs, principal generals and staffs of the Allies, which drew up a scheme for an offensive in the Somme valley in the coming summer. Following on the German attack at Verdun, however, a further conference on 14th March, 1916, decided on a general Allied offensive, to be begun by the Russians on 15th May, and by the French, British and Italians on 1st June. At a fourth meeting held on 16th November, was discussed the plan for the general offensive to take place in February, 1917.

Early in 1917, the heads of the French, British and Italian Governments met at Rome, when Mr. Lloyd George spoke fully and frankly of the pressing need of achieving the closest possible union among the Allies with regard to future military operations, and asked that the Conference should lay down in a concrete form the principles discussed at the Council of 16th November, 1916, and find some practical solution for doing so. The Conference adopted these two resolutions:—

(1) "If common Allied action becomes necessary on the Italian front, France and England will send troops there. The details will be decided on by the military experts.

(2) "The organization of an Inter-Allied staff will be studied at one of the Conferences to be held henceforward by the Entente Ministers every two months."

A further Conference was called at Calais by Mr. Lloyd George on 26th and 27th February, 1917, and a convention was drawn up, placing the British armies, for the time being, under the command of General Nivelle. The ill success of the French offensive in April, however, threw the question of united command for the time being into the background. In July, however, the French General Staff drew up a "Note on the constitution of an Inter-Allied Staff." This paper recommended the creation of a central inter-allied organization composed of highly placed officers enjoying the full confidence of the various commanders-in-chief, and empowered to give weighty advice for the immediate consideration of these commanders, or even to take rapid executive decisions in their names. In order that these officers should be in a position to fulfil their rôle, it would, however, be necessary for an Inter-Allied Staff, charged to study and follow up constantly all questions relating to the general conduct of the War, to be set up to furnish them with the necessary bases for their action.

Shortly afterwards, on 30th October, 1917, Mr. Lloyd George addressed a letter to M. Painlevé, the then Prime Minister of France, recommending the creation of "a single committee—a sort of Inter-Allied Staff—which should study the best methods of obtaining victory on the whole of the fronts and with the whole of the available resources." He suggested that it should be composed of one or perhaps two political representatives of the first rank for each of the Allies, with a military and if possible a naval and economic staff for each. The military representatives should remain in permanent session at the place chosen for the seat of this council, and could not, therefore, be the various chiefs of staff, with whom they must, however, remain in close relationship.

At this date then, the tendency was towards the creation of an Inter-Allied Staff, in view of the proved insufficiency of Inter-Allied conferences and the failure of the attempt to set up a unified command.

#### THE CREATION OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL OF THE ALLIES.

The disaster of Caporetto led to the conference at Rapallo, on 7th November, 1917, at which the Supreme War Council was set up. The decisions taken were as follows:

(1) "With a view to assuring a better co-ordination of military action on the Western European front, there is formed a Supreme War Council composed of the President of the Council and a member of the Government of each of the great Powers whose armies are fighting on this front. The extension of the Council's powers to the other fronts will form the object of future discussion with the other great Powers.

(2) "The Supreme War Council has the mission of superintending the general conduct of the war. It prepares the bases for the Governments' decisions, assures itself of their execution, and renders account to the various Governments.

(3) "The General Staffs and Higher Commands of the armies of each of the Powers charged with the conduct of military operations, remain responsible for them to their respective Governments.

(4) "The general war plans established by the competent military authorities are submitted to the Supreme War Council, which, under the authority of the Governments, assures their concordance, and suggests, if need be, necessary changes.

(5) "Every Power delegates to the Supreme War Council a permanent military representative whose exclusive function will be that of technical counsellor.

(6) "The military representatives receive from their Governments and the competent military authorities of their countries all projects, information, and documents relating to the conduct of the war.

(7) "The military representatives will keep the Supreme Council constantly informed of the situation of the forces and resources of all kinds at the disposal of the Allied and enemy armies.

(8) "The Supreme Council meets normally at Versailles, where the permanent military representatives and their staffs will reside. It may hold its sessions in any other place, as a result of special circumstances and decisions. These meetings will take place at least once a month."

The first permanent military representatives on the Supreme War Council were: for Great Britain, General (now Field-Marshal) Sir H. H. Wilson; for Italy, General Cadorna; for France, General (now Marshal) Foch. The last-named, being Chief of the French Staff, was disqualified from sitting, by article 5 of the agreement given above, and was replaced by General Weygand.

Both the French and British Prime Ministers hoped for great results from this new organization thus set up, which they regarded as the first step towards the achievement of real unity of Allied action.

#### THE MEETINGS OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL.

The second meeting of the Supreme War Council was held on 4th December, 1917. The questions dealt with were:—The situation in Italy, with regard to which the military advisers were ordered to elaborate a general plan of action; the questions of communications by rail between France and Italy, and by sea with the Eastern theatres; and the situation at Salonica. M. Venezelos was heard on this last subject by the Council.

The third meeting took place on 4th February, 1918. The plan of action for 1918, as drawn up by the military representatives, was discussed and adopted. The creation of an Inter-Allied general reserve was then mooted; Generals Foch and Bliss (the U.S.A. Military Representative) spoke on the necessity for constituting it, while General Robertson drew attention to the question of the command of this reserve. The Council then set itself to study the question of a supreme command, which should be empowered to deal with the constitution, maintenance, transport and use of the general reserve—a difficult question, as it was necessary to avoid the creation of a body which might substitute itself for the Council and trespass on the powers which the latter felt it necessary to keep in its own hands. The question was finally solved by the adoption of the military representatives' proposal

that an Executive Committee, of which General Foch should be chief, should be set up; and the following resolution was adopted :—

Resolution with regard to the formation and management of a general reserve.

(1) "The Supreme War Council decides on the creation of an Inter-Allied general reserve for the whole of the Western, Italian and Balkan fronts.

(2) "The Supreme War Council delegates to an executive body composed of the military representatives of Great Britain, Italy and the United States, with General Foch for France, the following powers which will be exercised in consultation with the commanders-in-chief of the armies concerned :

(a) "To determine the strength in troops of all arms and the composition of the general reserve, as also the contribution of the army of each country to the formation of this reserve.

(b) "To fix its areas of cantonment.

(c) "To take dispositions for its transport and concentration.

(d) "To decide on, and give orders, as to the moment, place and duration of the employment of the Inter-Allied general reserve.

(e) "To determine the time, place and strength of the counter offensive and the placing at disposal of the troops necessary for the operation.

(f) "Until the elements composing the Inter-Allied general reserve are moved they will remain for purposes of training, discipline and administration under the orders of their respective commanders-in-chief. Their movement may only be ordered by the Executive Committee.

(3) "In case of divergence of opinion, each military representative has the right of appeal to the Supreme War Council.

(4) "The Executive Committee has the right to go to all theatres of operations.

(5) "The Supreme War Council will nominate the President of the Executive Committee."

A second resolution nominated General Foch to this post.

The question of extending the British front then came up. Mr. Lloyd George opposed the proposal, but it was agreed that the French and British commanders-in-chief should mutually settle the methods and execution of this extension.

The Council then separated after publishing a communiqué to the effect that the Allied and Associated Powers were resolved on an energetic pursuit of the war, as they could find nothing in the recent speeches of the German Chancellor or the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which denoted any approach towards the satisfaction of their moderate war aims.

The fourth meeting took place in London on 14th and 15th March, when the constitution of the general reserve was postponed without the principle being departed from. The framework of the reserve was organized with the Franco-British contingent from the Italian front; and it was decided that Italian divisions up to a number to be fixed

by the Executive Committee should be added to them; a committee of generals was sent into Italy to discuss this point with the Italian commander-in-chief. It was further decided that when the American divisions arrived, they should be used to relieve the allied formations engaged in the battle, thus freeing them for the general reserve. Other questions, such as Japanese intervention in Siberia, reprisals against enemy air raids, and allotment of coal to Italy, were also discussed, and the taking over and utilization of Dutch merchant shipping was envisaged in certain eventualities.

As a result of the success of the German attack of 21st March, General Foch was appointed on 26th March to co-ordinate the action, and on 3rd April to undertake the strategic direction, of the military operations of the Allied armies in the west, the commanders of each army retaining the tactical control of their own forces, with right of appeal to their Governments from any measures of Foch's that seemed to them dangerous to their troops.

The next Supreme War Council at Abbeville on 1st and 2nd May, decided to abolish the Executive Committee and extended the command of General Foch to the Italian theatres and armies. Various means of increasing the effective strength of the Allied armies were then discussed; a mission was sent to Salonica to study the possibility of withdrawing British troops from there to France; it was decided to hasten the transport of the Czecho-Slovak corps from Russia by the Trans-Siberian railway; and General Foch requested that the U.S.A. should be asked to send to France 120,000 infantry and machine gunners per month during May, June and July. It was decided that, as had been arranged by Lord Milner and General Pershing on 24th April, these should be sent at first to the British Army, but that the formation of an independent American Army should be taken in hand as soon as possible. Other matters considered were the utilization of Belgian railway resources, the despatch of rolling stock from the United States, the situation in the East, and Inter-Allied naval activity in the Adriatic.

The sixth meeting of the Council took place at Versailles from 1st to 3rd June. It was concerned mainly with the question of manpower. President Wilson was asked to agree to the despatch of 200,000 American troops in June and July; the excess above this number (120,000) being taken by the British were to be absorbed in the French Army. It was also recommended that 300,000 men per month should be recruited in the U.S.A., so as to increase the Army to a strength of 100 divisions. An agreement had already been signed that priority in shipping for June should be given to (1) 170,000 combatant U.S.A. troops, (2) 20,000 railway workers, (3) the rest of the U.S.A. Army; it was agreed that priority for July should be given (1) to 140,000 fighting American troops, (2) the rest of the Army. An Allied pool of munitions was also decided on. Other questions less purely military were then dealt with. Japan was asked to intervene in Siberia under certain conditions, and to supply tonnage for the transport of the Czecho-Slovak corps from Vladivostock; a declaration was drawn up recognizing the right to independence of the Czecho-Slovak, Jugo-Slav and



Polish races; and the intervention of an Allied force under a united command in North Russia was also agreed to.

Meeting again at Versailles on 2nd, 3rd and 4th July the Council discussed the arrangements for the transport of the American reinforcements for August; it agreed to ask President Wilson to accept the principle of Allied intervention in Siberia, and to increase the forces in North Russia. The military representatives were ordered, on the demand of the French Government, to study the question of an offensive in Macedonia, and were also charged to consider in conjunction with the Allied commanders-in-chief the plan of campaign for next winter and spring (1918-1919).

The last meeting of the Council under war conditions took place on 31st October, 1st, 2nd and 4th November at Versailles. Bulgaria had already laid down her arms, and Turkey, on 31st October, followed her example, while Austria-Hungary and Germany had asked for an armistice. The terms on which these two last powers should be allowed to submit were therefore the only matters discussed, and the conditions as drawn up were accepted by Austria on 3rd November, and by Germany on 11th November.

#### THE RÔLE OF THE PERMANENT MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES.

The changes in the personnel of the Permanent Military Representatives are shown in this table :

France.	Great Britain.	Italy.	U.S.A.
General Foch (never actually held position). General Weygand. General Vidalon. General Belin.	General Wilson. General Rawlinson. General Sackville-West.	General Cadorna. General Giardino. General Di Robilant. General Cavallero.	General Bliss.

To each of these representatives was attached a staff, which in the case of the French was organized in three sections, dealing respectively with operation, economic and diplomatic, and naval and maritime questions.

The original duty of these officers was to keep the Supreme Council in constant touch with the situation of the forces and means of all kinds at the disposal both of the Allied and of the enemy armies. It gradually became the custom for them, looking at these matters as they did from the collective point of view of all the Allies, to express the result of their work in joint notes, which, as soon as they had been accepted by all the Governments concerned, became *ipso facto* decisions of the Supreme War Council. After the assumption of the supreme command by General Foch, the duties of the military representatives were defined as follows in a resolution dated 4th July :

(1) "They were to consider themselves as the competent advisers of the Supreme War Council as regards general military policy and were to study in consultation with General Foch and the commanders-in-chief in the theatres, the military situation in its broadest strategical aspect, taking into account all factors such as the political and naval

situation, the development of new weapons, etc., and considering the application of all these factors to actual or possible theatres of war. (2) The results of their studies were then to be presented to the Supreme Council in the form of advice, either on the special matter submitted to them by the Council, or on any other question considered suitable by the representatives or by General Foch only. The Council alone, however, could make decisions on these points."

The first meeting of the military representatives took place on 4th December, 1917, and fifty were held between that date and the armistice. The president and secretary at each meeting were furnished by each nation in turn in order of their entry into the war, three of the four representatives formed a quorum. The debates were conducted and the minutes drawn up both in French and English.

Questions to be studied were submitted either, as before described, by the Governments, or by one of the representatives on behalf of his Government, or on his own initiative; the result of the meeting was embodied in a collective note, signed by all four representatives, for submission to the Supreme Council and all the Allied Governments. The subjects discussed comprised such matters as the plan of campaign for 1918; armistice conditions; the naval and military clauses of the peace treaties; the situations on the various fronts from time to time; the scheme for operations in Macedonia; the extension of the British front; the American Army; the raising of Chinese and Abyssinian labour corps; Dutch shipping; pooling of munitions and forage.

The influence of the military representatives made itself felt particularly in the discussions on the subject of unity of command and of the Inter-Allied reserve and executive committee, and most of all in the adoption of the plan for the Macedonian offensive in October, 1918. They were the first to suggest the formation of Inter-Allied committees on transport, aviation and tanks. They were also unremitting in pressing on their respective Governments the importance of assuring the execution of the schemes put forward and approved. If they had no power of decision in themselves, their rôle was of great importance, for, looking at the situation as they did in its broadest aspects, not only were they the advisers of the Supreme War Council, but they prepared its decisions, and even provoked some of them, and also saw to the execution of all plans adopted.

#### CONCLUSION.

The Supreme War Council was thus the first tangible sign of the Allies' desire for unity of effort, and in the course of its action it succeeded in doing eminent service to the Allied cause. In no sense an "Aulic council," it did not shrink from taking upon itself the heaviest responsibilities; though long and difficult discussions were often necessary, action invariably followed them—an action which had been agreed to by all in the most complete harmony. All problems were studied from the point of view of the alliance as a whole, and as the end was common, so was the desire to attain it. The union of all the Allied forces under one command in the end secured the defeat of the Central Powers. The Supreme Council's greatest title to fame lies in the fact that it prepared and facilitated that union.

## THE WORK OF THE GERMAN MILITARY RAILWAY STAFFS BEFORE AND AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, 1914-1915.

(Summarized Translation.)

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THE following is a summary of a memorandum prepared by the German General Staff on the work of the German railway directorates during the first months of the war<sup>1</sup>:—

To appreciate the great difficulties with which the German railways had to contend during the critical days at the beginning of August, 1914, it should be mentioned that the holiday season was at that moment at its height and consequently the excursion traffic very heavy. Up to the last, the population believed that peace would be maintained, and, in any case, for political reasons, the railway organization could not be prepared ahead for the war conditions.

On the 2nd August, war was declared. All the holiday makers hurried to the stations to get home before the railways were blocked by troop-trains; relatives wished to see their sons or brothers before they left for the front; for these reasons the civilian traffic was exceptional. The troops themselves, on the outbreak of war, were mostly at the training-camps of the Corps districts, and they had therefore to be brought back as rapidly as possible to their respective garrisons.

The concentration of the German Armies had to be carried out chiefly in the great industrial area along the western frontier. Hundreds of long military trains had to be sent there, and to make room for them, a great mass of loaded and empty goods-trucks and rolling-stock had to be evacuated from all over the area to prevent hopeless confusion in the zone of concentration.

Simultaneously, other traffic movements on a large scale were taking place throughout Germany. Long trains of empty rolling-stock with two engines had to be sent in various directions to those places where, on the beginning of mobilization, the requirements greatly exceeded the normal.

The actual mobilization demanded the full resources of the German railway system. Thousands of reservists and *Landwehr* men had to be transported to their assembly garrisons. A quantity of rolling-stock was also needed to carry horses from the great horse-breeding centres of Germany to the various garrisons to bring the peace-up to war-

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<sup>1</sup> See Hans Walde's "Der Vormarsch im Westen, 1914," pp. 36-41.

establishments. Similarly, the movement of a mass of war-supplies and material, and guns for equipping the frontier fortresses, had to be contended with. In addition, a never-ending service of goods-trains had to be organized to carry coal from the great mining districts to the harbours to refill the bunkers of the High Sea Fleet.

A few hours after the declaration of mobilization the first troop-train left for the frontiers to protect them against invasion. This general movement frontierwards swelled daily until the German Armies were finally assembled in the zone of concentration, and the countless depôts behind their front, far back into Germany, were filled with supplies, munitions, etc. Every train had been previously arranged in peace-time and the time table was faithfully adhered to on mobilization. This had been the peace work of the Railway Section (*Eisenbahnabteilung*) of the German General Staff, and the department of the Line Commandants (*Linien-Kommandatur*). It had only been possible, thanks to a close co-operation with many other authorities, particularly those of the railway administration.

The transport arrangements ran smoothly, although it was realized how easily a treacherous act or even human error at any one place might upset the entire traffic on Germany's complicated network of railways and prevent the concentration of the armies along the frontier at the desired time. For this reason in its preparatory work the Railway Section had taken into account many possibilities of serious dislocation of traffic and provided against them. The various sub-departments of the Railway Section had been so trained in peace time that any traffic-disturbance could be rectified and the concentration carried out as nearly as possible to scheduled time. To this end, the construction of new railways had been carefully watched by the Railway Section in peace time. Its difficulty in this respect lay in the fact that the needs of German commerce did not always correspond with military requirements.

When the concentration of the German armies along the western frontier was complete and the advance began, the Chief of the Railway Section and his staff joined Supreme Headquarters at the front as Chief of the Field Railways (*Chef des Feldeisenbahnwesens*). From the day of mobilization the position of the military railway authorities with regard to the civil railway administration underwent a complete change, and all the railways of Germany came under the control of the Chief of the Field Railways. To assist him in his work for the railways in Germany itself, the Railway Section of the Acting General Staff (*Stellvertretenden Grossen Generalstabes*) in Berlin was placed at his disposal.

With the rapid advance of the German armies the railways of the occupied territories were soon added to the German railway system. The enemy in his retreat had, however, found time to demolish most of the railway bridges and block many of the tunnels. If the advance was not to be hindered or held up the railways must follow close on the heels of the armies. This meant that the railways of the conquered districts had to be restored and brought into use as rapidly as possible.

For this purpose two military railway directorates (*Militär-Eisenbahn-Direktionen*) had been formed on the day of mobilization, which were to organize the railway traffic in the occupied territory on the same system as in Germany. The first of these two railway directorates waited in Aix-la-Chapelle until the movement into Belgium began. The officers of the railway regiments, going on ahead with the advanced cavalry, reconnoitred and noted the various demolitions along the railways, beginning with the area Hasselt—Louvain—Namur—Marloie. In this area, apart from torn-up rails, overturned engines and much other small damage, thirteen bridges had been demolished and a tunnel blocked by sending engines at full steam into it from opposite directions. The telegraph and telephone wires had been torn down and the instruments at the railway stations rendered useless. Besides this, the permanent way throughout Belgium was for the most part in a most neglected condition, the points frequently giving way under the weight of the heavy German engines. The railway troops had therefore an almost superhuman task to get the supplies and munitions up to the advancing armies. Long military trains had often to be sent in quick succession along a single line, N.C.O.'s and a few men regulating the traffic at the stations. For example, before a single German engine had passed westwards through Liège, the first train-load of German troops ran into the station bringing reinforcements for the action about Brussels and was to be sent on at once to Louvain. There was no railway staff on this section of the line, the telegraph and telephone system was unserviceable and only a single line available, nevertheless train after train was promptly sent through to Louvain, the empty trucks returning along the same line in the intervals. In this manner, and in spite of shots being fired at them from houses along the line, the troops were able to reach their destination in time to take part in the fighting there.

The restoration of the railways was gradually completed step by step. On the 1st September the 1st Military Railway Directorate moved into Brussels, and on the 1st October it moved forward again and took up its headquarters in Lille, new Line Commandant Headquarters being formed at Liège and Brussels to take its place. South of the 1st, the 2nd Military Railway Directorate had taken up its headquarters at Ulfungen on the 20th August, moving on the 25th August to Libramont and on the 4th September going forward again to Sedan. A new Line Commandant Headquarters was formed behind it at Luxemburg. In time, however, the districts controlled by these two railway directorates became so extensive that a third had to be formed between them with its headquarters at Charleroi. All these officials were under the military administration. The railway traffic immediately behind the front was controlled by railway troops, though further back it was run by personnel lent by the German railway service.

Owing to the wet winter that followed and the bad state of the roads an intricate net of small-gauge railways had to be constructed to get supplies close up to the front positions. In the course of time



the temporary bridges that had been built in many places had to be made more permanent. This work, if in the zone of operations, was done by the railway troops, though further back on the lines of communication it was handed over to private German contractors. In this manner, up to June, 1915, 104 large bridges were built, eight tunnels restored, and fourteen main lines put into full service again. Entraining and detraining platforms and sidings were constructed at 160 railway stations, in addition to numerous other sidings for the long military trains and a number of junction lines to unite important railway systems. By the end of April, 1915, 4,500 miles of railway in the occupied districts on the western front were in use (1,900 single and 2,600 double track), 70 miles had not yet been restored (50 single and 20 double track), and 260 miles (250 single and 10 double track) were in process of construction.



## THE BATTLE OF MONS.

By Lieut.-Colonel M. H. C. BIRD, R.G.A., *p.s.c.*

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IT is thought that it may be of interest to get at the German view of the Battle of Mons, and with this object the following account, greatly abridged from one of the pamphlets published "on behalf of the Great General Staff," is given. What is omitted, or slurred over, is perhaps even more significant than what is related. We get, at any rate, an idea of what the German public was intended to believe.

### COMPOSITION OF THE FIRST ARMY, AUGUST, 1914.

IVth Reserve Corps—Von Gronau.

IIIrd Reserve Corps—Von Beseler.

IXth Corps—Von Quast.

IVth Corps—Sixt von Arnim.

IIIrd Corps—Von Lochow.

IInd Corps—Von Linsingen.

10th Mixed Landwehr Brigade—L. of C. Troops.

11th Mixed Landwehr Brigade—L. of C. Troops.

27th Mixed Landwehr Brigade—L. of C. Troops.

IInd Cavalry Corps—Von der Marwitz.

2nd Cavalry Division.

4th Cavalry Division.

9th Cavalry Division.

Each Corps=Two divisions and corps troops, i.e., one battalion heavy howitzers, bridging train, telephone detachment, search light section, flying squadron.

Each Division=Two infantry brigades, four regiments, twelve battalions, one battalion Jaeger (detached with cavalry corps), seventy-two field guns (one division per corps had fifty-four guns and eighteen howitzers), three squadrons divisional cavalry, one or two pioneer companies, etc.

The task of the First German Army, under Von Kluck, in the early part of August, 1914, was to outflank the Main Army of the French.

On the 17th August it was learned that the Belgians were behind the Gette. The French were known to be transferring troops to their northern wing in great haste, their intention apparently being to gain touch with the Belgians. Of the British, only vague and contradictory

reports had come in, but their early intervention was expected. In order to prevent the junction of the Belgians and British with the French, which might upset the whole plan, it was essential to act quickly, and defeat the Belgians. The Belgians, however, could not be held; they fell back fighting on Antwerp. This, although the First Army was but little delayed, necessitated a detachment being made towards Antwerp, namely, the IIIrd Reserve Corps, one-sixth of the fighting troops of the Army.

During the rapid advance through Belgium the First Army lost a good many men from the heat, and the cavalry and transport horses suffered considerably. The horses, however, were replaced by requisitioning, and meat, grain and forage were similarly obtained. By the 20th, First Army Headquarters learned from newspapers that the B.E.F. had completed its landing in the French ports on the 18th; its line of advance was unknown, but it was thought it might be expected from the direction of Lille. The mission of the First Army thenceforth became a two-fold one; not only was it to envelop the French left, it also had to protect the German right against the English.

The incompatibility of this new task with that of assisting the Second Army, under whose orders the First was placed, in its passage of the Sambre, soon became evident, and made itself felt throughout the operations up to the Marne. The difficulty was not solved by placing the First Army under the Second—it is strange that anyone should have expected it would be. As Von Kuhl remarks in his book "*Der deutsche Generalstab*," it was merely an expedient necessitated by the inefficient communication existing between the Armies and the German G.H.Q., which was at Luxemburg, far from the wing where the decision was sought.

On the evening of the 22nd August, the First Army halted east of the line Mignault-Laugrenée (IXth Corps), Chaussée Notre Dame de Louvignies-Thoricourt (IIIrd Corps), Silly-Ollignies (IVth Corps), Ninove (IInd Corps). The IIIrd Reserve Corps was detached towards Antwerp, while the IVth Reserve Corps had just arrived at Brussels. Army Headquarters were at Hal. The IInd Cavalry Corps (three divisions), under Von der Marwitz, was west of Ath; it also was under the orders of the Second Army. It was only on this day (22nd August) that the First Army received any indication of the whereabouts of the British, and even then, the only definite information was that an English squadron had been encountered at Casteau (five miles N.E. of Mons), that the Mons-Condé Canal was held from Mons to Ville sur Haine, and that an English aviator, who had gone up at Maubeuge, had been shot down.

No doubt, various causes combined to produce this state of ignorance; the preconceived idea that the B.E.F. was moving on Lille, the efficiency of the British counter-espionage service, the short range of the aircraft of that period, and the fact of the IInd Cavalry Corps being placed under the Second Army, all contributed to it. The First Army was, however, according to our ideas, remarkably strong in divisional cavalry; the IIIrd, IVth and IXth Corps had six squadrons

each, and as very little mention is made of the work they did, it is fair to suggest that more use might have been made of them. The preconceived idea, combined perhaps with the "raiding instinct," exercised such influence that the II<sup>nd</sup> Cavalry Corps, on the 23<sup>rd</sup> August, was fifteen miles further to the north-west of Mons than it was on the 22<sup>nd</sup>; while the feeling of insecurity was such that the II<sup>nd</sup> Corps was kept so far back that it only reached Condé on the 24<sup>th</sup>, by a night march. The result of all this was that the First Army fought at Mons with only three corps out of six, which went into action piece-meal, and on the very sketchiest of plans.

The Second Army intended, on the 23<sup>rd</sup>, to advance east of Maubeuge, and to push forward the right of the VII<sup>th</sup> Corps from Binche through Solre. General von Kluck decided to continue his advance on the 23<sup>rd</sup> into the area north-west of Maubeuge and at the same time to take steps to protect his left against that fortress. The destinations laid down in Army Orders that night were:—

II<sup>nd</sup> Corps—From Ninove via Grammont to La Hamaide.

IV<sup>th</sup> Corps—Via Ath to Basècles, and via Chièvres to Stambruges.

III<sup>rd</sup> Corps—Via Lens to St. Ghislain, and via Jurbise to Jemappes.

The high ground on the south side of the canal was to be captured.

The IX<sup>th</sup> Corps was to cover the movement on the Maubeuge side, and for this purpose to move by Mons and Thieu towards the north and north-west fronts of the fortress, with its principal force on its right.

The heads of the IV<sup>th</sup>, III<sup>rd</sup> and IX<sup>th</sup> Corps were to cross the line Ath-Roelx at 8.30 a.m. The corps were to reconnoitre up to the line Alost-Audenarde-Renaix-Leuze-Valenciennes-Bavai. The air reconnaissance was to cover the area Douai-Cambrai-Le Cateau-Avesnes-Valenciennes.

The IV<sup>th</sup> Reserve Corps was to follow, as before, in second line. The III<sup>rd</sup> Reserve Corps retained its mission to protect the right on the Antwerp side. The II<sup>nd</sup> Corps and IV<sup>th</sup> Reserve Corps were specially warned that Belgians were believed to be in the Alost area.

During the morning of the 23<sup>rd</sup> August, the II<sup>nd</sup> Cavalry Corps reported that large numbers of troops had detrained at Tournai on the 22<sup>nd</sup>. It thus became doubtful whether the British main forces were to the south or the west—a doubt which fog prevented the airmen from clearing up. The IV<sup>th</sup>, III<sup>rd</sup> and IX<sup>th</sup> Corps were therefore ordered to halt on the Leuze-Mons-Binche road, since, if the British were at Tournai, they could not otherwise be enveloped. Here we find a new plan, namely, to envelop the British, instead of protecting the German right against them. Later reports, however, confirmed the presence of the British in strength on the canal, and the information supplied by the II<sup>nd</sup> Cavalry Corps turned out to be false, there being only a French territorial brigade at Tournai. The advance was therefore resumed. This order, as is remarked later, did not reach the III<sup>rd</sup> Corps until

3 p.m. (German time), while the IVth Corps, having halted at Basècles and Stambruges at about 2 p.m., did not start again until 6.30, so that the envelopment of the British failed. About noon, when it became known that the IXth Corps was in action on the canal, the IIIrd Corps was ordered "to attack on the front St. Ghislain-Jemappes," and the IVth "to continue its advance towards Hensies and Thulin, in order to assist the IIIrd Corps."

The account then deals with the doings of the B.E.F. up to the 22nd August. The individual training and spirit of the troops are well spoken of, this opinion being based on the circumstances that the men were volunteers of long service, and that "all the senior officers had gained experience of active service in the Boer War." Not quite so much is expected of it in the tactics and leading required for Continental warfare. In this connection it is interesting to note that before the War the German public generally thought that, being what they called "mercenaries," the British troops could not possibly fight as well as Germans, who served from a high sense of duty, that the introduction of the sporting element into military training displayed a degree of frivolity incompatible with the serious nature of war, and that the cultivation of sports and games, in which both officers and men joined, was detrimental to discipline and proved that we had no sense for that virtue.

The British intentions and dispositions are then described.

Marshal French intended his army to advance in the direction of Soignies-Nivelles, in co-operation with the projected offensive of the French left wing formed by General Lanrezac's Fifth Army, which was to cross the Sambre on the 22nd August. Of the wide sweep to the north and the rapid advance of the army of General von Kluck both the English Commander and the French Headquarters had for a long time remained in complete ignorance. When, however, on the 22nd August, General Lanrezac found himself held fast on the Sambre by the German Second Army, and thrown on the defensive, Marshal French halted his divisions also on reaching Mons, and restricted himself to awaiting the German advance in a defensive position on the Canal du Centre, and to supporting the French left there. To the Ist Corps he allotted the area east of Mons, to the IInd Corps the canal line Obourg-Mons-Condé. While sending the 5th Cavalry Brigade to Binche to gain touch with the French left, he disposed the remainder of his cavalry as a reserve in rear of his left wing, thereby condemning it to inactivity. Two reserve divisions, which the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, had detailed to reinforce the English right, had not yet arrived.

#### THE ENGLISH POSITION NEAR MONS.

The defensive position, with the canal directly in front of it, was as favourable as it is possible to imagine, since the ground afforded natural advantage to the defender, while confronting the attacker with extraordinary difficulties. In his official despatch French himself describes the position as excellent. Numerous muddy ditches and



barbed wire fences intersected the meadows on the north side of the canal; groups of trees and bushes intercepted the view, rendered observation difficult, and correspondingly reduced the effect of the attacking artillery. But on the south side of the canal, where the mining district of Hainault begins, and also to the east of Mons, the ground rises towards the south. The crests of the ridges, and the conical, flat-topped slag heaps of the numerous mines, afforded the defender admirable sites for his batteries, machine-guns, and observation posts.

Making skilful use of the ground, the English had dug trenches on both sides of the canal, and on the rising ground built barricades of sand-bags and barrels filled with sand, and loopholed the houses. On the other hand, the preparations for blowing up or destroying the bridges had apparently not been completed in all cases.

#### THE IXTH CORPS AT NIMY, OBOURG AND EAST OF MONS.

At 9 a.m. on the 23rd August, this corps, marching in four brigade groups, approached the canal north-east of Mons. The 35th and 36th Brigades (18th Division) had at this hour arrived within one and a half miles of the canal. The 33rd and 34th (17th Division) were marching towards Ville sur Haine and Thieu respectively; their actual position is not clearly indicated, but they also appear to have arrived within one-and-a-half miles of the canal.

At 10 a.m. the divisions were ordered to cross the canal, but, for the time being, not to advance beyond the line Nimy—south-west corner of the wood west of the Obourg-Mons road—south edge of the Bois d'Havre-Bois du Rapois. The 17th Division was preceded by the 16th Dragoons (presumably the three divisional squadrons) who, assisted by some artillery, secured the crossings with but little trouble. The whole division crossed the canal and reached St. Symphorien and Villers St. Ghislain during the afternoon without much opposition.

The 18th Division, however, to which were allotted the bridges between the roads Casteau-Mons and Obourg-Mons, encountered strong resistance.

The 35th Brigade was to capture the crossings near Nimy, the 36th the bridges south of Obourg, the whole of the artillery supporting the attack from the high ground at Maisières and south-west of St. Denis.

The 36th Brigade found difficulty in identifying the British positions about Obourg, although the station and the wood to the west of it (both on the south side of the canal) were seen to be prepared for defence. The artillery (at 2,400 yards) was not very effective, until a gun was brought up to short range, which eventually destroyed the station. Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion 85th Regiment was held up, nor did it succeed in effecting a passage and seizing the Obourg bridge until the 2nd Battalion had got over by a crossing, not marked on the map, 1,400 yards north-west of Obourg bridge, and worked its way through the wood west of the Obourg-Mons road, which "forced the enemy to abandon the Obourg bridge in hot haste." The whole of the

85th Regiment, and portions of the 31st, now set themselves to attack the British "prepared position on the high ground north-east of Mons."

Patrols having reported that the passages at Nimy were held by the British, the tasks of the 35th Brigade were distributed as follows, at 10.30 a.m. The 84th Regiment, of which two battalions formed the advanced guard, and a company of pioneers, were to take the crossings north-west of Nimy, while the 86th was to take the bridge at the lock half-way between Nimy and Obourg. The 86th deployed in the Bois d'Obourg, with two battalions in the first line, one battalion and the machine-gun company in the second, worked through to the south edge of the wood, and rushed the building on the north side of the canal. Here, however, they were held up until supported by artillery, when they managed to cross over and penetrate into the British positions on the south-west side, capturing numerous prisoners. The advance was stopped soon after 2 p.m. on the line ordered, and the 2nd Battalion was then sent out towards Nimy to assist the 84th, which was unable to make progress.

From the above account it appears that the 4th Bn. Middlesex Regiment, reinforced by two-and-a-half companies Royal Ulster Rifles, who held the canal from Nimy bridge exclusive to Obourg bridge inclusive, a front of over two-and-a-half miles, were attacked by six battalions at least.

Of the 84th Regiment, the 3rd Battalion had to fight its way through Maisières towards Nimy, where it was held up by heavy fire, while the 1st and 2nd Battalions encountered strong resistance in front of that part of Nimy situated on the north side of the canal. A battery had to be brought up to assist the 2nd and 3rd Battalions before a footing could be gained in the northern part of the village. Even then, the north bank was only abandoned by the British towards 2.30 p.m. in consequence of well-directed artillery fire. The railway bridge west of Nimy was blown up; the road bridge was swung round to the south bank and could only be secured by particularly resolute action on the part of a patrol under a sergeant. The southern part of Nimy was then attacked by all three battalions of the 84th. It is alleged that the British were assisted by the inhabitants; nevertheless, the Germans claim to have reached the southern edge of the burning village in about half-an-hour. This would be about the time when the Royal Fusiliers received orders to withdraw from the canal salient.

The 18th Division had by now received orders to capture Mons and to advance to the line Cuesmes-Mesvin. The 35th Brigade was accordingly directed on Mons, the 36th on the high ground east of the town.

The 84th Regiment was ordered to secure Mons and Mont Eribus, the 86th to advance past the east side of the town, keeping touch with the 84th. The advance into Mons was not commenced until 6.30 p.m., four hours after the British had "abandoned the north bank of the canal." This interval of time was partly occupied in the capture of the bridge and of the village of Nimy; after this was accomplished we read that "units were re-organized, touch was regained with the rest of the brigade and preparations were made for further advance." The

impression conveyed is the Royal Fusiliers had given the 84th Regiment a very hot fight, and, in the light of the information thus given, it seems that the regiment might have been very roughly handled, had the 7th Brigade been brought up against it from Ciply, and that without prejudice to the plan of withdrawing from the canal salient. It is a point on which only those possessing full information of the situation on the British side can give a final decision; it might be worth considering.

The troubles of the 84th Regiment were not yet at an end, as the vanguard was heavily fired on just after it passed the market-place, and considerable confusion resulted. The advance was completely checked until a section of field guns was brought up in support. The regiment reached Mont Eribus at 8 p.m. The 86th reached Hyon without fighting.

The 36th Brigade, having crossed the canal at Obourg, attacked the British positions north-east of Mons, which it carried in the evening, capturing three officers, 1,202 men and four machine guns. The 36th Brigade got no further than the Mons-Obourg road, where it passed the night.

The 17th Division, in attempting to continue its advance beyond St. Symphorien and Villers St. Ghislain, partly with the object of cutting off the British troops opposing the 18th Division (presumably the 1st Gordon Highlanders), met with such resistance that it was completely held up. The 76th Regiment (33rd Brigade) got no further than the west edge of St. Symphorien, the 75th, having started in rear of the left wing of the 76th, had to turn against the British troops near Malplaquet (apparently the 2nd Royal Scots); the whole regiment was eventually deployed against the Malplaquet position, as well as a brigade of the 24th Field Artillery Regiment, but never got nearer than about 100 yards. During the night, officers' patrols observed active movement in the British position, and it was concluded that they were being re-inforced and would attack in the morning. So the 75th, being much disorganized and having lost five officers and 376 men killed and wounded (out of 3,000), was withdrawn to a position in line with St. Symphorien to re-organize.

The 34th Brigade appears to have done very little. "In the evening, it sent two battalions of the 90th Regiment into action on the left of the 75th against the enemy posted on the high ground south-west of Villers St. Ghislain. In the dark the skirmishers worked up to within about 500 yards of the enemy. The rest of the brigade, advancing through Villers St. Ghislain, reached the high ground about 1,000 yards south of the village without any infantry action taking place." The map issued with the German account shows that the brigade covered under eight miles after about 9 a.m.; no doubt this is partly accounted for by the order not to advance beyond the Bois du Rapois.

#### THE III<sup>RD</sup> CORPS AT ST. GHISLAIN AND JEMAPPES.

Of the III<sup>rd</sup> Corps, the 5th Division was to march from Thoricourt through Lens and Baudoir to St. Ghislain, the 6th Division from

Chaussée Notre Dame de Louvignies, through Masnuy St. Pierre, and Jurbise to the high ground south of Jemappes.

Reconnaissance of the canal passages proved almost impossible, the patrols were unable to reach the bridges. Wherever they attempted to penetrate between the numerous scattered farm buildings of the villages of Tertre, Ghlin, and Nimy, they were fired on by hidden riflemen. The troopers tried to make their way across country, but endless wire fences, hedges and broad ditches full of water checked even the boldest. Of a patrol despatched to the bridge north-west of Mons, all but two hussars were shot down, and Lieutenant Mueller of the Landwehr, the engineer officer accompanying the patrol, was reported missing.

When, therefore, towards 11 a.m., Major-General von Gabain, Commanding the Advanced Guard of the 6th Division, was traversing the large forest in the direction of the village of Ghlin, with its numerous outlying buildings, he found the situation still obscure. He did not therefore wish to emerge from the protection of the forest in column of route, and was actually arranging to deploy when the report came in that Ghlin was clear of the enemy, but that Jemappes was occupied. When, on continuing the advance, the vanguard reached Bustiau Station, North of Ghlin, a Corps Order, issued at Jurbise at 11 a.m., was received from General von Lochow, ordering the corps to deploy on the line Tertre-Ghlin, in order to attack towards the line St. Ghislain-Jemappes, but, in accordance with the Army Order, the troops were for the time being to remain in a position of readiness. The advance could not be resumed until 3 p.m., when the arrival of a further Army Order restored freedom of movement. The 64th Infantry Regiment was moved forward to the right of the 24th, which had hitherto formed the advanced guard. The objective of the 12th Infantry Brigade was Jemappes. The 20th Infantry Regiment followed in echelon on the left. Soon after the infantry commenced to advance, the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment and the Howitzer Brigade of the 39th Artillery Regiment opened fire on Jemappes, the station and the bridges.

Parallel with the Ghlin-Jemappes road, on the right of the 24th Regiment, its 1st Battalion was able to advance rapidly, and after a short fight in the gardens and farms north of the canal, it approached the north bank of the canal itself. But further advance was now impossible. The enemy was well entrenched and fully concealed among the houses on the far side, and opened a murderous fire.

The advance of the 2nd Battalion on the east side of the Ghlin-Jemappes road had proved far more difficult. The lines of skirmishers had to work through a thick maze of wire fences and hedges, and to jump across or wade through a network of water channels. The August sky was overcast, and in the swampy meadows of the Belgian plain the mid-day heat made the atmosphere intolerably heavy. The men, struggling forward under the burden of their packs and cartridge pouches, were tormented with thirst, with never a breath of air to cool their perspiring limbs. The advance was continued without a

check to within 900 m. of the sharply defined embankment of the canal. Then, all of a sudden, things became lively in front. First came a few single shots, then rapid independent fire; presently the machine guns chimed in, and the English batteries sent over their first greetings. It now became necessary to advance by rushes, to make use of even the scantiest cover, and to work forward by crawling. But of the enemy there was still nothing to be seen. The upper edge of the canal bank, where the enemy's riflemen were believed to be ensconced, had to serve as an aiming point. The casualties increased, the rushes became shorter, and at last the whole advance came to a standstill.

Consequently the two battalions had gradually become more and more separated, causing a wide gap between them. Colonel Freiherr Prinz von Buchau therefore ordered the 3rd Battalion, which had followed the 1st on the road from Ghlin, to close the gap with two companies and to capture the bridge about 800 m. east of the road-bridge between Ghlin and Jemappes. The objective could be clearly seen from the road junction about 400 m. north of Jemappes, where the 3rd Battalion began its advance. The bridge appeared to have been raised, but to be still intact. The 2nd Pioneer Company had already attempted to seize this crossing by surprise, but had been obliged to desist owing to severe casualties. Even now, although an advanced section of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment kept the houses along the canal under fire, the 24th were no more successful than the Pioneers had been.

But, in the meantime, a section of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment had also come into action in close support of the 1st Battalion. After the two guns had obtained a few good hits, Captain von Altmann and the men lying nearest to him succeeded in rushing forward on the Ghlin road and seizing the crossing. The companies of the 1st Battalion followed, and made their way into Jemappes on the south side of the canal. The enemy made no further resistance and fell back. The 64th Infantry Regiment followed the battalion that had already crossed, and finally, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 24th moved towards the captured bridge.

In the evening General von Gabain concentrated his brigade on the high ground south of Jemappes. The 11th Infantry Brigade was also moved up through Jemappes to the same area, which it reached towards 7 p.m.

Lieutenant-General von Rhoden (commanding 6th Division) intended to occupy the high ground at Frameries and south of Cuesmes that same day, and, towards 8 p.m., he started off the 12th Brigade on the right and the 11th on the left in the direction of Frameries-Ciply. But it was not possible to obtain a satisfactory view of the ground, which was broken up by numerous railway establishments, factories and slag heaps, so the operation was not carried out. After dark, the 6th Infantry Division settled down to rest on the general line of the railway Quaregnon-Flénu-Cuesmes. The tired troops were protected by battle outposts a few hundred yards in front.

A still more strenuous day fell to the lot of the 5th Infantry Division.



After a march of nearly twenty miles through Lens and Herchies, the 12th Grenadier Regiment, forming the advanced guard, reached Baudoir, which lies at the southern edge of the wood of that name. Here the troops rested and closed up. The field kitchens came up and halted by the roadside, and the companies collected quickly round their vehicles. The troops were quite ready to rest, for the long march and the great heat had exhausted them. Suddenly, quite close, came the sound of rifle fire. And almost at once Hussars came galloping back with reports:—They had been fired on at Tertre, less than a mile-and-a-half to the front; the canal at St. Ghislain, and that village itself, appeared to be strongly held. Lieutenant von Muench, commanding a platoon of the 10th Company, which was on outpost at the station south of Baudoir, identified English cyclists in Tertre. Major Prager, commanding the Fusilier (3rd) Battalion, requested permission to clear the village with the aid of a gun. A gun of the 54th Field Artillery Regiment was quickly brought up. After the first round some English troops were seen to retire. Lieutenant von Muench and his men dashed forward and penetrated into the village, followed by the gun. The latter had to come into action several times more among the houses, and then the platoon succeeded in reaching the southern edge of Tertre. Major Prager had also hurried forward and ordered up his battalion. At the south edge of the village the Fusiliers received heavy fire from a group of houses about 900 m. down the road to St. Ghislain. Major Prager ordered the leading company, the 10th and the two following ones, the 12th and 9th, to take the houses, and then the gallant officer was mortally wounded by a bullet. Immediately beside him fell Lieutenant Grapow, the commander of a machine-gun section. Presently, from the far side of the canal, artillery began shelling Tertre, and so there was no longer any doubt that the 12th Grenadiers were at last opposed by more considerable forces of the enemy.

In the meantime, Regimental Headquarters had received orders from the division to capture the bridges at St. Ghislain. Colonel von Reuter ordered the 1st Battalion to advance west of Tertre, and sent the remainder of the machine-gun company to support the Fusiliers (3rd Battalion). With one platoon of the 12th Company, Captain von Stocki succeeded in clearing a large farm from which the firing was particularly heavy. He was killed soon afterwards. When the 1st Battalion, leaving Tertre on its left, had worked its way through the thick undergrowth in the wood and, with the 2nd and 3rd Companies leading, appeared in line with the occupied buildings, the enemy abandoned his resistance in this quarter.

Colonel von Reuter, however, recognized that the two battalions would be insufficient by themselves to continue the attack against the enemy holding the bank of the canal. He therefore ordered the 2nd Battalion, which had reached the north edge of Tertre, to advance east of that village and carry on the attack on the left of the 3rd. When the 5th and 8th Companies of the battalion had come up approximately in line with the Fusiliers the advance began along the whole line. In front of the battalions lay a wide level area, cut up by

ditches and wire fences. At the far side of the plain, an even dark line showed up against the green of the meadows—the embankment of the Canal du Centre. Of the enemy there was nothing to be seen, so that the 54th Field Artillery Regiment (six batteries) which was supporting the infantry from positions south-east of Tertre, was unable to produce any effect. All the more ardent, however, was the desire of the Grenadiers and Fusiliers to get forward in order to be able at last to bring well-aimed fire to bear on the English. The companies and platoons dashed forward, vying with each other, regardless of the rapidly increasing casualties, caused mainly by shrapnel and machine-guns. The platoons in support were soon used up, the companies in reserve had to re-inforce the firing-line.

Meanwhile, to the east of the 12th Grenadiers, the 8th Grenadier Regiment, of the 9th Infantry Brigade, had also come into action. At 3.15 p.m., the Divisional Commander had ordered the regiment, which was then in readiness north of Douvrain, to prolong the line of the 12th Grenadiers and advance to attack the railway and road bridge at Mariette. The regiment deployed, with the 1st Battalion on the right, the Fusilier (3rd) Battalion on the left, and the 2nd Battalion in echelon on the left in the second line. The advance was made in extended lines which were able to cross the meadows north of Mariette without being fired on. The houses north of the canal were found to be clear of the enemy. But when the skirmishers tried to push on between the houses towards the canal they were suddenly assailed by heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from the buildings on the far side. The houses close to the bridges appeared to be especially strongly prepared for defence. The battalion commanders saw that with infantry alone it was impossible to get any further at this point. Accordingly, Major von Johnston, of the 3rd Battalion, sent to ask the 1st Brigade 18th Field Artillery Regiment for two guns. One section of the 1st Battery under Lieutenant Mierendorff succeeded in getting forward and opened fire. Soon one house immediately adjoining the crossing was in ruins. The brigade commander, General von Doemming, who was with the 3rd Battalion, ordered the 10th Company to assault. It rushed forward, but a heavy fire broke out afresh, and it was held up again a short distance from the objective. Together, the gunners and infantry pushed the guns up yet closer. Round after round now struck the closely loopholed houses; the few rounds that the section had been able to bring up with it were soon expended, but with the greatest coolness, Sergeant-Major Trampe succeeded, just in time, in bringing an ammunition wagon close up to the guns. The fire was continued, with the result that that of the enemy occasionally ceased. During these pauses, portions of both battalions reached the canal at several points simultaneously. The 3rd Battalion made their way over the road-bridge. To one side of the bridge, Captain von Sichert, with the 10th Company, crossed over by means of improvised material and pushed ahead east of Mariette. In Mariette itself a fluctuating fight ensued among the houses and barricades, in which both battalions rapidly became mixed up. Towards 5 p.m. the 8th Grenadiers were in undisputed possession of Mariette.

But the attack of the 12th Grenadiers on St. Ghislain had not yet been successful. The companies of the 2nd Battalion were lying down a few hundred yards short of the canal; the 3rd Battalion had worked forward on both sides of the St. Ghislain road to within about 500 yards; the 6th and 8th Companies were barely 200 yards from the enemy trench, which was now clearly visible, while the 5th was still nearly 800 yards away. Our own fire had almost ceased. Heavily reduced in numbers, the firing lines lay rooted to the ground, as though nothing would induce them to give up what they had so hardly won. Every man was saving his last cartridges for a favourable opportunity, perhaps for a counter-attack by the enemy. In the broad meadows over which the attack had passed, lay numerous dead and wounded Grenadiers. The work at the dressing-station in Tertre could hardly be dealt with. With a sad heart Colonel von Reuter saw that his splendid regiment was near to extinction, and considered that he could not take the responsibility of incurring further sacrifices by making another effort with his last remaining forces. So, for the time being, he gave up the attempt to advance further, but sent to the sister arm an urgent request to alleviate the situation for the Grenadiers and prepare the way for the attack by increased artillery fire. Neither the divisional commander nor the brigade commander had remained in ignorance of the arduous fight in which the 12th Grenadiers were engaged. They had therefore already taken steps to assist the regiment, when Colonel von Reuter came to the conclusion that the capture of the crossing was hopeless.

Early in the afternoon, the 52nd Infantry Regiment, which was in readiness in Tertre, had complied with the order to prolong the right wing of 1/12th Grenadiers by putting in its 2nd Battalion. The companies in first line, 5th and 6th, and one section of machine-guns, were met by a heavy fire from an invisible enemy from the direction of the canal and from their right flank. It was then seen that the enemy also was extending his western wing. Major Behr, commanding the battalion, therefore deployed the 7th Company with two machine-guns in addition, and sent them into action further to the right in the direction of La Hamaide. Towards 4 p.m., the regiment received an order from the division to capture the canal crossings 1,200 m. south-east of La Hamaide. In this manner, General Wichura hoped to afford permanent relief to the 12th Grenadiers. This intention was expressed still more plainly to the 52nd, who had in the meantime come into action, by a second order, directing it, after taking the bridges, to turn eastwards and assist the 12th Grenadiers.

The 1st Battalion 52nd Regiment now proceeded to fight its way southward towards the bridges, between the 5th and 7th Companies, and on both sides of the railway from La Hamaide to Haine and of the road from Petit Villerot to Haine. The road was lined with houses on both sides, and the whole area was cut up by gardens and farm buildings, thus giving the action the character of village fighting. Thanks to the close support afforded by one gun of the 1st Battery 54th Regiment under Lieutenant Neumann, the battalion however

made a rapid advance to within 200 yards of the canal. In this operation, seventy-two men of the "Yorkshire Regiment" (i.e., K.O.Y.L.I.) were cut off and taken prisoner. There, for the time being, the first rush of the 52nd was checked.

Whilst this attempt to help them in their fight in front of St. Ghislain was being made on the right of the 12th Grenadiers, on their left the 8th Grenadiers, who had succeeded in crossing the canal at Mariette, had also taken steps to assist their comrades. The 1st Battalion, having been ordered to advance on St. Ghislain, had, after passing through Mariette, turned to the west, and approached Hornu without being fired on. An advanced cyclist patrol was shot down in the middle of this village. Thereupon, one portion of the battalion proceeded to attack Hornu, whilst another attacked a hill near St. Ghislain which was occupied by the English. But the attack made no progress, and thus failed to afford the desired relief. Meanwhile, the other two battalions of the 8th Grenadiers turned from Mariette towards Wasmuel, which they occupied at 8 p.m. The country being close, and cut up by slag-heaps, the gathering darkness prevented further advance.

The Artillery having done their utmost to clear the way for the attack, Colonel von Reuter had ordered his whole regiment to advance on St. Ghislain at 6.30 p.m. Regardless of danger several companies again dashed forward, but the fire from the canal bank and the houses of St. Ghislain broke out with increased fury and held them up. Other companies were not even able to rise from the ground, every attempt being frustrated by the vigilance of the hostile machine-gunners. The foremost lines did not receive the order in time; the runners lay dead or wounded on their way. The Colonel now definitely abandoned all further attack, and decided to seize the crossings under cover of darkness. But the officers' patrols which went forward at dusk found the enemy's position so strongly held that the attack was postponed to the early morning. Arrangements for the assault were made with the Artillery. Wiskott's Battery of the 54th Regiment was brought up and placed in position near the 3rd Battalion in the centre of the regiment.

During re-organization it was found that twenty-five officers and far more than 500 N.C.O.'s and men had given proof of their devotion by death or wounds.

The enthusiasm with which, in spite of the previous exhausting march, the troops had gone into action at noon, had given way to a feeling of seriousness and sadness. Conscious though they were of having done their duty, the heavy casualties, and the general impression of having failed to gain the victory, had a depressing effect upon the spirits of all. And yet, as was to be seen the next day, the attack had not been made in vain.

Late in the afternoon, the other regiment of the brigade, the 52nd, had brought its action to a more successful conclusion, although, owing to the darkness, its task of taking the pressure off the Grenadiers could not be fulfilled. At 8.30 p.m., the 1st and 2nd Companies, singing, "Deutschland, Deutschland ueber alles," had stormed

the railway bridge south of La Hamaide. (As previously pointed out in the JOURNAL, this does not agree with our account). A demolition charge had been fired on the bridge, but this did not prevent the 2nd Company from using it, and taking up a covering position on the far side. During the night, patrols of the 3rd Company, and some Pioneers under Captain Pehlemann of the 3rd Pioneer Battalion, made their way to the road bridge, which they found to be abandoned by the enemy and intact. This passage also was occupied.

Lieutenant-General Wichura remained with his headquarters in the station buildings at Tertre, whence he issued orders at 9 p.m. for the division to rest in the positions it had reached, in readiness to resume the attack at daybreak.

#### THE IVTH ARMY CORPS.

The severe struggle in which the 3rd Corps had become involved for the passages at St. Ghislain and Jemappes, decided General-Oberst von Kluck to set the IVth Corps again in motion during the afternoon, in order to gain the further bank of the canal the same day, and thus assist the IIIrd Corps. Already, at about 2 p.m., the IVth Corps had received orders to continue its march in the direction of Hensies and Thulin, but had then, owing to a later Army Order, settled down to rest.

After a march of some twenty-five miles the head of the 8th Infantry Division had reached Basècles, via Ath and Ellignies, while the 7th passing through Brugelotte and Beloeil, had reached the neighbourhood of Stambruges.

Towards 6.30 p.m., the 8th Infantry Division was once more assembled near Grandglise (one-and-a-half miles north of Harchies and three-and-a-half miles north of the canal) ready to advance via Harchies on Hensies.

At this time also the 7th Infantry Division resumed its march, via Ville Pommeroeuil, with the object of seizing the canal bridges on the road to Thulin. On passing through Ville Pommeroeuil, the advanced guard, under Major-General von Schueszler, came upon English troops holding the railway embankment south and south-east of that village. The 1st Brigade 4th Field Artillery Regiment came into action at the Bois de Ville in support of the 26th Infantry Regiment, which, regardless of the sharp fire of the enemy's artillery, captured the embankment in a smart attack, and pushed on towards the canal, keeping on the west side of the Thulin road. Here the advance was checked, for the enemy kept the ground north of the canal under sustained machine-gun fire. General von Schueszler now sent into action a battalion of the 66th Infantry Regiment on the left of the 26th. The 66th reached the canal towards 9.10 p.m., but were unable to cross it, as the hostile fire continued in undiminished intensity. By about midnight, however, in spite of hostile machine-gun fire, an improvised foot-bridge was thrown across. Lieutenant von Reusz, with some N.C.O.'s and men of the 10th Company 26th Infantry Regiment, was the first to cross by the swaying planks, followed by



Lieutenant Schacht with a section of machine-guns. The blown-up bridge was repaired with improvised material, and during the night portions of the 3rd and 1st Battalions also passed over. The 11/26th and 11/66th were put across on the pontoons of the Divisional Bridging Train. With the road embankments between them, the 26th and 66th dug themselves in about 450 yards south of the canal. Darkness, and ignorance of the general situation, prevented the attack from being continued immediately.

During the advance of the 8th Infantry Division, a short, but violent house-to-house fight took place at the southern exit of Harchies between English troops and the Machine-gun Company of the 93rd Infantry Regiment. After overcoming this opposition, the advanced guard commander directed the 2nd Battalion 93rd Regiment against the northern canal crossing on the Harchies-Hensies road, which was held by the enemy. Supported by the 2nd Brigade 74th Field Artillery Regiment, the battalion soon secured the bridge, and went on to attack the southern one. But they were held up by heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from the farms on the far bank. As the darkness now prevented further artillery support, the attack could not be continued. The bridge was blown up by the English during the night.

#### SITUATION ON THE EVENING OF 23RD AUGUST AND INTENTIONS FOR THE 24TH.

On the evening of the 23rd August, the Corps of the First Army that had been engaged lay on a general line from the canal north of Hensies—1,000 yards north of Thulin—north of St. Ghislain—south edge of Mons-St. Symphorien. In rear of the right wing, the IIInd Corps had reached La Hamaide west of Lessines, in rear of the centre the IVth Reserve Corps had reached Bierghes.

Late in the afternoon, heavy gun fire to the east had indicated that the Second Army was still fighting. The VIIth Corps had defeated the enemy in its front, and its left wing had reached Binche; on the 24th, it was to continue its attack in the direction of Merbes le Chateau.

The day's fighting had proved that the First Army had strong English forces in front of it. From their stubborn resistance, particularly in front of the IIIrd Corps, it was to be expected that they would continue to put up a strong defence the next day, making use of the hilly country south of Mons.

Although the battle had to some extent cleared up the situation in front, Army Headquarters was still in complete uncertainty as to the right flank. It was true that, on the right, the IIInd Cavalry Corps had advanced in a north-westerly direction from about Ath across the Scheldt towards Courtrai, without finding any enemy. But there was no fresh information from the country further south, beyond Lille, where detrainments had been reported in the morning, and beyond Tournai, where the presence of French infantry had been established at noon. As before, it was still necessary to allow for the possible appearance of further strong hostile forces, either English or French;

however, the right wing of the Army seemed to be in no immediate danger; it was even permissible to hope that the extreme flank of the enemy had been located.

General von Kluck decided to continue the attack on the enemy in his front the following day, combining it with a turning movement round his left flank, with the object of cutting off his retreat to the west and driving him into Maubeuge. Simultaneously, the IXth Corps was to invest the north-west front of that fortress. The IIInd Corps was to make a night march to Condé, in order to join in the turning movement at an early hour. To guard against surprise from the west, the IVth Reserve Corps was moved across behind the right wing; it was to reach Ligne west of Ath.

It was suggested to General von der Marwitz, commanding the IIInd Cavalry Corps, that he should now move to the south-west, approximately towards Denain, in order to clear up the situation on the right flank of the Army, and to cut off the enemy's retreat to the west. On the evening of the 23rd he was placed under the orders of the Army, so that General von Kluck was now in a position to employ the Cavalry Corps without reference to higher authority.

#### THE 24TH AUGUST.

There was a fine drizzle when, at dawn on the 24th August, the troops of the First Army, ready for action, awaited the coming day. Now and then the sound of a gun, hostile and friendly, broke the silence of the dawn. Gradually, things became more lively, rifle fire could be heard, and an occasional machine-gun broke in with sudden, short bursts. Towards 5 a.m. the fighting recommenced almost simultaneously along the whole front.

#### THE IVTH CORPS AT ELOUGES AND AUDREGNIES.

During the night only the 7th Infantry Division of the IVth Corps had succeeded in putting any considerable bodies of troops over the canal. The patrols sent forward at early dawn by the 8th Division discovered that the English had evacuated the south bank. As soon as a few crossings had been made by the 3rd Company 4th Pioneer Battalion, the advance on Hensies was started at about 9 a.m. In consequence of the sudden alarm on the afternoon of the 23rd, the infantry regiments had not marched off with their proper brigades. On the 24th, therefore, the 93rd and 72nd Regiments were grouped together as Reichenau's Brigade, the 153rd and 36th forming the Duke of Altenburg's Brigade. The 72nd Regiment having occupied Quiévrain without difficulty, Reichenau's Brigade, supported by the 74th Field Artillery Regiment, engaged the enemy on the line Marchipont-Audregnies, soon after 1 p.m. Altenburg's Brigade had remained stationary south-west of Hensies, in order to cover the right flank, and was now ordered to pass round the north side of Crespin and then wheel to the south, so as to make an enveloping attack on the enemy's left wing.

The attack of Reichenau's Brigade made rapid progress, although at times, English artillery, posted at the north edge of Audregnies, directed a very effective fire on the skirmishers. Towards 2 p.m., the 1st and 2nd Companies of the 72nd made their way into Audregnies by surprise. The English artillery had limbered up just in time, leaving only two ammunition wagons behind. At the last moment, English cavalry had been thrown into the fight at Audregnies, but had also failed to keep the German infantry out of the place. The German troops then advanced to the line Hill south-east of Marchipont-Hill south-east of Audregnies. The enemy retired to the south. The pursuit was not carried further, in order to avoid being drawn off in a wrong direction, for, the task of the Army being to envelop the enemy's left flank, its proper direction was south-west.

Altenburg's Brigade reached Quiévrechain without serious opposition.

On the 7th Division front, the 3rd Battalion 66th Regiment had crossed the Haine at about 5 a.m., and, after a short engagement, overcame the small garrison of Thulin, which made a stubborn defence. The advance was not pushed beyond the Valenciennes-Mons railway. The 26th Infantry Regiment came up into line on the left.

After a short rest on the railway embankment, the division received orders from General Sixt von Arnim, at about 11 a.m., to continue the attack on the high ground about Elouges, which was seen to be held by the enemy. The 13th Infantry Brigade was to advance on both sides of the Thulin-Elouges road, with the bulk of its strength on the right, in order, as far as possible, to drive the enemy in a south-easterly direction. The 14th Brigade was to follow in echelon in rear of the right wing.

The advance was commenced at 1.20 p.m., the 2nd and 1/66th being on the east side of the Thulin-Elouges road, the 3rd and 1/26th on the west of it, all moving in extended lines. In vain the enemy sought to stop them by shrapnel fire. The battalions dashed forward without a check, supported by the artillery under General von Stumpff, which, from positions behind the railway embankment, smothered the enemy's lines with admirably timed shrapnel, and silenced his guns. The English did not wait for the attack to close; they left their trenches and retired in haste to the south, effectively pursued by our fire. After passing through Elouges, the movement was stopped at the Quiévrain-Elouges railway embankment. Among the farms and slag-heaps, however, the 26th Regiment had some heavy fighting, in which it sustained considerable casualties.

Thus, on the IVth Corps front, the resistance of the English was broken with unexpected speed. The infantry gratefully acknowledged the brilliant support afforded by the artillery, who were credited with a great share in the success. The troops were cheerful and full of fight. Great captures in prisoners, machine-guns and horses were secured. At the capture of Elouges alone 600 English had surrendered.

The corps halted for the night with the 8th Infantry Division in the area of Quiévrechain-Baisieux-Quévrain, and the 7th in and about Elouges.

## THE IIIRD CORPS AT HORNU, WASMES, PATURAGES AND FRAMERIES.

Towards 6 a.m. General von Lochow arrived at Flenu, and took post on a prominent slag-heap. The close country, the numerous buildings, factories and pit-heads, made the control of the fighting extremely difficult. Already during the night the General had given orders that the 5th Infantry Division, after taking St. Ghislain, was to place itself south of Hornu, in readiness for employment in a south-westerly direction, and that the 6th Division was to be on the high ground at Frameries at 4 a.m., ready to continue the advance.

In the meantime, both divisions had resumed their movements in accordance with the orders.

On the right wing of the 5th Infantry Division, the 1st and 2nd Battalions 52nd Regiment, after crossing the bridges, which had been seized during the night, had moved off towards Boussu and Hornu at about 5 a.m. They were followed by the 2nd Battalion 48th Regiment. At the same time the artillery had again opened fire on the crossings at St. Ghislain. The enemy abandoned them, and the 12th Grenadiers were now able to gather the fruits of their attack of the previous day. The 3rd Battalion 52nd Regiment, which had been placed at the disposal of Colonel von Reuter, was the first to cross the bridges at St. Ghislain, and advanced on Hornu, followed by the Grenadiers.

South of Hornu both regiments became involved in a severe engagement, as the enemy had, with stubborn determination, established himself again in this area. The trenches, which were skilfully adapted to the ground, so as to provide both frontal and enfilade fire, were further supported in a particularly effective manner by the occupation of the coal-heaps, which dominated the whole country.

The 8th Grenadiers, advancing round the east side of Hornu, had come upon the enemy holding a position north and north-west of Wasmes.

At 2.25 p.m., Lieutenant-General Wichura ordered his division to attack. The inter-brigade boundary was the line from the southern exit of Hornu to Champ des Sarts.

The attack did not make proper headway until supported by the artillery, which was brought over the canal with great difficulty. The 18th Field Artillery Regiment came into action west of Quaregnon, the 2nd Brigade 54th Regiment on its right. The 1st Brigade of the latter was at the railway junction between St. Ghislain and Wasmuel. The 3rd Battery was more advanced, and its fire was very effective, particularly against two hostile batteries.

The infantry having got forward to within 450 yards, the enemy abandoned his positions at 3 p.m. and retired to the south.

The 6th Infantry Division had spent the night on the high ground south of Jemappes, and in the early morning the whole of its artillery opened a heavy fire on Frameries and the buildings adjoining that place. The events of the previous day had shown that without a heavy preliminary bombardment by artillery, village and house-to-house fighting involved unduly high casualties. The 39th Field Artillery

Regiment fired from positions south of Flenu, the 3rd from the area east of Flenu railway station.

Towards 8.30 a.m. the infantry attack commenced. To the right of the 12th Infantry Brigade, which was directed on Frameries, the 20th Infantry Regiment was working towards Paturages. The English offered a desperate resistance: Their riflemen were concealed in the numerous factories and mine buildings, and in many cases inflicted severe losses on the attacking regiments by enfilade fire. The 1/24th were the first to carry the northern edge of Frameries, and to drive the enemy from his position. A particularly difficult attack was that of the 1st Battalion 64th Regiment on the stubbornly defended high ground near the cemetery of Frameries. But, in spite of the very heavy artillery fire, Major Matthiasz succeeded in reaching the double line of the hostile trenches, and in driving out the enemy at this point also. Towards noon both the 24th and 64th had reached the high road between Paturages and Noirchain. At the same time, the 20th were able to penetrate into Paturages, which was on fire in several places.

The enemy fell back.

General von Lochow now ordered both divisions to continue their advance towards Warquignies. The 5th Division was to start from the south of Hornu, the 6th was to support the 5th by moving via Eugies. Further fighting, however, did not take place, as the enemy had now apparently ceased to offer further opposition. Towards 6 p.m., therefore, the troops settled down to rest, the 5th Division in and to the north of Dour, the 6th in and north of Warquignies. The 3rd Hussars were to maintain touch with the enemy in the direction of Bavai and west of that place.

#### THE IXTH CORPS.

On the front of the 18th Infantry Division, rifle fire had again broken out at dawn. The 35th Brigade, supported by the 45th Field Artillery Regiment, had throughout the night remained in close touch with the enemy on Mont Eribus; the 36th Brigade, with the 9th Field Artillery Regiment attached, had pushed forward south of Hyon as far as the line of the Trouille. The impression was that the enemy had been re-inforced, an impression that was apparently corroborated by the heavy artillery fire which opened soon afterwards.

Lieutenant-General von Kluge and his headquarters were at the junction of the Mons-St. Symphorien and Mons-Malplaquet roads, watching the battlefield. General von Quast had also arrived soon after 5 a.m.

It was known at corps headquarters that the 17th Division had not been in touch with the enemy during the night, and was not in touch that morning. The G.O.C. now detailed the divisional zones for the further advance, but, owing to the proximity of the fortress of Maubeuge, he directed that the Noirchain-Givry road was not to be crossed. Hardly had this order been issued, at 9 a.m., when an airman brought a report, from which it appeared that the enemy was only holding the line Ciply-Nouvelles-Givry with weak forces of infantry



and artillery, in what seemed to be rear-guard positions, while numerous small columns were retiring to the south and south-west between Bavai and Valenciennes; it confirmed the information that hostile artillery at Givry, Nouvelles, and Frameries was briskly engaged with the German.

Towards 10 a.m., the hostile fire suddenly died down. The advancing infantry met with no further resistance, and found that the enemy had marched off, apparently in great haste. They found great numbers of packs and heavy English coats lying about, which might well have proved fatal to their wearers.

At 2 p.m., General von Quast received information of the good progress being made by the IIIrd Corps at Frameries. The VIIth Corps reported that it was already in action at Merbes Ste. Marie south of Binche. At about 3.45 p.m., therefore, the G.O.C. IXth Corps ordered his corps to take ground to the right in order to protect the IIIrd Corps against Maubeuge. The divisions were to follow each other on the Frameries-Eugies-Sars la Bruyere road in the direction of Ruinsette. Delay occurred in fitting the divisions into the column, so that by evening the head of the corps only reached Eugies. Outposts protected the resting troops at Sars la Bruyere.

#### SITUATION ON THE EVENING OF THE 24TH AUGUST AND INTENTIONS FOR THE 25TH.

The strength of the enemy who had been encountered up to date was estimated by First Army Headquarters to be about two or three divisions. On this day also, the enemy had violently resisted the IIIrd and IVth Corps, but had then given way before the strong pressure of the First Army and fallen back in the direction of Curgies and Bavai. The picture of the situation on the enemy's side was completed by English and French orders which were picked up. It was inferred that the whole of the English expeditionary force was before us, in the area between Valenciennes and Maubeuge, and would accept battle. The IInd Cavalry Corps had dispersed a French infantry brigade at Tournai, but had met no stronger force elsewhere. For the present, therefore, the right wing of the Army appeared to be in no danger.

The Second Army was known to have inflicted a decisive defeat on the enemy opposed to it on the 24th, and to be continuing its victorious attack.

General von Kluck now hoped to strike his decisive blow at the English Army on the following day, and therefore ordered the attack to be continued on the 25th. The IVth and IIIrd Corps were to cross the line Onnaing-Angres-Athis at 5 a.m.. The IXth Corps was to cover the attack against interference from Maubeuge, and to assist the IIIrd Corps according to the situation. The IInd Corps, which had on this day occupied Condé, was to move through the Forest of Raismes and round the south-west side of Valenciennes, and then attack the enemy's left flank. The IVth Reserve Corps had also reached its destination for the day, Ligne; moving through Basècles, its advanced guard was to arrive at Condé at 9 a.m., where it was to remain at the disposal of the Army Commander.

General von der Marwitz was instructed to lead the cavalry round to the rear of the English and to cut off their retreat to the west.

The section dealing with the situation of the B.E.F. on the 22nd and 23rd August is not of great interest. In its main features it appears to agree with our own account.

The German view of the situation on the 25th August may be quoted more fully.

#### THE 25TH AUGUST.

The reports received by German Headquarters at Soignies during the night created the impression that the English were trying to escape towards Maubeuge, but they gave no indication of the degree of confusion prevailing among them.

Towards 8 a.m. General von Kluck ordered the Army to continue its march to the south, with the object of cutting off the retreat of the English Army and of the French wing which was retreating further to the east.

The supposition on which these measures were based turned out during the course of the day to be erroneous. According to reliable reports, strong hostile forces were retreating by Bavai on Le Cateau, while weaker forces were retreating through Solesmes to the south-west.

In order to overtake and bring them to action, the right of the IVth Corps was now directed on Solesmes, and the IIInd Corps to the west of that place. General von der Marwitz was ordered to get ahead of the enemy and to stop him without fail. The IXth Corps was to blockade the north-west front of Maubeuge, the IVth Reserve Corps to advance through Valenciennes.

Generally speaking, the attempt to reach the enemy on this day proved unsuccessful. General von der Marwitz was able to repulse some French Territorial troops at Bouchain, and to force some English columns north-west of Solesmes, that were retreating on Cambrai, to turn away to the south. Towards evening, the 8th Division came up with hostile forces at Solesmes. The latter offered a determined resistance, and could only be forced to abandon the place in the night.

For the 26th also Army Orders demanded long marches, so as to give the enemy no rest. The pursuit was to be continued on the whole in a south-westerly direction, the right wing passing by Cambrai, the left by Le Cateau, while the IXth Corps continued to perform the duty of protecting the left flank against the French fortress of Maubeuge.

The following passages from the final section appear to be of interest :—

Throughout the account, illustrations of the "dash of the cavalry" are conspicuous by their absence. During the morning of the 23rd, the cavalry did discover that Obourg, Nimy and St. Ghislain were strongly held, and that weaker detachments were in the villages and woods north of the canal. When this information was obtained is not stated; the impression one gets is that it was rather late. The

advanced guard of the 5th Division, for example, was halted peacefully by the roadside near Baudoir when Tertre, one and a-half miles in front, was found to be occupied. Similarly, the attempt to reconnoitre in advance of the 6th Division, does not appear to have been undertaken until the division itself was close up. Of the work done by the divisional cavalry of the IVth Corps no account is given.

#### CONCLUSION.

It was a "Victory" that the First Army won over the English, however artfully the English accounts may seek to minimize German successes. It was a victory, although it brought about no decision, and although the trophies and the number of prisoners were not enough to dazzle the eyes of untrained spectators. In order rightly to appreciate the success it is necessary to consider the circumstances, and especially the consequences.

The fact that the English Commander-in-Chief ascribes the "very heavy losses which the British troops have sustained in the great battle" to the circumstances that "only two days after its concentration from the railway the British Army was confronted with the task of withstanding the attack of five German corps" is the best proof of the soundness of General von Kluck's action in forcing the opponent to accept battle as early as the 23rd August.

The English commander did indeed succeed in escaping in time from the threatened envelopment. But the hasty retreat did more than the great losses in killed, wounded and prisoners, to shake the steadiness of the troops. Field-Marshal French was therefore unable, even during the following days, to pull his forces together sufficiently to offer a determined resistance. On the 26th August the English escaped total destruction only by the narrowest margin, so that the Field-Marshal, in his report, describes this as "the most critical day of all."

The success of the battle of Mons did not consist only in the actual fighting. The attacks by the 12th and 8th Grenadiers, by the 84th, and other regiments, were indeed brilliant achievements on the part of the German infantry, whose peace training was thereby splendidly vindicated. The daring of the gunners who cleared the way for the assaulting infantry, and the dash of the cavalry, were admirable. But victory was won, not alone on the 23rd, when the enemy's determination to resist, as yet unimpaired, was broken, nor on the 24th, when the English rear-guards were overcome. The victory was founded on the rapid execution of the enveloping operations of the First Army, by which the plan for the co-operation of the allied armies—Belgian, English and French—was frustrated. By means of the surprising advance and the ruthless attack the individual portions of the hostile army were caught in the act of deployment and thrown into disorder. Field-Marshal French, on the other hand, had already resigned the hope of victory when he took up his position at Mons, and thereby allowed his action to become dependent on the will of his adversary.

## THE VIIth GERMAN RESERVE CORPS AT THE AISNE, SEPTEMBER 10th-15th, 1914.

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*The following account of the action of the VIIth German Reserve Corps at the Battle of the Aisne is taken from the recent book of General Von Zwehl ("Maubeuge—Aisne—Verdun"). The author at the time commanded this corps, which was opposed to the British Ist Corps during the fighting in September, 1914.*

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### INTRODUCTION.

WHILE the fate of the German offensive against France was being decided on the Marne, the VIIth Reserve Corps, which originally formed part of the Second German Army, had been left behind to besiege Maubeuge. Operations against this fortress commenced on 27th August, and the garrison capitulated on the 7th September. The VIIth Reserve Corps was then placed under the command of the Seventh Army, the headquarters of which had just been transferred from Lorraine to Belgium, and it was intended at first to despatch the corps to the latter area. On 9th September, however, Von Zwehl was ordered to leave behind a detachment to guard the prisoners and booty taken at Maubeuge, and to advance on La Fère; moving by Avesnes, the corps reached the area of Guise on the evening of 11th September, and was continuing its march along the valley of the Oise on the morning of the 12th, when it received orders from Seventh Army Headquarters, now at St. Quentin, to change direction towards Laon. This was done and on the evening of the 12th the heads of columns of the VIIth Reserve Corps lay just south of the line of the Serre River, east of La Fère.

The first accurate news of the situation on the fighting front was given to Von Zwehl on this evening in the Second Army's orders for the day. From these it appeared that the German right wing was in position behind the line of the Aisne—the First Army from Vic to Vailly, the Second from north-west of Reims along the Vesle to Thuizy. The VIIth Corps of the Second Army, in position near Fismes, and the IInd Cavalry Corps around Troyon, were endeavouring to fill, as best they could, the wide gap of twenty-five miles between the First and Second Armies. The enemy was known to be moving northwards, on the roads from Château Thierry and west of it, and his cavalry had been encountered in the area Braisne—Fismes. The orders for the VIIth Reserve Corps were to advance on Laon, which was to be reached on the evening of the 12th.





Reserve Division) and Cerny-en-Laonnois (14th Reserve Division). These instructions were approved by General Von Heeringen, G.O.C. Seventh Army, whom Von Zwehl met in the suburbs of Laon; but barely had the troops moved off when a new order was received from the Second Army, directing the corps to advance at once on Berry-au-Bac and deal with hostile forces threatening to envelop the Second Army's right north of Reims.

Von Zwehl decided, after some reflection, that to endeavour to carry out these instructions would involve too much loss of time, and that his presence was more necessary on the right of the First Army, which was also menaced by the advance of three hostile columns across the Aisne between Bourg and Beaurieux. He therefore decided to adhere to his original plan, and to let his troops continue their march. By 3 p.m., the 13th Reserve Division had reached its assigned post around Malval Farm and established connection with the VIIth Corps, on the left of the First Army, around La Royère Farm.

The advance of the 14th Reserve Division to its assigned position around Cerny-en-Laonnois was, however, delayed by the necessity of circling its left flank against a passive advance by the enemy (parts of the French XVIIIth Corps) from the direction of Pontavert, from which they had just expelled units of the VIIth German Corps. Accordingly, the 28th Infantry Brigade was despatched to Corbeny and the heights of Craonne and Craonnelle, where it took position early in the afternoon, shelling strong forces of British and French cavalry which were observed moving eastwards in the vicinity of La Ville-aux-Bois. About 4.30 p.m. the hostile infantry assailed this position in front, covered by artillery fire from the woods east of Oulches and south of Craonne, but were repulsed after getting to within 500 yards of the German line. An enveloping attack against the left flank of the brigade, however, made serious progress; Corbeny was lost and its defenders forced back into the woods to the west; but though a serious assault was expected none was delivered before nightfall.

Meanwhile the 27th Reserve Brigade, further to the west, had advanced to the Chemin des Dames ridge, from which the 25th Landwehr Brigade and the IIInd Cavalry Corps were falling back in some disorder, and taken position around Cerny-en-Laonnois. At about 5.30 p.m. their front was felt by British patrols and dismounted cavalry, but no actual attack took place.

On the front of the 13th Reserve Division also everything was quiet and the infantry entrenched themselves undisturbed on the crest on either side of Malval Farm.

From reports received it appeared that hostile forces were pushing forward to the Aisne against the front of the First Army, and that in the sector of the VIIth Reserve Corps, from Chavonne eastwards, infantry held the river crossings and cavalry were advancing towards the crest of the Chemin des Dames. The main effort of the enemy, however, seemed to be directed north-eastwards, by Pontavert on Guignicourt.

The present intention of Von Zwehl was to hold the line he at present occupied, from Malval Farm by Cerny-en-Laonnois to north of Craonne. Any idea of an offensive seemed out of the question, in view of the fact that the corps was dispersed over a front of eight and a half miles, that a wide gap of three miles existed in its front between Cerny-en-Laonnois and Hurtebise Farm, and that its left flank was seriously menaced. However, at 7.30 p.m., Von Zwehl heard that the IIIrd Corps on his right was preparing an attack for the morrow, and at 10.30 p.m. orders were received from the Seventh Army, which informed him that the XVth Corps, now detraining at Laon, would attack next day down the Reims high road, in order to secure the right front of the Second Army and regain the line of the Aisne east of Pontavert. The VIIth Reserve Corps and the IInd Cavalry Corps, then in position about Chermizy, with detachments on and to the east of the Laon—Reims high road were to hold their ground till the arrival of the XVth Corps and then join in its attack.

#### THE BATTLE OF 14TH SEPTEMBER.

Between 6 and 7 a.m. the French XVIIIth Corps opened its attack against the positions of the 28th Reserve Infantry Brigade, north and west of Craonne. The latter suffered heavily from artillery and infantry fire, which grew every moment heavier; its artillery, which was well forward, was soon overwhelmed and it proved impossible to bring away all the guns, which were put out of action; one complete battery was thus lost and two guns of another. At about 1 p.m. the brigade commander, seeing his positions swept from front and flank and lacking sufficient artillery to hold down the enemy's fire, issued instructions for a retirement on Bouconville. The artillery took up a position north of that village to cover the withdrawal of the infantry, which fell back about 3 p.m., and assembled in their new position. Behind it, near Ployart, stood the 9th Cavalry Division; the remainder of the IInd Cavalry Corps was engaged further to the east with strong hostile forces which had penetrated as far as Amifontaine, and were obviously striving to effect a break-through between the First and Second Armies.

The 27th Reserve Infantry Brigade, which had only three battalions at its disposal, was also attacked from 6 a.m. onwards. The 1st British Division, advancing astride the Vendresse—Chamouille road, pushed vigorously forward, seized the sugar factory south of Cerny and captured part of the 16th Reserve Regiment, and the guns of a battery. Reinforcements drawn from all available sources were thrown in; the lost guns were recovered and the position held. The situation, however, remained highly critical; the brigade several times reported that it could not hold its ground, but was informed that it must do so at all costs. Some support was afforded by two batteries of mortars, which came into action south of Chamouille; but the only available reserve at Von Zwehl's disposal consisted of the three exhausted battalions of the 25th Landwehr Brigade, and these had continually to be put in on

the left wing of the 27th Reserve Infantry Brigade, to meet the advance of hostile infantry and cavalry which crossed the Chemin des Dames ridge north of Paissy, and were only checked west of Ailles. At 1.30 p.m. the British attack was renewed but failed to make much progress, losing heavily from the fire of the mortars in the valley of the Ailette. Shortly before this hour the XVth Corps had come into action on the left of the VIIth Reserve Corps, and was attacking Corbeny with its leading division; the other was put into line further eastwards, so that a gap of some three miles still existed between the two corps and gave rise to continued anxiety. Fortunately, about 4 p.m., reinforcements reached Von Zwehl in the shape of the two battalions which had been left behind at Maubeuge; both were placed at the disposal of the 14th Reserve Division, and being fresh and in good fettle, somewhat relieved the strain of the situation.

No attack took place in the morning on the front of the 13th Reserve Division, although British infantry were known to be in movement. Preparations were being made for an advance on Moussy, in conjunction with the IIIrd Corps on the right, when about 10 a.m. a report was received that the 14th Reserve Division on the left was being heavily pressed. The 25th Reserve Infantry Brigade was therefore ordered to advance on Cerny—Troyon, against the flank of the British 1st Division; the attack on Moussy being postponed for the moment. The three battalions of this brigade advanced with their left on the Chemin des Dames, but lost heavily from enfilade fire from the south, and after maintaining themselves against it for some time, were compelled to retire to their former positions. The brigade commander was mortally wounded, and the other casualties were high. Fortunately the British did not seize the opportunity and penetrate into the gap between the 13th and 14th Reserve Divisions.

At 11 a.m. the 20th Reserve Infantry Brigade observed that the IIIrd Corps, on its right, was attacking, and at 2 p.m. it was ordered to advance on Moussy; it pushed forward as far as Bray, and was there held up, and finally returned to its former line after darkness had fallen. The IIIrd Corps' attack had also failed. On the other hand, the XVth Corps on the other flank had successfully occupied Aizettes and Corbeny, and the IInd Cavalry Corps reported that the enemy cavalry who had penetrated to Amifontaine had been driven back south-westwards.

The position then, on the evening of 14th September, was as follows: Of the VIIth Reserve Corps, the 28th Reserve Infantry Brigade held the crest north of Bray, with the 25th Reserve Infantry Brigade on its right, south of Courteçon; the 27th Reserve Infantry Brigade was still around Cerny; the enemy holding the sugar factory and the ridge eastwards, facing the 25th Landwehr Brigade on the northern slope, west of Ailles. The 28th Infantry Brigade was assembling north of Bouconville; from this point a wide gap existed as far as Corbeny, which was held by the XVth Corps.

The orders for the 15th were that the positions should be fortified and held.

## THE EVENTS OF 15TH SEPTEMBER.

The day passed quietly along the corps front. The enemy seemed disinclined for further attack, and in view of the wide extent of front held by his troops and the exhaustion of many units, Von Zwehl considered it prudent to remain on the defensive. The 28th Infantry Brigade was drawn in towards Ailles to regain touch with the remainder of the corps and form a united line, and it was reported that the right flank of the Second Army was some six miles north of Reims and that a detachment held Guignicourt; the XVIIIth Corps was expected to arrive on the morrow to strengthen the line in this sector. So far as the VIIth Reserve Corps was concerned the battle was over.

## REMARKS.

On the evening of 12th September the Allies held the line of the Vesle from Braisne and Fismes eastwards, while the VIIth Reserve Corps had only just crossed the Serre. Had the former been in a position to push forward as rapidly as the latter, the encounter between them must have taken place just south of Laon; and the First and Second German Armies would have been cut off from each other, and the German front broken. The exertions of the VIIth Reserve Corps succeeded in averting this catastrophe. The long marches effected (twenty to twenty-five miles on 10th and 11th September and close on forty miles between dawn on the 12th and dawn on the 13th), were highly creditable to it, as weather conditions were bad and the men, being largely reservists, unused to such great efforts. Moreover, the corps was considerably outnumbered and outgunned on the actual battlefield; for it put into line only nineteen battalions (11,000 rifles) and fourteen batteries, as against the twenty-four battalions and twenty-six batteries of the British 1st Corps alone, apart from the forces of the French XVIIIth Corps. Moreover, the action of the commander of the 14th Reserve Division, in sending the 20th Infantry Brigade to guard his flank on the heights of Craonne resulted in the splitting up of the available forces without any compensating advantages. Had all the troops been under one head in the Chemin des Dames, it might have been possible to carry out an attack in conjunction with the left of the First Army and throw the British back on the Aisne.

In any case the VIIth Reserve Corps had played its part well in the battle by bringing to a stand the attacks of the enemy in the most critical sector of the front. Its losses between 13th and 15th September amounted to 175 officers and 4,207 men—about a third of its total strength before the battle. All the guns lost during the course of the fighting were eventually recovered.

## THE BATTLES BETWEEN ARRAS AND SOISSONS IN AUGUST, 1918.

(Extracted from GENERAL VON ZWEHL'S "The Battles of the Summer of 1918 on the Western Front.")

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ON 24th July General Foch assembled the leaders of the Entente armies and imparted to them his views as to the future course of operations. Now that the Allies could count on a moral and numerical superiority over their enemies, the time for the offensive had arrived. Five attacks with limited objectives and at short intervals were to be taken in hand: (a) the offensive on the Marne, to free the Paris—Avrincourt railway (already in progress), (b) an attack to free the Paris—Amiens railway, (c) the elimination of the St. Mihiel salient, (d) the recovery of the French coal mining area in the north, (e) the liberation of the Belgian coast. It seems improbable that the recovery of these shattered railway lines could really have been the object of these offensives, which must have and should have had as their main purpose the infliction of losses on the German Army.

The second of these five operations, the most important, and as it turned out the most fateful of the war, was undertaken to envelop the salient Albert—Villers Bretonneux—Montdidier from two sides, and it was intended later to widen the area of attack on either flank to a front of some 100 miles. Tanks which broke through the German front lines and sowed disorder in their rear, were to prove once more the deciding factor—a factor which the strain on German industrial resources and perhaps an under-estimation of its true importance rendered it impossible to counterbalance. Low flying aeroplanes also co-operated in, and greatly assisted, the Allies' infantry attacks.


On 8th August, under cover of mist and smoke, which rendered useless the anti-tank guns of the defence, the Canadians and Australians broke into the German positions astride the Amiens—St. Quentin (Roman) road; the attack then spread to the whole front between the Ancre and the Avre. The XIth Corps and the 51st General Command, which held this front, were forced back some ten or eleven miles astride the Roman road as far as Foucaucourt, where counter-attacks stayed further retreat. North of the Somme and south of the Luce the retirement was less extensive, and the attack got forward only some one to six miles in these sectors. The concentration of the hostile tanks was skilfully carried out, but certainly the troops of the 51st General Command might have been expected to inflict on them greater damage than they actually did during the advance; it seems that the defence was surprised and demoralised by the rapid progress of the attack along the Roman road and that certain units were entirely cut off by tanks



exploiting their first success to the south. British cavalry attempts to complete the break-through, however, proved in vain.

At the end of the day the Germans held the line Morlancourt—Chipilly—Vauvillers—Rosières—Hangest—Contoire.

The morning of 9th August saw only partial attacks, which gave the Allies possession of Le Quesnel and Hangest with little trouble;



while another small advance took place to Assevillers, south of Montdidier. Probably this last was due to the initiative of some subordinate. In the afternoon the British renewed their offensive and forced the Germans back to the line east of Morlancourt—Proyart—Meharicourt—

Rouvroy—Saulchoy. In order to straighten the line, the troops north of the Somme were drawn back further for a short distance.

The Allied success had been considerable, as at the end of the second day's fighting they had penetrated to a depth of some fourteen miles astride the Roman road, captured most of the German heavy artillery in that area, and taken the first step towards the elimination of the salient menacing Amiens.

The second phase of the battle now began, and it was decided by the Eighteenth Army that the salient south of Montdidier should be evacuated before it could be attacked; thus on the night of 9th August the front was drawn back to the line Etelfay—Orvillers—Marest, and the French attack on the 10th proved a blow in the air. Whether it would not have been wiser to extend the withdrawal to the whole front between Arras and Noyon, and to have fallen back first to the line of the Somme, and then to the Siegfried line, is worthy of consideration; but it seems that the German Higher Command was not as well informed as it might have been either about the real power of resistance of its own troops or about the strength of the Allies. The latter had put into action since 15th July no less than fifteen divisions from overseas (four Canadian, four Australian, one New Zealand,<sup>1</sup> and six American), and yet others were to be expected.

The Allies pursued their advantage, pressing forward at various points along the whole front, and extending their large scale attacks to both banks of the Oise against the Eighteenth and Ninth Armies. On the west bank they made little headway, but on the east they drove the Germans back some three to four miles on 19th and 20th August, and at the same time gradually forced the Eighteenth and Second Armies eastward to the general line Roye—Bray—Albert. Following on this the battle spread to the Seventeenth Army front around Bucquoy from 21st August onwards. Ten British divisions, four tank battalions and a light tank company saw their attack brought to a stand on the line of the Moyenneville—Miraumont railway, to which the advanced German troops fell back. A general counter-offensive on the 22nd forestalled the British, but led to no gain of ground; it seems unwise to have attempted it, especially as the Allied advance was resumed on 23rd and 24th August in such strength as to force the Seventeenth Army to give up further ground. Pressure at the same time continued severe on the Ninth Army front between the Oise and the Aisne, and on 26th August the 1st Bavarian Reserve and IIInd Bavarian Corps on the right wing of the Seventeenth Army east of Arras were in their turn assailed and driven back for some little distance astride the Scarpe. By 30th August the German front had been either forced back or withdrawn to the general line Biache—east of Bapaume—Combles—Péronne—the Somme—east of Nesle—Noyon—the Oise to Chauny—Coucy Le Château—north of Soissons. The battle continued to rage along this front of eighty miles; the Allies, in making full use of their great superiority in numbers, pressed hard on both flanks of the German line, exploited every success however small,

<sup>1</sup> The New Zealand Division only came into action on 21st August.

and fed the battle with continual reinforcements; ten divisions were employed against the Seventeenth Army alone, and its right wing south of the Scarpe was especially severely handled.

Accordingly on 2nd September at noon the German High Command issued orders for that Army to commence its retirement to the Siegfried line the same night; the other armies were to follow in succession. The Allies followed them up with due caution but stubborn rear-guard fighting took place here and there. On 7th and 8th September the Germans were standing in the Siegfried position on the general line Arleux—St. Quentin—La Fère, and thence to Condé and Vailly. The Seventh Army of the Crown Prince's group fell back from the line of the Vesle behind the Aisne—a position which offered good security against tanks but was commanded by the crests to the south.



## GERMAN SUPREME COMMAND ORDER OF THE 28th AUGUST, 1914.

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WITH reference to the series of Orders of the German Supreme Command published in the November, 1920, number of this JOURNAL (pp. 756-763), an interesting amplification of that of the 28th August is given by General von Kuhl in his book "Der Marnefeldzug: 1914," p. 92. He gives the following addition to the first paragraph of the "Directions" ending "to facilitate a Russian offensive":

"After the evacuation of the line of the Meuse, the northern and centre groups of the Franco-British Armies may again offer resistance behind the Aisne, their extreme left wing probably advanced to about St. Quentin—La Fère—Laon, and their right west of the Argonne about Ste. Menehould. Their next line will probably be the Marne, their flank resting on Paris. It is possible also that a force may concentrate on the Lower Seine. The situation on the French southern wing is not yet cleared up. In order to relieve the pressure against their northern wing and centre, the enemy may again take the offensive into Lorraine. Even should this wing of the French be withdrawn, it will make constant efforts to outflank the German Armies from the south, based on the fortress-triangle Langres—Dijon—Besançon, or assemble a force there with which to resume the offensive."

The hope of fighting a decisive battle in Lorraine, which Moltke had had in mind from the outset of the campaign, was not yet dead, in spite of the expensive failure of the Sixth Army to force the Charmes gap on the 24th-26th August. Empty rolling stock, sufficient to carry six corps, lay ready near the Rhine from the 23rd August to transport the greater part of the Sixth and Seventh Armies to reinforce the German right wing, but Moltke still played with the idea of breaking through the French eastern barrier, and thus enveloping both the French flanks simultaneously. He therefore kept the Sixth and Seventh Armies intact in Lorraine instead of following Schlieffen's conception of a right wing as strong as possible. Schlieffen centred his whole efforts on one decisive battle about Paris; Moltke now attempted to win two simultaneously at the extreme ends of the battle-front, in Lorraine and about Paris. His numerical superiority was insufficient for such an ambitious project and he lost both.

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## NAVAL NOTES.

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### GREAT BRITAIN.

#### THE INDUSTRIAL CRISIS.

The period from 1st April to 30th June, covered by the following Notes, was one of industrial disturbance within the country, which naturally had its influence on the life and work of the Royal Navy. Following the decision of the Triple Alliance to proclaim a general strike in support of the claims of the miners, who had ceased work on 1st April, the Government decided to mobilise the Reserves. A supplement to the *London Gazette* was issued on Friday, 8th April, containing five proclamations, calling out respectively Class "B" of the Royal Fleet Reserve, the Army Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, and continuing soldiers in the Army service and Air Force service. That calling out the Fleet Reserve referred to "the state of public affairs and the demands upon our naval forces for protection of the Empire" as the occasion for the step. All men of Class "B" of the R.F.R. were to proceed to their depôts at once without waiting for individual summonses from the registrars. Should train services be interrupted and make it impossible for Reservists to travel thereby, they were to report themselves to (1) naval recruiting authorities at the principal cities; (2) officers in charge of coastguard stations; (3) commanding officers of H.M. ships which might be at ports round the coast; or (4) the police, should it prove impracticable to report to any of the above.

Supplementary Navy Estimates were issued on 12th April, providing for an additional 25,000 officers and men beyond the number already voted for the year, thus bringing the revised total to 148,700 officers and men. On the report stage of this vote, in the House of Commons on 2nd May, Colonel Amery, the Admiralty Secretary, said that it was the duty of every subject of the Crown to assist the constituted authorities in maintaining the law against any body of men who wished to break it. All the more was it the duty of those citizens whose discipline and training specially qualified them for the task. There was no question of intervention in the strike itself. Again and again when there had been trouble the most easily available force for supporting the law had been used for that purpose.

At the same time that the Reserves were called up, all leave in the Navy was stopped. The Atlantic Fleet had returned but a few days from its spring cruise to the coast of Spain, and the first watches of its vessels had proceeded on fourteen days' leave, but were recalled. On 6th April there was a distribution of the vessels to emergency stations from which they would be in a position to assist the civil authorities in case of need. Thus the "Valiant" proceeded to the Mersey, as she had done in the coal strike of 1920 and the railway strike of 1919; the "Warspite" went to Greenock, the "Delhi" to Cardiff, the "Dunedin" to the Humber, the "Dauntless" to Avonmouth, the "Verity" and "Whitshed" to the Tyne; the "Barham," "Winchester," "Ready," "Rosalind," and "Rob Roy" to the Clyde, and so on. Movements of men, apart from ships, included the bringing to London of a number of stoker and other technical ratings who were capable of working at the power stations in case of necessity; these men were for the most part accommodated at Chelsea Barracks. A force of Marines was also allotted duty at the Admiralty building in London, and precautions against sabotage were taken at the dockyards and arsenals.



In the early days of the mobilisation a number of naval officers and men were encamped in Kensington Gardens. Here, on 21st April, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty inspected the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Brigade, composed of officers and men from the battle-cruiser "Repulse" and battleship "Royal Oak," before they left to return to their ships. Captain A. D. P. R. Pound, C.B., of the "Repulse," received Lord Beatty, and afterwards informed the battalion that the First Sea Lord had expressed his entire satisfaction with the reports of their work and behaviour. In the first week of May the Admiralty published the following extract from a letter received from Lieutenant-General Lord Cavan, commanding-in-chief, Metropolitan area:—"Now that all detachments of the Royal Navy have left my command, I should like to put on record my appreciation of their excellent behaviour throughout. The minor difficulties of mastering the Army system of feeding were quickly overcome, the camp was well pitched and struck, and the ground left perfectly clean. It has been an honour and pleasure to command the naval detachments, and I beg to thank their Lordships most respectfully for the loyal help that the Royal Navy has afforded me." Lord Cavan on 13th May reviewed the Naval Brigade, which had been encamped at Aldershot for ten days. The review was held in Long Valley, and the brigade paraded in three battalions.

On 2nd May Captain R. N. Bax, C.B., commanding the battleship "Royal Sovereign," in reserve at Portsmouth, and Captain Oliver Backhouse, C.B., a naval member of the Ordnance Committee, were lent from their respective duties to be Commodores, 2nd Class, to command the Naval Brigades at Aldershot and Tidworth. Paymaster Lieutenant-Commander W. H. Medd, O.B.E., was appointed Secretary to Commodore Backhouse, and Paymaster Lieut.-Commander M. M. F. Condé Williams, O.B.E., Secretary to Commodore Bax. The Admiralty approved the payment of command money to officers of the Royal Navy specially appointed to command the battalions organised in consequence of the emergency, captains R.N. to receive 7s. a day, and commanders R.N. 5s. a day. Entertaining allowance was not payable in addition. As regards the men, an order stated that Royal Fleet Reservists called up would be excused drill for 1921, and that those who were already exempted from such drill under monthly order No. 65, of 1921, and who subsequently completed fourteen days' mobilised service during the emergency, would be further exempted from drill for 1922.

The demobilisation of the Royal Fleet Reserve, Class "B," commenced on 3rd June, by which time the Defence Force specially recruited was considered adequate for all purposes for which it might be required, thus rendering the retention of Army, Navy, and Air Force reservists no longer necessary. It was not, however, until the end of the month that vessels of the Fleet were able to resume their normal routine, and leave was again granted to their crews. On 30th June, writing from the "Queen Elizabeth" at Portland, to the Mayor of Torquay, to inform him that some of the Atlantic Fleet ships would visit that place during the summer, Admiral Sir Charles Madden said:—"It is desirable that no official entertainments be offered to officers or men, since the recent industrial troubles have delayed the exercise programmes of the fleet, and it is necessary to devote as much time as possible to further them."

#### NAVAL COMMANDS AND APPOINTMENTS.

There were no changes in the composition of the Admiralty Board during the quarter, but certain other changes both in the Naval Staff and in the Technical and Administrative Departments were announced. On 21st May it was announced that Vice-Admiral Sir Morgan Singer had been appointed Admiral Commanding the Coastguard and Reserves, in succession to Admiral Sir Dudley De Chair, to date 23rd July. On 13th June the appointment was approved of Rear-Admiral Maurice

S. Fitzmaurice to be Director of the Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiralty Naval Staff, in succession to Rear-Admiral Hugh F. P. Sinclair, to date 15th August. The last-named officer was selected to be Rear-Admiral of the Submarine Service, in succession to Rear-Admiral Douglas L. Dent, to date 25th August. Four other flag officers who received appointments on 8th and 9th June were the following:—Rear-Admiral Lewis Clinton-Baker, to be Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, in succession to Rear-Admiral Sir Hugh Tothill (15th November); Rear-Admiral E. B. Kiddle, to be Admiral-Superintendent of Chatham Dockyard, in succession to Rear-Admiral Lewis Clinton-Baker (28th September); Rear-Admiral Crawford MacLachlan to be Rear-Admiral and Senior Naval Officer, Yangtse, in succession to Rear-Admiral G. H. Borrett (17th October); and Rear-Admiral John Luce, to be Rear-Admiral-in-Charge and Admiral Superintendent of Malta Dockyard, in succession to Rear-Admiral B. H. F. Barttelot (1st November). On 2nd June the appointment was announced of Captain R. W. Glennie to be Assistant Hydrographer of the Navy, to date 1st August.

Changes among the civil officers of the Navy during the quarter included the appointment, announced on 15th April, of Mr. Conrad J. Naef, formerly Deputy Accountant-General, to be Accountant-General of the Navy, in succession to Sir Charles Walker, who was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Admiralty. At the same time, a reorganization and regrading of the higher staff of the Secretary's Department was carried out, as a result, it was stated, of the report of the Joint Committee of the Civil Service National Whitley Council, dated 17th February, 1920. Sir Vincent Baddeley, formerly Assistant Secretary, became First Principal Assistant Secretary. Mr. A. Flint, who was known as Acting Staff Assistant Secretary, became Principal Assistant Secretary. Mr. W. J. Evans, formerly Acting Assistant Secretary, was also graded as a Principal Assistant Secretary, with the title of Director of Establishments. The officials formerly known as Principal Clerks were regraded as Assistant Secretaries; those known as Assistant Principal Clerks became Principals; and those known as Clerks became Assistant Principals. In reply to a question on 15th June, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty said:—"A Deputy Secretary to the Admiralty has been appointed, and a new post of Director of Establishments has been created, as part of the scheme of reorganization adopted for all first-class departments, with a view to more efficient financial control, and particularly to carry out the Government's decision that the Permanent Secretary and his staff are to be charged with enlarged duties and responsibilities in regard to such control. The duties of the Deputy Secretary are to assist the Secretary in his new financial functions, and to relieve him of much of his administrative work. The salary of the Deputy Secretary is £2,200, and that of the Director of Establishments £1,200, rising to £1,500, and the present rates of bonus are £500 and £750 respectively. The increased cost involved by the various changes referred to is £2,300 in respect of salaries and £435 in respect of bonus."

On 19th May the appointment was announced of Mr. A. W. Smallwood, formerly Deputy Director of the Contract and Purchase Department at the Admiralty, to be Director of Greenwich Hospital, in succession to Mr. C. H. R. Stansfield, to date 15th July.

At the Admiralty, on 27th May, Mr. Balfour made a presentation to Sir W. Graham Greene of the latter's portrait in oils, on the occasion of his retirement from the Civil Service. The portrait, by Mr. R. E. F. Maitland, was hung in this year's Royal Academy. Sir Graham Greene had been forty-two years in the public service, and for sixteen years from 1887 he was private secretary to successive First Lords. He was appointed Assistant Secretary in 1907, and Secretary of the Admiralty in 1911. In August, 1917, on the invitation of Mr. Churchill, he became Secretary of the Ministry of Munitions.

## DEATHS OF FLAG OFFICERS.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Knyvet Wilson, V.C., died on 25th May, at his home, Beech Cottage, Swaffham, Norfolk, from congestion of the lungs, at the age of seventy-nine. The funeral took place at Swaffham on 30th May, when the King was represented by Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville. A memorial service was also held in Westminster Abbey, attended by Lord Lee, the First Lord, and many Admirals. To Miss Wilson, sister of Sir Arthur, the King sent the following message:—"The King is grieved to hear of the death of Sir Arthur Wilson, and assures you of his true sympathy in your sorrow. In your brother the King and the whole nation have lost a man of outstanding character, and a most distinguished and gallant sailor." It is proposed to erect a memorial to the Admiral of the Fleet in Swaffham Parish Church, which he loved so well, and in which he unveiled, only two months before he died, a memorial window and tablet to ninety men who fell in the war.

Admiral Sir Edmund Poë died suddenly at Saint Raphael on 4th April, of angina pectoris. He retired in September, 1914, after more than fifty-one years' service.—Rear-Admiral Sir R. Massie Blomfield, who was for nearly thirty years in the Egyptian service, and of whose labours there the great harbour of Alexandria is a lasting monument, died on 26th June, in London. He chose to be buried at Stevenage, Herts, where his father was rector for many years; and the first part of the funeral service was held in St. Martin-in-the-Fields, Trafalgar Square, the Admiralty church whose connection with the Royal Navy the Admiral investigated and wrote a monograph upon.—At Haslar Hospital, on 1st May, the death occurred of Rear-Admiral Henry M. Doughty, who only a few days previously had hauled down his flag in the battleship "Resolution," on ceasing to be Rear-Admiral of the First Battle Squadron of the Atlantic Fleet. The funeral took place at Haslar on 5th May, with naval honours.

## DUTIES OF THE NAVAL STAFF.

On 22nd June there was issued as a Parliamentary Paper (Cmd. 1343) a document showing the "Distribution of the Duties of the Naval Staff." It was prefaced by the following note:—"The detailed information contained in this Paper is furnished in fulfilment of an undertaking given by me in the House of Lords on 4th May, 1921.—L. of F." The following is a statement of the general distribution of Naval Staff duties:

*First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.*—All large questions of naval policy and maritime warfare. Organization, distribution, and fighting and sea-going efficiency of the Fleet. Advice as to, and general direction of, operations of war. Internal organization and general direction of the work of the Naval Staff and the co-operation of the Naval Staff with the material side of the Admiralty. (To be kept informed of all important matters by the D.C.N.S. and A.C.N.S.)

*Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (D.C.N.S.).*—Naval intelligence—its collection and utilization for naval operations; and superintendence of Naval Intelligence Division. Principles of training of the Navy in combatant and staff duties, and superintendence of Training and Staff Duties Division. All operations and movements of H.M. ships and co-operating aircraft, including auxiliary craft. Consideration of strategic policy, and plans relating to such operations. Distribution of the Fleet as affecting operations and movements. Dates of refits and repairs (in conjunction with Controller). Strategic aspect of land and wireless telegraphy. Policy in relation to sea-borne trade and maritime transport. Maritime international law.

*Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (A.C.N.S.).*—Methods of fighting at sea generally. Tactical investigation. Requirements of design of vessels and material in relation to policy and tactics. Signalling in connection with tactics and weapons, Fleet practices, co-ordination and standardization of methods. Staff questions dealing with research and experiment. Air development in relation to naval warfare.

#### NAVAL OCCURRENCES.

**H.M.S. "CARDIFF."**—On 31st March a presentation of silver plate from the people of Cardiff was made at the Admiralty to the commander and officers of the light cruiser "Cardiff," for use on board as a memento of the distinction of the vessel in heading the line to receive the surrender of the German Navy. The Lord Mayor of Cardiff at the time, Alderman Kirk, Mr. J. C. Gould, M.P., and other representatives of the city were present at the ceremony.

**APRIL "NAVY LIST."**—The official quarterly "Navy List" for April contained lists of officers and men of the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, etc., who hold decorations or medals. These lists, formerly published in each quarterly issue, have not been given, on the score of economy, since January, 1920; but they will appear in future annually in the issue for April.

**MARITIME LEAGUE DISSOLVED.**—On 1st April the Imperial Maritime League, of which Lord Willoughby de Broke was president, ceased to exist. The League was founded in 1907. Its dissolution was decided upon at a meeting at which the cause was stated to be lack of public interest, and the offices in Westminster Palace Gardens were closed forthwith.

**OPTIONAL RETIREMENT.**—By an order of 2nd April the rules for the optional retirement of officers at the age of forty, adopted in July, 1919, remain in force for the present. They were to be reconsidered after eighteen months' working, with a view to some limit being placed on the numbers allowed to retire annually; but no such limit is yet necessary.

**ROYAL MARINE DISCHARGES.**—Another order of 2nd April reopened the system of discharge by purchase in the Royal Marines. The strength of this corps in the current year is 14,837, as compared with 16,577 in the previous year and 18,585 in 1914.

**DRY DOCKINGS IN THE WAR.**—On 6th April Mr. Amery stated in the House of Commons that the number of individual dry dockings of battleships and battle cruisers of the Grand Fleet from 4th August, 1914, to 11th November, 1918, was 254. The reasons were:—Grounding, 4 battleships; collision, 7 battleships, 3 battle cruisers; mining, nil; torpedoing, 1 battleship; gunfire, 3 battleships, 4 battle cruisers; other reasons, such as refits, fouling propellers, etc., 179 battleships, 53 battle cruisers. Totals, battleships, 194; battle cruisers, 60.

**NEW CAPITAL SHIPS.**—On 6th April Mr. Amery announced that the dimensions of the slips at the royal yards are at present not adequate for the construction of capital ships of the new type. The question of the time and cost of alterations to enable this construction to be undertaken at the royal yards is being investigated, and the results of the inquiry will be taken into consideration when the time arrives to place orders for the new ships. It is, in any case, unlikely (said the Admiralty Secretary) that the Admiralty will be in a position to place orders for three months. On 15th June the Secretary informed Viscount Curzon that H.M.S. "Queen Elizabeth" represents the largest type of vessel which could be constructed at present on a slip at Portsmouth Dockyard.

**OSBORNE CLOSED.**—In the week ending 9th April the last cadets left the Royal Naval College at Osborne, and on 20th May the grounds and buildings passed under the charge of the Admiral Superintendent at Portsmouth on the College ceasing to be a separate establishment. There were 165 cadets in the last Osborne term, and these passed on to Dartmouth in May, when the total there was 589. Dartmouth was built in 1904-5, to accommodate 600 cadets, and during the War as many as 535 were under tuition there without inconvenience. The present total will gradually decline, owing to reduced post-war entries, and in May, 1922, will be 480.

**PORTUGUESE UNKNOWN WARRIOR.**—For the funeral in Lisbon of the Portuguese Unknown Warrior on 9th April, the light cruiser "Cleopatra," Captain the Hon. Arthur Stopford, C.M.G., and the United States cruiser "Chattanooga," Captain L. A. Cotten, represented their respective navies. The military representatives included Marshal Joffre, General Diaz, and General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

**MIDSHIPMEN'S SEA CHESTS.**—From an order early in April it seemed that the time-honoured sea chests of midshipmen in the Royal Navy, referred to by Marryat and other writers, would soon disappear. The Admiralty announced that it is under consideration to adopt chests of drawers, "pattern 335 (modified as necessary)" for the use of midshipmen, warrant officers, and others who are not provided with cabins.

**KING GEORGE'S MARINE FUND.**—The two King George Prize Scholarships to officers of the Royal Marines for the year 1921 were awarded in April to Captain (brevet Major) Harold C. Harrison, D.S.O., R.M.A., and Captain Cuthbert H. Coode, R.M.L.I., who receive £50 each while studying at the Military Staff College, Camberley. The fund from which these scholarships are granted was subscribed in the coronation year of King George, by subjects of His Majesty in all parts of the Empire who bore the Christian name "George."

**NEW H.M.S. "BROKE."**—On 15th April the Admiralty ordered the flotilla leader "Rooke," completing at Portsmouth, to be renamed "Broke," thus perpetuating in the "Navy List" the name of a famous frigate captain, and also of a vessel which, in company with the "Swift," fought the successful engagement with German destroyers in the Dover Straits on the night of 21st April, 1917. The former "Broke" was sold to Chile in 1920.

**COASTAL MOTOR BOATS.**—On 19th April Commander C. C. Dobson, V.C., D.S.O., and other officers of the coastal motor-boat branch were appointed to the new C.M.B. base at Haslar, to which the headquarters of the branch are now transferred. The base at Osea Island, erected in 1918-19, at a cost of nearly a quarter of a million, is in process of being given up.

**NAVAL VOTERS.**—An Admiralty order on 20th April pointed out that difficulties had arisen from some naval voters having claimed registration in respect of their residence in a naval establishment, instead of the address for which they would have been registered but for their naval service. Under the naval procedure, said the order, it is not intended that members of the naval forces should be registered in respect of an actual residence qualification in naval shore establishments, but only for the addresses at which they would have been resident but for their naval service.

**BRITISH WAR MEDAL.**—The Admiralty have decided that service in a post-armistice operation area which qualifies for the award of clasps to the British war medal shall also be considered as qualifying for the award of the medal itself, provided that twenty-eight days' service was rendered in the area in respect of which the medal is claimed.



**MORE BOYS IN THE FLEET.**—During April an unusually large number of boys and youths left the training establishments, and difficulty was experienced in drafting them at once to seagoing ships. Among the measures therefore taken was an increase of the maximum number of boys carried in certain classes of ships. Fifty more were sent to the battleship classes in full commission, from the "Royal Sovereign" to the "King George V." types inclusive, or 100 to those with three-fifths' complements. The "Hood" took 65 more, and the "Repulse" and "Tiger" 50 each, while light cruisers took from 10 to 30 each, according to type. No additional boys were sent to the East Indies, on account of the climate.

**PROMOTION TO LIEUTENANT.**—It was announced on 27th April that the Admiralty desired to begin as early as possible selections for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant, under M.O. 4017/18, of those commissioned officers from warrant rank who, in certain specified branches, were eligible for earlier promotion by selection, in conjunction with seniority, subject to passing educational and professional tests. Up to the date mentioned, however, only four officers had qualified, and all these belonged to one branch. As they had had harbour appointments and exceptional opportunities to qualify, the Admiralty ruled that they were not to be considered for promotion before those serving at sea had also had fair opportunities for taking courses and passing the necessary examinations. Arrangements were therefore made for candidates belonging to the gunnery, boatswain, or signal branches to be given courses as early as possible, so that promotions might be commenced on 31st December if the number then qualified justifies a selection being made.

**FLOTILLA CHANGES.**—On 1st May the new Sixth Destroyer Flotilla of the Atlantic Fleet was formed, under the command of Captain S. J. Meyrick, in the "Shakespeare." This was the first of a series of changes carried out in May and June, by which, instead of having three flotillas, each composed of two leaders and sixteen destroyers, the Atlantic Fleet had six flotillas, each of one leader and eight destroyers. The Mediterranean Flotilla was renumbered the Sixth, and a new Ninth Flotilla was formed in reserve at Port Edgar, Firth of Forth, with two-fifths complements.

**DIRECTIONAL WIRELESS.**—The transfer to the Post Office of the Admiralty stations for position-finding by means of directional wireless, announced in the First Lord's Memorandum, is being carried out gradually. One station, that at the Lizard, is to be retained by the Navy for development and research work.

**JAPANESE VISIT.**—Ships of the Atlantic Fleet took part in the welcome, at Portsmouth, to the Crown Prince of Japan on his arrival on 7th May. A division of destroyers, headed by the "Spenser," Captain H. T. Walwyn, D.S.O., met the battleships "Katori" and "Kashima" in the English Channel, and escorted them to Portsmouth Harbour. The visiting ships saluted the British flag with twenty-one guns, which was returned by the shore batteries. The "Queen Elizabeth," "Royal Oak," and other ships in harbour were dressed over-all, and hoisted the Japanese ensign. As soon as the visiting ships had moored, the British vessels in port fired a salute of twenty-one guns, the Japanese national anthem was played, and seaplanes circled round the fleet and over the town. Admiral Sir Charles Madden entertained the Crown Prince and his suite to luncheon in the "Queen Elizabeth" on 8th May, and in the evening the Prince of Wales arrived to welcome His Imperial Highness, who proceeded to London next day.

**THANKS TO ROYAL NAVY.**—In Navy Orders on 10th June there was published a telegram received from the Japanese Minister of Marine, expressing gratitude for the cordial welcome given to His Imperial Highness and to the Japanese Third Fleet at the British stations at which they touched en route to England, and also

on their arrival. "His Imperial Highness," said the message, "having now brought to a close a visit which has given him the greatest of pleasure, I, on behalf of the Imperial Japanese Navy, desire to express to you, and through you to the Royal Navy, my warmest thanks, and to express the hope that the friendship existing between the two navies may continue to become closer and closer."

**MINELAYING DESTROYER.**—On 13th May the destroyer "Telemachus," in reserve at Devonport, was ordered to be attached to the Atlantic Fleet for minelaying duties, and the "Tower," in reserve at Chatham, to be attached to the Atlantic Fleet for towing coastal motor-boats. On 10th June the appointment was announced, to command the "Telemachus," of Commander H. Taprell Dorling, D.S.O., of the Plans Division, Admiralty, which officer commanded the vessel on minelaying duty in the North Sea and Heligoland Bight in 1917-18.

**PRINCE AT DARTMOUTH.**—On 18th May the Prince of Wales visited the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth, in the course of his tour in the West Country, and inspected the cadets. It was ten years since he had himself been a cadet at Dartmouth, and, recalling this in his speech, he said that "having had to file in quite often for divisions, and been called upon to listen frequently to what we termed 'pi-jaw,' I am not going to make the mistake of inflicting a long speech upon you." After lunch the Prince watched a cricket-match, played squash rackets, and had a swim, all of which he enjoyed, and at 7 p.m. he left by motor for Princetown.

**ADMIRAL SIMS IN ENGLAND.**—Admiral William S. Sims, U.S.N., arrived at Liverpool on 23rd May, on board the "Cedric," which was met forty miles out by the British destroyers "Venturous" and "Vendetta." Captain F. Martin Leake, D.S.O., R.N., was appointed in attendance on the Admiral during his stay in England. Admiral Sims had the honour of lunching with the King at Buckingham Palace, and with the Pilgrims' Club. He visited the Royal Tournament at Olympia, the Royal Naval College at Greenwich, and the House of Commons, where the Navy Group, under Admiral Sir R. Hall, M.P., entertained him. He also paid a week-end visit to his old colleague at Queenstown, Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, at Ermington, Devon, and on the Saturday evening was entertained at dinner by the Commander-in-Chief at Devonport, Admiral Sir Montague Browning. One of the chief reasons for his visit, however, was to receive the honorary degree of LL.D. at Cambridge, on 1st June, when the Prince of Wales received a similar honour. On 7th June there was a luncheon of the English-Speaking Union. Before leaving in the "Olympia" from Southampton, on 15th June, the Admiral said: "I have enjoyed my visit to this country very much indeed, and shall look forward to returning."

**THE ROYAL TOURNAMENT.**—At the Royal Tournament at Olympia, from 19th May to 4th June, the special event was a pageant of the Royal Marines, "Neptune's Soldiers," showing the origin and progress of the sea regiment up to the present day. It was produced by Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Peel, C.M.G., R.M.L.I., and Captain J. S. Hicks, R.M.L.I., of the Naval Intelligence Division, assisted by Mr. Edward Fraser, of the Admiralty Library. In a letter to the *Times* on 10th June, General A. F. Gatliff, Royal Marines, stated that the Tournament had been a greater financial success than last year, a result due to the patriotic citizens of London, as the train service restrictions prevented the usual influx of visitors from the provinces.

**" CERES " AT TUNIS.**—On 19th May the light cruiser "Ceres," Captain H. O. Reinold, arrived at Tunis on a visit. This was the first time since Tunisia had been a protectorate of France that a British warship had entered the harbour, and a cordial welcome was accorded the officers and men, a special celebration being arranged for them in honour of Empire Day.

**SHEERNESS MEMORIAL.**—In the Dockyard Church at Sheerness, on 27th May, the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas, unveiled a bronze tablet in memory of the 1,070 officers and men of the Royal Navy who lost their lives in the internal explosions which destroyed the battleship "Bulwark" and the mine-layer "Princess Irene" on 26th November, 1914 and 27th May, 1915, respectively. The tablet was dedicated by Archdeacon C. W. C. Ingles, the Chaplain of the Fleet.

**RESERVE OFFICERS.**—On 28th May the Admiralty issued the revised regulations for the entry and training of officers of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. The new organization came into force at once, but did not apply to the Reserve Forces in the Dominions. Periods of training, both obligatory and voluntary, were increased to meet the new post-war conditions, and the courses were remodelled to enable officers to specialise. Certain new ranks, including engineer ranks in the R.N.V.R., were introduced.

**SALE OF WARSHIPS.**—What was described as the biggest deal of the kind ever made was concluded in May between the Admiralty and Messrs. T. W. Ward, Ltd., of Sheffield, for the breaking up of 113 warships. These included five battleships, six cruisers, six light cruisers, three flotilla leaders, 72 destroyers, 13 torpedo-boats, and eight monitors. The provisional price was at the flat rate of £2 10s. a ton, and amounted to about £600,000.

**CANADIAN NAVAL CRUISE.**—The active squadron of the Royal Canadian Navy, consisting of the light cruiser "Aurora" and the destroyers "Patriot" and "Patrician," commanded by Captain Henry G. H. Adams, C.B.E., R.N., left Esquimalt at the beginning of June, to return to Halifax, having been on the Pacific coast since the early part of the year. On the return voyage it was to call at Astoria, Portland (Oregon), San Pedro, Acapulco, Salina Cruz, Puerto Culebra or Punta Arenas, Panama, Colon, Kingston (Jamaica), and Bermuda.

**HAULBOWLINE CLOSED.**—On 2nd June Haulbowline Dockyard was closed down, and the workmen discharged. Although it was announced in the First Lord's Memorandum accompanying the Estimates that the closing of the yard would take place during the financial year 1921-22, the event itself came rather as a surprise. On the previous night an explosion had occurred on board the destroyer "Trenchant," which was under repair, and caused a certain amount of damage to her boiler and plates.

**BRIGADIER-GENERALS ABOLISHED.**—An Admiralty order of 3rd June stated that, in consequence of the abolition of the rank of brigadier-general in the Army as from 1st January, 1921, the rank of brigadier-general, Royal Marines, had been abolished as from the same date. Colonels commandant, R.M., will continue to hold the relative rank of commodore. Since 14th October, 1913, these officers at the Royal Marine Divisions and Depôt had been granted temporary rank as brigadier-generals.

**"EFFINGHAM" LAUNCHED.**—On 8th June the light cruiser "Effingham" was launched at Portsmouth Dockyard by Lady Salisbury. This was the first public launch seen in the yard since the "Queen Elizabeth" was put afloat in 1914. The ship took the water beautifully, and after the ceremony Rear-Admiral Sir Edwyn and Lady Alexander Sinclair entertained a large party at luncheon at the Admiral Superintendent's residence.

**SOMALILAND CLASP.**—The King has been pleased to approve of the African general service medal, with a clasp, "Somaliland, 1920," being granted to those officers and men who served in H.M. ships "Odin," "Clio," and "Ark Royal," and in the Royal Naval Medical Contingent accompanying the expedition, during

the operations in Somaliland from 21st January to 12th February, 1920, provided their claims are approved by the Admiralty.

**MEDAL RIBBON CHANGE.**—To preserve distinction between the Distinguished Service Cross and the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal, when the ribbon only of either decoration is worn, the ribbon of the latter has been altered to white, with narrow blue edges. Formerly the ribbon of both medals was exactly the same—blue, white, and blue in equal proportions.

**SAFETY OF THE "VICTORY."**—At the annual meeting of the Society for Nautical Research held at the Royal United Service Institution on 15th June, Admiral the Marquess of Milford Haven stated that the "Victory" was likely to sink at her moorings. As the Admiralty had no funds with which to preserve her, he thought that something would have to be done privately, and it was agreed to obtain estimates of probable cost. It was suggested that a cement or steel casing round the hull might be made.

**ADMIRALS IN PARLIAMENT.**—On 16th June Rear-Admiral Murray F. Sueter, C.B., was returned as Member of Parliament for East Hertfordshire, in the vacancy caused by the retirement of Mr. Pemberton Billing. He is the third flag officer to be elected to the present Parliament, the others being Rear-Admiral T. B. S. Adair and Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall.

**LAUNCH OF THE "OLNA."**—On 21st June the Royal Fleet auxiliary "Olna," an oil-carrier of 10,000 tons capacity, was named and launched at Devonport Dockyard by Mrs. Underhill, wife of the Admiral Superintendent. The "Olna" is built on the Isherwood system, under the Board of Trade and Lloyd's requirements, and is the first large oil-tanker to be built at a Government yard since the War.

**NEW ZEALAND NAVY BOARD.**—On 24th June the Admiralty announced that a Naval Board had been constituted for the Dominion of New Zealand. The regulations issued by the Governor-General provide that the Board shall be composed of the Minister of Defence (president) and the following members:—The Commodore commanding the New Zealand Station, as First Naval Member; the Chief Staff Officer to the Commodore, as a temporary member until such time as the Commodore vacates the command of the "Chatham," or other ship relieving the "Chatham"; and the Secretary to the Commodore, who is appointed Secretary to the Board. The officers now holding these posts are Commodore Alan G. Hotham, C.M.G., Captain Thomas A. Williams, C.B.E. (who is a native of New Zealand), and Paymaster-Commander John Siddalls, O.B.E.

**Functions of the Board.**—The new Naval Board, which is similar to that in Australia, except that the latter has also an engineer rear-admiral as Third Naval Member, is charged with the control of all matters relating to the Naval Forces, of which it has executive command, on the policy directed by the Minister. The Governor-General may delegate to the Board the functions, and commission it to execute the office, of Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces. The Board is to meet weekly, or as may be directed by the Minister, or, in his absence, by the Senior Naval Member of the Board present. Two members constitute a quorum, and orders are to be issued over the signature of the Secretary or other official authorized to act for him. All decisions which involve a matter of policy, or important principle, or new expenditure, are to be submitted for Cabinet approval.

## FOREIGN NAVIES.

**SUBMARINES BUILT AND BUILDING.**—Mr. Amery, in the Parliamentary Debates, gives particulars of submarine craft at present built or building by the various

**Powers.** The numbers for the principal countries are:—Great Britain, 92 built and 8 building; France, 49 (including 4 condemned) and 5; Italy, 51 and 0 (4 projected); Japan, 24 and 15; Russia, 36 and 22; United States, 107 and 41. The figures for Great Britain and Italy exclude vessels which have been ear-marked for disposal.

#### FRANCE.

**NEW PROGRAMME.**—On 10th June the Chamber of Deputies adopted, by a vote of 468 to 128, the whole of a new naval programme. This provides for the construction of 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo-boats, 36 submarines, and the conversion of the battleship "Béarn" into a plane carrier. The Committee considered that the ships mentioned should be laid down during 1921, 1922, and 1923. The total approximate cost was 1,416,000,000 francs (£56,640,000 normal), of which 168,000,000 francs (£6,720,000 normal) would be required for the torpedo-destroyers. The Committees of the Ministries of Finance and Marine were agreed that Parliament should be asked for the present to vote credits for the first instalment of the programme—that is to say, for the laying down during 1921 of 3 light cruisers, 6 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, 12 submarines, and for the conversion of the "Béarn."

**No New Battleships.**—At the discussion which took place on 10th June, the official report emphasized the fact that the French were a pacific nation, and there was not so much need for warships for offensive purposes as for coast defence. It enumerated the battleship strength of Italy, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, and said: "Whatever efforts she might make, France could not keep up with the naval developments of Japan, Great Britain, and the United States." Regarding Germany, the committee was convinced that France had nothing to fear from these developments, provided she was sufficiently determined in her insistence upon the execution of the Treaty. Consequently, their report advocated the abandonment of the construction of battleships which, "according to the opinion of the great foreign experts, were too vulnerable to submarine attacks."

#### GERMANY.

**THE NEW NAVY.**—The semi-official *Marine Rundschau* has just published particulars of the new organization of the German Navy in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty. It remarks that the period of ruin which destroyed the old Navy is passing away, and that a new situation had been developed. The following summary is taken from *The Times* of 8th June, 1921:—"The National Assembly, on April 16, 1919, decreed the organization of a future German Navy, and on March 19, 1921, many changes and decisions in relation to the Wehrgesetz were adopted, and will now come into force. 'The foundation-stone has been laid upon which hopes may be built.' By virtue of the Wehrgesetz of March 23 promulgated on the 31st of the same month, the whole of the forces, military and naval, are to be brought under a single organization. The defensive forces of Germany are the Reichswehr, which is composed of the Army (Reichsheer) and Navy (Reichsmarine)."

**FLEET DISTRIBUTION.**—The arrangements have been completed for the division of the Fleet between two seas. The naval commanders-in-chief are at Wilhelmshaven and Swinemünde, each controlling the sea forces respectively in the North Sea and the Baltic, and they will fly their flags afloat. Rear-Admiral Zenker has been selected for the North Sea Command, and Commodore Freiherr von Gagen for that in the Baltic. Kiel has been reduced to a captain's command. The formations are, as yet, rudimentary. In the North Sea it is intended to organize a squadron composed of the "Braunschweig" (flag), "Elsass," and "Schlesien,"



with the cruisers "Hamburg," "Arcona," and "Amazone," and the second flotilla, including six destroyers and six torpedo-boats, but the "Hamburg" alone is in commission. She will soon be joined by the "Arcona," and the flagship will be commissioned later in the year. A beginning has been made with the flotilla. In the Baltic the battleship "Hannover" (broad pennant of the commodore) is in commission, with the cruiser "Medusa," and the first flotilla, composed of six destroyers and six torpedo-boats. The cruisers "Thetis" and "Berlin" will join shortly, but dates for the two other battleships, "Hessen" and "Schleswig-Holstein," are not known. The object is evidently to organize the Fleet progressively, with the objects of showing the flag, creating the sea spirit afresh, and training and disciplining the men. The long-continued social unsettlement in Germany has impeded the work. The men are now all volunteers, and are attracted by good pay. The unsatisfactory elements have been discharged, and the new men are reported to show a good spirit. For the most part they have been formed into military organizations for disciplinary purposes, and many of them were sent to Silesia and elsewhere.

**DOCKYARD CHANGES.**—The former Imperial dockyards have undergone great changes. The great establishment at Kiel has been taken over by a limited company, the Deutsche Werke A.G., for commercial shipbuilding and general industrial work, only a small portion being retained as an "arsenal." The only naval dockyard is that at Wilhelmshaven, but the greater part of that establishment is employed in building cargo and fishing vessels. Some members of Parliament were agitated by the news that a light cruiser was to be added to the German Navy. She will be built at Wilhelmshaven, strictly according to the Treaty, displacing not more than 6,000 tons, and will replace a vessel which has already exceeded the prescribed age.

#### UNITED STATES.

**NAVAL BILL.**—The Naval Appropriation Bill passed the Senate on 1st June, with a total of 494 million dollars (£99,000,000 at par), and included Senator Borah's amendment calling upon President Harding to summon a conference of representatives of the United States, Great Britain and Japan to consider disarmament. This the President did on 10th July, approaching with informal but definite inquiries the group heretofore known as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, to ascertain whether it would be agreeable to them to take part in a Conference at Washington.

**NAVY COMMANDS.**—On 21st June the appointments were announced of Vice-Admiral H. P. Jones to be Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, and of Rear-Admiral E. W. Eberle to be Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. The former relieved Admiral H. B. Wilson, who was appointed Superintendent of the Naval Academy, and the latter Admiral Hugh Rodman, who became Commandant of the Fifth Naval District. Several other changes in commands were made at the same time.

**PRACTICE CRUISE.**—On 4th June the annual cruise of the midshipmen of the Naval Academy, except the Second Class, began. The Naval Academy practice squadron consists this year of the "Connecticut," "Kansas," "Michigan," "Minnesota," and "South Carolina," commanded by Rear-Admiral C. F. Hughes, and the programme provided for a cruise by way of the Azores and north of Scotland to Christiania, Norway, and thence to Lisbon and Gibraltar, and across to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The cruise was to last three months.

**"CINCINNATI" LAUNCHED.**—The light cruiser "Cincinnati," the third of the vessels of the "Omaha" class, was launched on 23rd May, at Tacoma. The second of the type, the "Milwaukee," was launched at the same place two months earlier, as noted last quarter.

## MILITARY NOTES.

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### GREAT BRITAIN.

**R.A.M.C. War Memorial.**—The amount contributed to this memorial to the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Royal Army Medical Corps who were killed in action, or died, during the Great War was, on the 1st April, £19,328, of which £1,566 was earmarked by donors for families and dependents of the fallen.

**Precautionary Measures in the Event of Civil Disorders.**—On 5th April, in consequence of the threatened strike by the Triple Alliance, all leave was stopped in the Home Forces and all officers and men then on leave were recalled.

On 8th April the Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons the creation of emergency units, called "Defence Units," for service in England, Scotland and Wales.

The Army Reserve having been at this date called out for permanent service, loyal citizens between the ages of 18 and 40 (except officers), including those serving in the Territorial force, were invited to join the Defence Force except those—

(a) Belonging to any other branch of His Majesty's Service.

(b) Employed on Government service.

(c) Serving in the Police Forces.

The Defence Units on formation formed part of the Regular Army.

**New T.F. Reserve of Officers.**—Towards the end of April it was decided to form a new Territorial Reserve of Officers comprising two classes, one of officers fit for general service and the other for service at home, or garrison duty abroad.

**Royal Military College War Memorial.**—On 5th May the Archbishop of Canterbury dedicated the new East End at the Royal Military College Church, Sandhurst, as a memorial to some 4,000 past Sandhurst cadets who fell in the Great War.

The memorial embodies general, regimental, brigade memorials as well as a memorial to officers of the Indian Army. The last-named takes the form of oak panelling in the Sanctuary with the names of fallen officers, and forty-five regiments of the British Army have contributed their own regimental panels, while the Brigade of Guards, the Rifle Brigade, the 5th Fusiliers and the Hampshire Regiment are also giving memorial windows, and the Loyal Regiment have contributed the marble paving of the chancel. The names of the whole of the 4,000 former cadets who fell in the War will be inscribed on the interior of the Church.

**Promotion from the Ranks.**—Towards the end of May arrangements were in progress for a substantial increase in the number of commissions granted in Corps other than the Educational Corps, but for the present candidates from the ranks will be commissioned only in the Cavalry, Infantry and R.A.S.C. (Since January, 1919, 103 commissions have been granted, of which 98 were commissions in the Army Educational Corps.)

Candidates, if in all respects suitable, will be required to undergo a course of training of about one year's duration at an Officers' Cadet School—the first course will commence in April, 1922, and in subsequent years in January. To begin with the number of candidates will be 60, the maximum age in 1922 being 24, and in 1923, 23.

*Demobilization of Army Reserve.*—On 2nd June it was announced that the Army Reserve, which was called up on 8th April last for service in the emergency created by the coal stoppage, was to be demobilized forthwith, as the Defence Force was sufficiently trained and organized to undertake without further assistance such special duty as might be required of it in the preservation of public order.

*Imperial Troops in the East.*—At the beginning of June the number of troops employed in the East were:—

	British.	Indian.
Constantinople ... ..	5,200	5,500
Egypt ... ..	13,800	3,200
Palestine ... ..	4,400	10,800
Mesopotamia ... ..	10,000	50,000

(including troops withdrawn from North-West Persia in May).

*Army Council Change.*—From the 18th June, the Army Council will consist of ten members instead of eleven, the office of Surveyor General of Supply having ceased to exist.

#### IRELAND.

Till 25th May the incidents of the rebellion in Ireland did not seem to call for notice in these notes, as the record of murders, ambushes of Crown Forces and attacks in superior numbers on police barracks by members of the Irish Republican Army could not be regarded as military operations, but as acts of desperadoes relying chiefly on assassination as their *modus operandi*.

However on 25th May the seizure and burning of the Custom House in Dublin in broad daylight marked the commencement of a more serious phase in the struggle between Sinn Fein and the Government. At 1 p.m. on that day some hundreds of Republicans entered the Custom House, held up the staffs, and having imprisoned them in the cellars, set fire to the building with bombs and petrol. Soldiers and police were rushed to the scene and a fierce fight developed in which seven civilians were killed, ten or eleven wounded, and over 100 taken prisoner. Six auxiliary policemen were wounded. The Custom House was completely destroyed by fire.

On 27th May all communication with Queenstown by wire ceased through the wires—including the cables to Haulbowline Dockyard—being cut.

On 28th May it was announced that the Cabinet had decided to send large reinforcements of troops to Ireland, and a proclamation was issued by Vice-Admiral Gaunt and Major-General Strickland prohibiting motors or any mechanically propelled craft in Cork Harbour or approaches or on any part of the coast of Clare, Limerick, Kerry, Cork, Waterford, or Wexford.

On 31st May the rebels electrically exploded a land mine under a party of the Hampshire Regiment, with their band, as they were marching near Youghal. Six of the party were killed (two of whom were band boys) and twenty-one wounded—five seriously. Four of the wounded were band boys. Throughout May the ambushes of patrols in the country and the bombing of military and police in Dublin by the rebels were of almost daily occurrence.

From the beginning of June the attacks on Police Forces were intensified—thus:—

2nd June. A district inspector and three policemen were murdered in Co. Kerry and a patrol of seventeen R.I.C. was ambushed in Co. Mayo by about 100 rebels—the police casualties being a district inspector, a sergeant and five constables killed, and four constables seriously wounded. The patrols' arms and ammunition were captured and two tenders and one touring car were burnt. On

the same date in Co. Tipperary a party of twelve police cyclists and sixteen others in cars were ambushed near Borrisokane by 200 rebels. Seven constables were killed and a sergeant and four constables wounded.

8th June. Crown Forces were engaged in a big round-up of rebels in the South, where concentration of the I.R.A. had been reported. In the Millstreet district of Cork troops with aeroplanes as scouts, made an encircling movement over a wide area and encountered a large party of armed volunteers. After a brisk fight three rebels were killed, twelve wounded, and over 100 captured with full equipment. The Military casualties were slight.

12th June. As a sequel to rioting during the afternoon Sinn Feiners commenced sniping from windows in the York Street district, Belfast. The sniping was kept up during the whole morning of 13th June, and Royal Irish Constabulary and Special Constables who arrived in armoured lorries were heavily fired on. Military armoured cars subsequently were brought up and kept down the sniping with machine gun fire. Later during the 13th June, firing broke out in other parts of Belfast.

14th June. Sinn Fein gunmen opened fire from concealed positions in Belfast on workmen going to the dockyards—trams were stopped and strings of loaded cars had to wait for opportunities to run the gauntlet. Police entered the danger zone, and after a hot fight drove off the concealed gunmen. In Dublin also attacks were made on troops and police during curfew hours, and on the 15th June heavy fire was directed on the sentries on the Custom House from the south side of the Liffey at 11 p.m. Military and police in lorries, and armoured cars, were rushed to the spot, and machine gun fire was opened on the rebels, the surrounding streets being swept with bullets. The fighting lasted till midnight.

Earlier during the 15th June a party of the Royal Scots travelling by train between Limerick and Ennis were stopped by an obstruction on the line near Meelick, where rebels were in ambush. After clearing civilian passengers out of the train, the officer in command backed it towards the rebels. A sharp fight ensued, two civilians being killed and four taken prisoner.

*Seizure of Machine Guns in New York.*—On 15th June Customs officials in New York seized 510 Thompson machine guns and large quantities of ammunition in the coal bunkers of the steamer "East Side" due to sail for Ireland. These Thompson guns are the latest product of the Colt factory, are many pounds lighter than the Service rifle, and fire a .45 bullet at the rate of 400 a minute.

16th June. A patrol of twenty-five auxiliary police in lorries going from Banteer to Millstreet, Co. Cork, was attacked by between 200 to 300 rebels who were in ambush between Laught and Rathcoole. The road had been mined and three, of the four, lorries in the convoy were put out of action, 2 cadets were killed and four wounded. The fight lasted for three hours till 10 p.m., when the rebels withdrew.

In consequence of the increase of murders of officers and members of Crown Forces the Government, by the 23rd June, decided to reinforce the troops in Ireland by ten battalions.

24th June. A troop train conveying a party of 113 men and 104 horses of the 10th Hussars—part of the King's escort in Belfast on the 23rd—was blown up by a mine laid by rebels on the line from Belfast to the Curragh. Three soldiers and the guard of the train were killed and many horses killed and injured. Civilians running away from the scene were fired on and two were shot dead and others captured.

28th June. A party of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry was ambushed near Tulla, Co. Clare. One officer was dangerously, and three soldiers slightly wounded. On the same day a party of the King's Regiment was also ambushed at Gortnacoola near Bantry but repulsed the assailants.

30th June. A force of auxiliary police surprised a number of rebels lying in ambush in Co. Armagh. Two rebels were killed and one wounded—rifles and shot guns were captured.

# INDIA.

*North-West Frontier.*—On 2nd April it was officially announced that roving Mahsuds attacked a British convoy at Rogha Kot in the vicinity of Wana on 17th March and were dispersed—one British officer and four Indian troops were killed, and four Indians wounded.

On the same day a picket of twenty-six Punjabis was ambushed by Mahsuds near Jandola and five of the Punjabis were killed.

On 22nd March 100 Mahsud raiders attacked a camel convoy at Mazziani Kirriward and got away with fifty camels; three days later Mahsuds attacked picketting troops belonging to the 4th Battalion (Royal Garhwal) Rifles near Piazza Ragzha, east of Ladha. The British rear-guard commander was wounded and sixteen Indian privates were killed and twenty wounded.

At the end of March, in consequence of the recent growth of sniping and attacks on convoys in the Wana and Mahsud areas, British aircraft bombed the Mahsud capital of Makin.

Four heavy and 150 light bombs were dropped and 1,800 rounds of small arm ammunition fired at various targets, causing heavy damage and loss to the tribesmen, who dispersed in various directions. Makin was entirely evacuated.

Early in April severe fighting took place in the Wana and Mahsud areas as the result of the reappearance of the Afghan adventurer, Abdur Razak, who had organized levies consisting of Waziri and Mahsuds.

On 6th April Rogha Kot was captured by the 2/41st Dogras, who, however, were subsequently driven back, but Rogha Kot was re-occupied on the 8th April by a column under Lieut.-Colonel Nicolay.

On 10th April sharp fighting took place in the Mahsud country—the British casualties being twenty-six killed (including one British officer) and twenty-four wounded. The British force began fresh operations on 11th April.

On 23rd April about 300 Mahsuds under Musa Khan attacked two passing convoys at Piazza Ragzha. The British losses were heavy—killed, one British officer and seven Indian other ranks; wounded, four British and two Indian officers and twenty-six Indian other ranks. Three hundred camels were killed or wounded. A column from Ladha arrived on the scene next day.

On 24th April a picket was ambushed near Saidgi (where a week before a detachment of Sikhs was ambushed, losing eight killed) and lost nine killed and seven wounded.

A Simla message of 29th April stated that the raiders who had been active in the Zhob area recently had been severely punished, three movable columns, at Haidarzaï, Sabakzaï, and Fort Sandeman, were watching the Zhob area, aeroplanes co-operating.

*Indian Frontier Casualties.*—The casualties incurred by British forces in the operations which have been almost constantly in progress on the North-West Frontier from early in January, 1919, to the end of April of this year amounted to 5,169 killed, or died of wounds or disease, 3,474 wounded, and 829 missing—a total of 9,472.

*Strength of Tribesmen.*—On the 23rd May the "Pioneer" stated that the frontier tribes within the Durand line can call out 400,000 fighting men far better equipped and trained than in the days before the war, possessing some 120,000 modern rifles and able to fight under conditions limiting the effective use by their adversaries of the heavier engines of modern warfare.



By 10th June the resistance of the Waziristan tribesmen was gradually breaking, although the Mahsuds continued their sniping tactics up to the end of that month.

**Indian Army Reductions.**—During April and May the reorganization of Indian Cavalry Regiments, involving the reduction of pre-war regiments from thirty-nine to twenty-one, was in progress on the three-squadron basis and on non-silladar lines. The reductions were being carried out on different lines to those contemplated in Great Britain, viz., in India, regiments with a distinguished record were not disappearing altogether as in this country, but were being linked in pairs. Towards the end of May the disbandment of the Indian infantry regiments raised during the war was nearly complete, forty infantry and pioneer battalions having been already disbanded, while twenty-two others will complete disbandment within the next few months. Further, the number of Indian troops employed abroad will be reduced by half.

**Military Council.**—In May the Military Council, formed in conformity with the recommendation in the Esher report, began sitting—the Secretary being Lieut.-Colonel E. W. Lascelles, 3rd Dragoon Guards.

**Indian Territorials.**—A new Territorial Force scheme, based on the Militia system, was originated at the end of June, a start being made with six provincial battalions, each affiliated to a regular regiment.

#### SOUTH AFRICA.

**Defence System.**—The proposals of the Government for the reorganization of the Defence System were embodied in a Defence Bill which provided for the establishment of a permanent military force of all arms of 2,500 men, the annual cost of which is estimated at £800,000. During the current financial year the number of batteries will be brought up from three to five. A regiment composed of three squadrons of mounted riflemen is to be formed, and the headquarters of an Air Force with one squadron, consisting of three flights of six aeroplanes each, will be constituted, leaving to the following year the establishment of a fourth squadron of mounted riflemen and a new regiment of five squadrons of dismounted riflemen, also a second air squadron.

**Fight with Native Fanatics.**—On 24th May a fight occurred between a body of native fanatics led by the Prophet Enoch and a force of 800 Police under Colonel Truter. These fanatics, who called themselves Israelites, had camped on Government ground at Bullhoek near Queenstown and refused to take orders from any Government authorities unless Enoch declared that such orders had the sanction of Jehovah God of Israel.

On the arrival of the Police the Israelites were called upon to surrender but refused and delivered a fierce attack with stabbing assegais, some getting to close quarters. They were, however, beaten off with a loss of 199 killed or died of wounds and 125 wounded.

#### ARABIA.

**The War in the Yemen.**—On 16th May it was reported from Aden, through Cairo, that the Imam Yehia of Senaa, in the Yemen, had captured Jebel Burraa, south-east of Bajil, in the Tehama.

#### GERMANY.

**German Disarmament.**—In the Bavarian Diet, on 31st May, Herr von Kuhr announced the decision of the Bavarian Government not to disarm or disband the Einwohnerwehr. The British Government thereupon made a categorical statement to the Bavarian Government that, in respect of disarmament, no concession to Bavaria was possible any more than to the rest of Germany, under the terms of the Allies' ultimatum.

On 6th June the Einwohnerwehr decided voluntarily to disarm before the end of the month.

[In April the Einwohnerwehr consisted of 320,000 men who disposed of 240,000 rifles, 2,780 machine guns, and 44 pieces of light artillery.]

By the 25th June the equipment of the fortresses of Kustrin, Glatz, Neisse, Glogau, Loetzen, and Marienburg had been surrendered, and the Kiel and Heligoland coast defences had been razed. The German Government also, on that date, issued a proclamation dissolving the Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria, the local and frontier defence forces in Prussia, and the organization Orgesch.

*Upper Silesia.*—At the beginning of April the withdrawal of British troops (see JOURNAL OF R.U.S. INSTITUTION for May, 1921) began.

On 3rd May armed Polish insurgents marched into Beuthen-Beuthen and occupied the principal squares and street crossings; later in the day French troops also occupied the same crossings. In Kattowitz the insurgents commenced indiscriminate shooting, whereupon the French occupied the Friedrichsplatz and railway station.

In Tarnowitz there was also wild shooting by the insurgents who were engaged by French cavalry and dispersed.

On 4th May reports from Warsaw stated that the insurgents had occupied the districts of Pless, Rybnik, Beuthen, Kattowitz, and Tarnowitz.

[The cause of the outbreak appears to have been the dissatisfaction of the Polish workers, 300,000 of whom were already on strike as a preliminary protest, with what they believed to be the unjust decision of the Allies in regard to the partition of the province. The workmen broke out into an armed revolt and seized most of the industrial area.]

By the 6th May Upper Silesia within the Korfanty line was effectively occupied by the insurgents. Ten Allied authorities nominally controlled the town, but were only there on sufferance. Work was absolutely at a standstill and all communications were interrupted. Kattowitz was completely surrounded by insurgents, and food supplies were cut off. The French were pursuing a policy of non-resistance but the Italians, who fought, suffered heavy losses. The Germans were mainly quiet. The insurgents, about 125,000 strong, were well organized, armed and controlled, and their discipline was fairly good.

[M. Korfanty, the dismissed Polish plebiscite propagandist, was the leading spirit in the insurrection which it is now clear was caused partly by the disappointment and apprehension set up in Polish circles by the result of the Upper Silesian plebiscite and partly by the delay of the Allies over the fixing of the new frontiers. Korfanty, emulating D'Annunzio at Fiume, evidently hoped to present them with a *fait accompli* even at the risk of coming into armed conflict with the Allied detachments which, vastly outnumbered at this date, were practically powerless to arrest the progress of Korfanty and the insurgents, backed by the large and organized forces brought over from Poland. The commander of the insurgent forces, Doliwa, worked under a pseudonym, covering the identity of a well known Polish gentleman, said in Berlin to be Count Mathias Mielcynski, an ex-reserve officer in the Prussian Cavalry—the Breslau Light Hussars—who fought in the War on the German side and won the Iron Cross.]

On 6th May Gross Strehlitz fell to the insurgents, as the defending Italians and a French artillery battery had to give way. By this date railway communication had been cut at all important points. Attempts to re-establish railway and telephone communication at Gleiwitz under protection of French troops on 8th May failed, as the insurgents at Oppeln opened fire, and in the fighting which ensued the French had to retire.

On 9th May Kattowitz was still cut off and Beuthen, Tarnowitz, Gleiwitz, Königshütte and Hindenburg were surrounded by masses of Polish insurgents extending to the Oder as far as Kandrzin where, since the 8th, the railway station was being fought for. The defence of Kandrzin consisted of German Upper Silesian Police commanded by a British Captain Craster and railwaymen armed by the authorities in Oppeln.

On 10th May very large forces of Poles and Germans were concentrated in the sectors of Rosenberg and Kosel, and the neighbourhood of the latter was the scene of heavy fighting, the Poles employing artillery and an armoured train, while the Germans were also reported to have used artillery. The same day Kandrzin, the most important railway junction in the area, was finally captured after two days' hard fighting by the insurgents—the Poles had about 100 casualties, the Germans not quite so many.

On 12th May fighting was practically suspended along the whole front in consequence of the series of armistices arranged by the Inter-Allied officers between the local groups of combatants.

[The apparent sympathy of the French with the Polish insurgents rendered the task of the Inter-Allied commission very difficult. The Prime Minister, speaking in the House of Commons on 14th May on the Upper Silesian "impasse," said that either the Allies had to keep order in Silesia and defend the Treaty of Versailles, or if they would not they must let Germany do it for them. This view met with strong opposition in France and much interchange of notes between the French and British Governments resulted.]

On 21st May a German invasion of the Plebiscite territory by volunteer organizations began in force and a new German front was established; these German "Free Corps" consisted of cavalry, artillery and infantry and were plentifully supplied with machine guns. The German objectives were the Oder bridges to the south of Oslau and Krenzenort which were successfully seized on 22nd May.

On 24th May France, acting alone, delivered an ultimatum to Germany—giving her twenty-four hours in which to answer the French request for the closing of the Upper Silesian boundary against German irregular troops seeking to advance against the Poles. The German offensive was not continued beyond the five mile advance of the 21st May, but it appeared that it would be resumed if the Allies did not act promptly to restore the situation.

*Despatch of British Troops.*—On the night of 27th May the following four battalions left Cologne for service in Upper Silesia—2nd Black Watch, 3rd Middlesex Regiment, 1st Durham Light Infantry, 1st Royal Irish Regiment, while in addition the 2nd Connaught Rangers and 2nd Leinster Regiment were under orders to proceed from England.

On 2nd June it was reported from Oppeln (Upper Silesia) that a German attack in force, preceded by bombardment by artillery and mine-throwers, was made on the villages of Kalinowitz, Kalinow, and Rosniontaw which were captured. The Poles withdrew to the outskirts of Gross-Strehlitz, where there was a French garrison.

On that date the 2nd Black Watch had moved towards the Polish front, halting eight and a half miles south-east of Stubendorf en route to Gross-Strehlitz, while the 1st Royal Irish Regiment had reached Oppeln.

By the 3rd June General Lerond's plan for creating a neutral zone between the German and Polish forces was in operation, the 1st Durham Light Infantry taking over the positions of the Leschnitz sector, till then occupied by the German Selbstschutz. A feature of this plan was the use of British troops to coerce the Germans and French troops to coerce the Poles.

The Poles, however, continued their aggressive tactics. On the 2nd and 3rd June they attacked the Germans near Rosseland.

On 3rd June they occupied the town of Pless and hoisted the Polish flag—the French troops in garrison remaining in barracks. On the same day Tarnowitz was surrounded by insurgents who seized the railway station.

In consequence of the activity of the insurgents, the German General Höfer made an attack in force, on 4th June, to liberate Gleiwitz, pushing forward from Leschnitz and driving the Poles back on the Klodnitz. The Poles retired across the river blowing up the bridges, but were outflanked by the Germans who crossed the Oder south of Kosel.

Despite an ultimatum to General Höfer by the Allied Commission to stop his advance, fighting was resumed on the Klodnitz on 5th June, and German patrols pushed forward to the neighbourhood of Gleiwitz. In the meantime a screen of French troops had been thrown in their path and British patrols were hurried up in motor lorries to support the French. These movements induced the German General to desist, but only on the condition that the Poles did so also. At this date practically all the British troops in Upper Silesia had been put into the line and a large concentration of Allied troops had been made in the Gleiwitz region, but they were not in sufficient force to maintain a neutral zone.

On 9th June armed Germans, south of Gleiwitz, were ordered, by the Allied Commission, to withdraw west of the Oder, and the Poles in the same sector to the boundary between the Rybnik and Ratibor districts. These movements were to be followed by successive withdrawals of Poles and Germans in opposite directions until the whole of the plebiscite area should be clear of armed civilians.

Following the occupation of Rosenberg by the 2nd Leinster Regiment the 2nd Black Watch, on the 9th, took possession of the railway junction of Vossowska, pressing back the Poles farther to the south. At this time the British had occupied Krenzberg, Rosenberg, and Lübnitz in the German part of the province, and Tost and Tarnowitz in the zone desired to be kept neutral, and were advancing on Beuthen, Kattowitz, and Königshütte. Two battalions of Italian troops were moving in support.

Up to the 13th June the evacuation scheme hung fire, however, and on the 15th the Inter-Allied Commission suspended its operations for the re-establishment of order owing to the refusal of the German "Self-Defence" Corps to withdraw from the districts they held along the Oder.

On 21st June the general situation was quiet, but the General in command of the German irregulars laid down, as a condition of their disbandment, that it should be carried out in proportion as the Polish insurgents were cleared out of the industrial districts, and proposed to the Allied Commission that the Poles should be withdrawn to a line from Lablinitz through Tarnowitz, Beuthen and Königshütte to east of Rybrick.

#### HUNGARY.

*Strength of Arms.*—April. The proposed National Army will consist of seven mixed brigades, each brigade containing two regiments of three battalions and one independent battalion, one squadron of cavalry, one section of artillery with three batteries, and auxiliary services.

#### MESOPOTAMIA.

*Air Attacks on Hostile Tribes.*—On 9th May aerial attacks were delivered in the Sug-esh-Shuyukh area in consequence of the recalcitrancy of the Sheikhs who refused to meet the Political Officers as ordered. These attacks brought no change in their attitude—the district on 21st May still remaining unsettled.

On 9th May also the camps of the tribes in the Shatra area (on the Shat-el-Hai, 120 miles north-west of Basra) were attacked by aeroplanes for similar defiance, without effect. In the Mosul area, however, the aeroplane operation against the Surchi Kurds near Batas (sixty-eight miles north-east of Mosul) proved effective—the tribesmen being dispersed.

#### MOROCCO.

During June, the operations of General Aubert against the Bein Warain tribe, in the hill country south-east of Fez, were brought to a successful conclusion, and the French positions between the Sebu and Muluga rivers were connected. General Aubert's force consisted of five squadrons of cavalry, five batteries, and five infantry battalions.

#### PERSIA.

By the 24th May British troops had almost entirely withdrawn from Persia, while the Russians had evacuated the front and reached Enzeli.

#### TURKEY.

*Greek Advance Checked.*—On the 31st March it was reported that the news that Eskişehir had been captured by the Greeks was premature. During the four previous days violent fighting took place on a front extending from north-west to south of the city and the Greek advance was temporarily checked. Apparently the Greeks suffered a reverse owing to their rash advance towards the city from the west. The Turkish defeat at Afium Karahissar and the fall of that town was stated to be due to the mutiny of the 23rd Turkish Division.

On the 2nd April, the Turks were throwing every ounce of strength into the effort to prevent the Greeks from advancing in the level country east of Eskişehir. The fighting appears to have been of the fiercest character.

*Greek Retreat.*—On 6th April it was given out at Smyrna that the Greek advance against Eskişehir had stopped and that the Greek troops had returned in perfect order to their former positions. The communiqué added that the Nationalists having had severe losses as well as the Greeks, were unable to follow up their advantage, and further that in spite of the set-back the spirit of the Greek troops was excellent.

On 11th April it was reported from Constantinople that in Anatolia both sides were busy preparing for a renewal of hostilities and that the Nationalist Turks were hurriedly transferring their Caucasian Army to the Western front, an operation facilitated by the use of Batum as a port of embarkation with the permission of the Bolsheviks.

By the 14th April the Hellenic headquarters had been moved to Ushak, and fighting was confined to the southern sector of the front which had fallen back from Afium Karahissar.

On 12th June King Constantine, and the Greek Princes, arrived at Smyrna en route to the front to take command of the Greek Armies in a fresh campaign against the Kemalist Turks. At this date the Greek Army in Anatolia was from 160,000 to 175,000 strong, while the Kemalists on its front numbered about 60,000; but the latter had an equality in artillery and more ammunition.

On 21st June a collective note from the Allies, proposing mediation in the Græco-Turkish conflict was handed to the Greek Foreign Minister at Smyrna, but the offer was declined on the 24th. However, the Greeks were defeated by the Turks at Adabuzar and were obliged to fall back on İsmid, which was evacuated on the 28th June by the Greeks and immediately occupied by Kemalist regular troops.



## ROYAL AIR FORCE NOTES.

### FRANCE.

(1) A Bill has been drafted, and is now before the Army Committee of the Chamber of Deputies which is concerned with the reorganization of the French Army. The proposed increase of the Army Air Service is remarkable, and draws attention to the importance attached to that Service by the French military authorities.

The effective strength of the Army Air Service personnel is to be increased from 22,600 (the figure budgetted for in this year's estimate) to 32,000. The effective strength of the whole Army as budgetted for is approximately 398,000; this figure is, under the provisions of the Bill, to be increased to 450,000.

It will be seen, therefore, that whereas the strength of the Army Air Service personnel now represents approximately 5.7 per cent. of the total strength of the Army, the new organization will increase this proportion to 7.1 per cent., while 18 per cent. of the total increase of the Army strength will be air service personnel.

As regards establishment of units, the Bill proposes that the existing organization, which consists of 15 regiments comprising 115 squadrons, of which 59 are fighting and bombing and 56 observation, shall be increased to 19 regiments comprising 220 squadrons, of which 140 shall be fighting and bombing and 80 observation squadrons. The only difference in the establishment of units which the Bill reveals is that two air divisions will be formed in the place of the one which exists now, and that these will consist of two brigades of two regiments each instead of three regiments each.

It is also understood that plans have been drawn up to increase the personnel to 300,000 on mobilisation.

The Bill provides that these changes in organization shall come into force on the 1st October, 1923.

(2) It is proposed to form in the French Army Air Service a special ground branch to be known as the Administrative and Technical Corps, Army Air Service. The object of forming this Corps is to relieve flying personnel of all work connected with administration, technical research and inspection. The Corps will be formed from volunteers from the Army Air Service and Artillery who are found by examination to be possessed of adequate administrative or technical qualifications.

(3) The French Army has adopted a scheme for the training of volunteer pilots with the object of offering to them the opportunity to keep in touch with military aviation. Any demobilized pilots who hold the "Brevet Militaire" are eligible to apply for a course of training lasting from 15 to 20 days in one of the air regiments. After passing a medical examination they are posted to the air regiment nearest their domicile, where the course is carried out. The period of the course is recorded as military service, and pilots are eligible for full pay and allowances and all the benefits of serving personnel. It is not known what success this scheme has met with, but at its inception a year ago provision was made to train 400 pilots per annum in this way. As regards the training of unqualified pilots for the Colours, and subsequently for the reserve, the Ministry of War has a scheme whereby a sum of 1,800 francs is paid to certain civil training establishments for each youth of the annual conscript class who is taught to fly. In addition

a payment of 1,000 francs is made to each pupil on joining the school, 250 francs a month for a maximum of eight months, and 1,000 francs on obtaining the "Brevet Militaire." After leaving the school the pupils are drafted to air regiments with the rank of corporal, and are required to serve their term of military service as pilots, and then to spend three years in the reserve.

#### GREECE.

Practically the whole of the Air Force, both military and naval, has been transferred to the Smyrna district. Two squadrons of the Military Air Force are stationed to the south of Brusa, and they have with them some 23 machines, mostly Breguet. The Naval Air Force is stationed at Smyrna and Usbak. It consists of some two squadrons and a park with 20 D.H.9's and four Avro's. The Military Flying School still remains at Salonika, and the Naval Flying School is at Tatoi, near Athens. Practically no flying is taking place in Greece at the present moment, the few remaining personnel being employed in repairing and preparing machines for transport to Asia Minor. The Military Air Force has lately received 40 Breguets and 12 Samson Scouts from the French. These machines were delivered by an Italian ship.

The Greek military authorities have practically no appreciation of the importance of aircraft, and it is understood that very little use is being made of the machines which they now possess. Hitherto practically no attention has been paid to reconnaissance nor to the co-operation of aircraft with artillery.

Arrangements are, however, being made for fitting machines with wireless in order that ranging for the artillery can be carried out. There is a fairly plentiful supply of 20 lbs. bombs. Lewis and Vickers guns are fitted in the machines so as to allow for firing fore and aft.

Some of the French aviation mission still remain with the Military Air Force, but they have not succeeded in bringing any efficiency to that force.

#### LITHUANIA.

General Kroftzewitch, who was formerly in the Russian Imperial Air Force, and subsequently served under General Deniken in South Russia, is now in command of the Lithuanian Air Force, and has already obtained a measure of success, in spite of the fact that there is a very great shortage of money for the Army. The personnel amounts to some 50 officers and 200 mechanics. Two Germans, who served with distinction as officers in the German Air Force during the War, are acting as instructors.

There is nominally an aircraft park, a squadron and a flying school, but in reality all these units are merged into one, which is of the strength of a squadron.

The training is very primitive, no regard being paid to reconnaissance, co-operation with the artillery or fighting.

#### SPAIN.

The Spanish Army Air Service is showing considerable interest in the subject of the development of civil aviation in its relation to military aviation. The opinion is held that Spain will never be able to afford to maintain an autonomous Army Air Service of adequate proportions, and therefore she must establish a powerful civil aerial fleet, which must be afforded every possible assistance both technically and in the matter of training pilots in the military aviation schools.

Suggestions have recently been put forward by the Army Air Service, as the result of which a Cabinet meeting was held on 24th April, at which it was agreed

to appoint a commission to draw up plans for the establishment of "National Air Routes."

The suggestions put forward by the Army Air Service were as follows:—

- (a) A mixed commission, composed of representatives from the Army, Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to be formed.
- (b) The War Office to be responsible for the drawing up of the plans for the organization of one national main route of 5,000 kms., and to be given a vote of credit of 2,000,000 pesetas.
- (c) The main route to be completed within three years.
- (d) The War Office to provide and issue a general aerial map of Spain and maps for particular routes that are established.

The Army Air Service has already established a military aerial service between Pamplona—Soria—Madrid—Cordova—Seville—Larache (Spanish Morocco).

In addition the following services are well on their way to completion, and should soon be working:—

Madrid to San Sebastian (via Burgos and Vittoria).

Madrid to Caceres.

Madrid to Barcelona (via Saragossa).

Madrid to Cartagena.

The lack of military funds naturally limits the development of these services on a large scale, but it is hoped to overcome this difficulty by making the matter a civil one, in which the army will render all possible assistance.

#### UNITED STATES.

##### AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.

Owing to the failure of contractors to complete the work within the time specified, the conversion of the ex-collier "Jupiter" into the aircraft carrier "U.S.S. Langley" has been protracted beyond the date at first estimated for her completion. It had been hoped that she would be completed at the beginning of this year, but now it is not expected that she will be ready for service until the autumn.

## SOME FOREIGN MILITARY PUBLICATIONS.

### *REVUE MILITAIRE GÉNÉRALE.*

No. 3 (March, 1921).

EVOLUTION OF THE PRE-WAR DOCTRINES AND TRAINING MANUALS, AND THE TECHNICAL VALUE OF OUR INFANTRY. (A review from 1875 onwards. To be continued.)

THE GERMAN NAVAL HIGH COMMAND.

THE FRENCH CAVALRY IN THE ORIENT.

No. 4 (April, 1921).

THE ATTACK ON MAUBEUGE BY THE GERMANS. (This makes available in French General von Zwehl's account of the siege.)

UPPER SILESIA CHRONICLE.

No. 5 and 6 (May-June combined).

NAPOLEON'S INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INFANTRY FIRE TACTICS BEFORE AND AFTER THE WAR OF 1914-18.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE. (Extracts from the diary of a cavalry officer, March, 1918.)

EVOLUTION OF FIELD FORTIFICATION DURING THE WAR. (Deals with principles not details.)

THE RAILWAY REGULATING STATION.

SWISS CHRONICLE.

MILITARY CHRONICLE OF ECONOMIC QUESTIONS.

### LES ARCHIVES DE LA GRANDE GUERRE.

No. 19 (February, 1921).

MEMOIRS OF ADMIRAL SIR PERCY SCOTT. (Extracts referring to 1914-15.)

LOSSES OF THE BELLIGERENT NATIONS IN THE COURSE OF THE GREAT WAR. (To be continued. The figures are mainly taken from the resolution presented to the Chambre des Députés by M. Louis Marin.)

TWO YEARS IN LORRAINE WITH THE 222ND INFANTRY REGIMENT.

SUBMARINES AND UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE. (To be continued.)

TWO YEARS OF MILITARY POLITICS IN GREECE. (To be continued.)

No. 20 (March, 1921).

MARÉCHAL FOCH AT DECISIVE MOMENTS. By M. André Tardieu. (From the Doullens Conference to the Peace Treaty.)

BEFORE ST. MIHIEL, 1914. (An account of the many fights on this front. To be continued.)

Other articles continued from previous number.

No. 21 (April, 1921).

HOW THE GERMANS CAMOUFLAGED THE TRUTH. (A notice of Herr Binder's book, the translated title of which is "What we might not say as War Correspondents.")

INTERVENTION OF LORD KITCHENER IN THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE. By Sir John (sic) Arthur. (Extracted from the French translation of Sir George Arthur's Life of Lord Kitchener.)

THE GERMAN ARMY DURING THE WAR. (A summary of General Buat's book.)

Other articles continued from previous numbers.

### WISSEN UND WEHR.

No. 3 (May, 1921).

FRENCH AND ENGLISH LITERATURE OF THE WORLD WAR. By General von Kuhl. (A review mainly of French war books.)

THE FRENCH G.Q.G., 1915-18. (Conclusion. A review of M. de Pierrefeu's book.)

RELIGION AS AN ART.

GERMANY AFTER THE CRASH. (A review of M. Ambrose Got's book. He was attached to the French Military Mission in Berlin.)

NAPOLEON AND THE PRUSSIAN ARMY AFTER THE PEACE OF TILSIT. (A sketch of the changes in the Prussian Army between 1808 and 1812.)

### THE MILITÄR WOCHENBLATT.

Articles of military interest concerning the War, which have appeared between March and June, 1921. For previous articles, see the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL of May, 1921. This list completes volume 105.

No. 32.

A CRITICISM OF THE WORLD-WAR.

A review of a book of this title by a German staff officer (written anonymously, but now known to be a Capt. Ritter, of the German General Staff). The author

accuses the leaders of the German Army of culpable ignorance of the real feelings and conditions of their men, and refusing to face facts. General von Kuhl, Chief of Staff to the First Army, and later to Rupprecht, of Bavaria's Army Group, declares that the accusation is unjustified. He says that headquarters of armies and groups were always accessible to complaints, and continually invited junior commanders to see them. He personally saw the conditions for himself, and will never forget, he says, the impression made on him by the sight of units withdrawn from the Flanders front in 1917. The accusations made in the book are, he continues, only a part of the search for a scapegoat on whom the blame for defeat can be laid. No one who saw the men before the March, 1918, attack can doubt for a moment, he concludes, that their moral was splendid, and that to attempt to belittle it is only to rob the German Army of its glory.

No. 33.

#### ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY.

A short article on the German Flak (or anti-aircraft) artillery. The word Flak is derived from the initials of *Flieger-Abwehr-Kanone*. In August, 1914, there were only 18 Flak guns in the German Army, and the demand became so great and urgent that all available weapons of that nature were used. The result was that at the end of the war there were 25 different kinds of Flak guns in use. The difficulty of training the personnel and arranging the ammunition supply can therefore be imagined. The author, Capt. Seydel, nevertheless, praises the work done. He claims that the Flak guns were able to make enemy aircraft fly at an average height of 4,000 instead of 800 yards, and that they brought down between May and September, 1918, a total of 420 aeroplanes, of which 125 were shot down in September. He also mentions their value as anti-tank guns.

No. 35.

#### A GERMAN VIEW OF FRENCH AND ENGLISH WAR LITERATURE.

General von Kuhl states that all French and English military writers reveal how near Germany often was to a military victory. Among French writers, Buat, Mangin and Pierrefeu get attention, and among the English, Capt. Wright, though described as "highly dramatic," is taken seriously.

No. 39.

#### A FRENCH VIEW OF MARSHAL VON HINDENBURG.

General von Kuhl reviews General Buat's book in an appreciative manner. He, however, does not agree with the author that Ludendorff did everything, and that Hindenburg was merely a figure-head.

No. 40.

#### MARSHAL FOCH AND THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE, 1914.

In this article General von Kuhl merely repeats the denial of a fable long since exploded by the French themselves that the French 42nd Division which was brought from the left to the right flank of Foch's Ninth Army on the 9th September, 1914, prevented a break-through the Allied centre about the St. Gond marshes on that day by the left of the German Second Army. The 42nd Division did not turn up till the evening some hours after the German Second Army had finished the attack, and begun the retreat northwards. As General Dubois, who was commanding the IXth Corps on the right flank of the Ninth Army, points out, the 42nd Division had nothing to do with the German retreat.

No. 41.

#### THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MACEDONIAN FRONT.

General von Scholtz, who commanded the Army Group on the Macedonian front, declares that that front could have been perfectly well held in 1918 if the Bul-



garians had behaved reasonably well. There were plenty of reserves, but they would not fight, and the only part of the front which fought well was that commanded by Basov and Neresov, opposite the British. If troops will not fight, he says, no one can win battles with them. The Bulgarian Army was, however, far too weak morally and materially to make an offensive itself.

No. 42.

#### 1914—NEAR PARIS.

An article by the commander of a company of the 43rd Reserve Infantry Brigade, which was the right flank guard of the German First Army in the advance on Paris in September, 1914. He claims that his was the unit to get farthest south, and that he saw the Eiffel Tower from the village church at Montagny St. Felicité. Among other adventures he was surrounded by French cavalry for 24 hours.

Nos. 43 and 45.

#### GENERAL VON PRITZWITZ AFTER THE BATTLE OF GUMBINNEN.

On the 21st August, 1914, after the battle of Gumbinnen, General von Prittwitz, commanding the German Eighth Army, was dismissed as, according to all previous writers on the subject, he threatened to retire the Eighth Army to behind the Vistula. In this article General von Reitzenstein attempts to clear General von Prittwitz, who has since died, of any such intention. He produces a document found among von Prittwitz's papers, which contains an autograph report to Supreme Command on the evening of the 21st. In this, it expressly states that the General had no idea of retiring on the Vistula, and was already laying his plans for attacking Rennenkampf's army advancing from the south. These plans, General Reitzenstein maintains, enabled Hindenburg, Prittwitz's successor, to win the battle of Tannenberg, for which, however, Prittwitz has never had the least credit. In No. 45 Colonel von Schafer disagrees with Reitzenstein, and says that the report quoted was written after von Prittwitz had talked with Supreme Headquarters, who had expressed their displeasure at his intention to retire.

No. 43.

#### IN GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS.

Review of a book of this name written by the head of the Austro-Hungarian Mission with the German forces. It contains several interesting revelations, and a good account of German Supreme Headquarters in the early months of the war.

Nos. 44 and 46.

#### RAILWAY TRANSPORT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR.

General Baumgarten-Crusius blamed the railway authorities for delay, especially in the transport of the two corps at the end of August from about Namur to the Eastern Front, in his book, "The German Leadership in the Marne Campaign." Major Kretschmann in this article says this was not the case, and stands up for the work on the railways. The duel is continued in No. 46 on the question of the railway system on the Eastern Front, which General Crusius says was bad, and on the reasons for the employment of untrained troops at Ypres, which the General says was due to technical railway difficulties that prevented trained formations being brought in time from other parts of the front. Major Kretschmann denies both these statements.

No. 46.

#### GERMAN ARTILLERY IN THE BREAK-THROUGH BATTLES.

A review praising the book of this title by Colonel Bruchmüller, nicknamed Durchbruchmüller, who was the chief authority in organizing the artillery for the principal battles. He says that during the last 18 months practically all the counter-battery work was done with field-guns.

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
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








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